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The purpose o f this thesis is to demonstrate that metaphysics is a necessary discipline -
necessary in the sense that all areas o f philosophy, all areas o f science, and in fact any 
type o f rational activity at all would be impossible without a metaphysical background 
or metaphysical presuppositions. Because o f the extremely strong nature o f this claim, it 
is not possible to put forward a very simple argument, although I w i l l attempt to 
construct one. A crucial issue here is what metaphysics in fact is - the nature o f 
metaphysics. The conception o f metaphysics which I support could be called 
Aristotelian, as opposed to Kantian: metaphysics is the first philosophy and the basis o f 
all other philosophical and scientific inquiry. I w i l l argue that this is indeed the most 
plausible conception o f metaphysics. 
The thesis consists o f a brief historical introduction o f certain important views 
concerning the nature o f metaphysics, namely Aristotle's, Kant's, Carnap's and Quine's, 
and o f a longer survey o f the status o f metaphysics in the context o f contemporary 
analytic metaphysics. I make some critical observations o f recent accounts by people 
like Hilary Putnam, Michael Dummett, Frank Jackson and Eli Hirsch before launching 
into a thorough analysis o f the relationship between metaphysics and other 
philosophical and scientific disciplines. 
The central argument o f the thesis is that our a priori capabilities, which I claim to be 
grounded in metaphysical modality and ultimately in essences, are necessary for rational 
inquiry. Detailed accounts o f a priori knowledge and modality w i l l be offered in support 
of this claim. In fact, my accounts o f the a priori and modality are perhaps the most 
important contributions o f the thesis, as given this basis, the 'necessary' role o f 
metaphysics in other disciplines should be quite obvious. I also pursue topics like the 
metaphysical status o f logic and the law of non-contradiction as well as truthmaking, the 
substance o f metaphysical debates, and the methodology of metaphysics. There is, 
however, a distinct theme which connects the broad range o f topics that I discuss: they 
are all analysed f rom a metaphilosophical point o f view. Indeed, it could be said that 
this is a metametaphysical survey o f the status o f metaphysics. The upshot is an original 
account o f the status o f metaphysics in contemporary analytic philosophy - the 
conclusion that metaphysics is the core o f all our rational activities, f rom natural science 
to logic, semantics and truth. 
Preface 
Preface 
This thesis is the culmination of a problem that has puzzled me since I was a little boy. I 
can finally formulate that problem accurately: what is the fundamental structure of 
reality and how can we reach knowledge about it? To answer this question - to even 
approach it - we need to turn to a discipline called metaphysics. 
My sympathies have always been with an Aristotelian, realist conception of 
metaphysics. During my philosophical career I have repeatedly tried to convince others 
that this is how we should understand metaphysics and this thesis is my latest effort to 
establish that. My Master's thesis, Grounding Metaphysics: Metaphysical Necessity and 
Essentialism (2005), which I did at the University of Helsinki, focused on the technical 
details of grounding a realist metaphysical system. In this thesis I have developed on 
many of the same themes, but I have taken a more metaphilosophical approach here. 
Some of the results in this thesis have already been shared with the philosophical 
community. I have presented drafts of many of the chapters at international conferences 
around Europe, including Italy, Greece, Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Spain and 
the UK. I am grateful to the organisers and audiences of these conferences. A paper 
presented at Metafisica 2006 in Rome in July 2006, 'Metaphysics in Natural Science', 
which is based on the f i f th chapter of the second part of the thesis, is forthcoming in the 
conference proceedings. Another paper, based on the first chapter of first part, 'The 
Aristotelian Method and Aristotelian Metaphysics', is forthcoming in the proceedings of 
the 2 n d International Conference on Philosophy which was held in Athens in June 2007. 
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Preface 
A paper entitled 'The Metaphysical Status of Logic', which is based on the 11 t h chapter 
of Part I I , is forthcoming in the proceedings of LOGICA 2007, held at Hejnice 
Monastery, Czech Republic, also in June 2007. Finally, a paper based on chapter eight 
of Part I I , 'A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis' is 
forthcoming in the journal Metaphysica (Vol. 9, No. 2, Apri l 2008 ). 
My greatest debt is to my supervisor E. J. Lowe. His The Possibility of Metaphysics 
(1998) gave me hope of defending metaphysics proper, and was in fact the main 
motivation behind my Master's thesis. I have been fortunate enough to work with the 
best possible person in regard to the project, and I am indeed very grateful. I would also 
like to express my gratitude to my friends and family in Finland who have supported me 
in many ways. The graduate community at the philosophy department in Durham 
deserves to be mentioned as well, I have had many insightful discussions with Lloyd 
Taylor, Paul Winstanley and Donnchadh O'Conaill, among others. 
During my time in Durham, I have received financial support from a number of sources. 
In 2005 1 received an award from Helsingin Sanomain 100-year Foundation to fund the 
first year of my research. In 2007 I was accepted for a Teaching Fellowship scheme run 
by the Centre for Science Outreach of Durham University and funded by the County 
Durham Economic Partnership and the Ogden Trust. Finally, in 2007 I was awarded a 
prize by the Finnish Cultural Foundation for the completion o f the thesis. I am most 
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The primary purpose of this thesis is to defend a certain conception of metaphysics. 
According to this conception, metaphysics is a necessary discipline: whenever we 
engage in philosophy, science, or any rational activity whatsoever, there wi l l be some 
metaphysics involved. In fact, metaphysics is a necessary precondition for all rational 
activities. Because of the extremely strong nature of this claim, it is not possible to put 
forward a very simple argument. The first question that has to be dealt with is what 
metaphysics is. Thus, not only wi l l we be dealing with metaphysics, but also 
metaphilosophy, or, to use an emerging term, metametaphysics. Having said this, I will 
put forward a structured argument for the necessity o f metaphysics. It wi l l have to be 
done in a piecemeal fashion, as there are a number of difficult problems to settle along 
the way. The key issues in this regard are the nature of a priori knowledge and its role in 
metaphysics, modality and what it is grounded in, and the relationship between 
metaphysics and natural science. The upshot of the thesis is a defence of a realist 
conception of metaphysics, its role in philosophy, and its importance for natural science; 
we wil l see that there is a fundamental continuity between metaphysics and science. 
Firstly, I should outline the main argument for the necessity of metaphysics. The initial 
hypothesis is that we need some kind of a metaphysical framework to be able to pursue 
other topics, even supposedly 'purely' empirical ones, such as natural science. The first 
part of the argument wi l l motivate this claim by an examination of scientific 
methodology. It wi l l be argued that in a very clear sense, natural science relies on a 
priori reasoning. Observations of scientific thought experiments wi l l be used to 
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corroborate this claim. More importantly, however, it must be clarified what is meant by 
'a priori' here, for my understanding of it is certainly not the traditional one. My 
contention is that the a priori deals with possibilities, namely, a priori reasoning is a 
delimitation of the possible. Thus, an account of modality is also needed. I wi l l offer a 
defence of genuine or metaphysical modality and suggest that it is grounded in the 
identity and existence conditions of different kinds of entities, i.e. essences. This links 
the argument together: once it is established that empirical information is not 'purely 
empirical', but has some a priori elements, we have a direct argument from natural 
science to metaphysics. The task is considerably easier with other philosophical 
disciplines, as most philosophers acknowledge the use o f a priori reasoning to start with. 
The thesis is divided into two main parts, the first part is concerned with some of the 
major views that have influenced the debate over metaphysics, the second wil l deal, 
among other things, with the topics that I mentioned above - it is an analysis of the 
nature of metaphysics. We wil l have to go as far back as Aristotle to launch the 
discussion: in the first chapter of the first part 1 wi l l discuss the Aristotelian method of 
philosophising, where metaphysics plays an important part. In fact, it could be said that 
the understanding of metaphysics that I wi l l be defending is Aristotelian in spirit. 
However, when 1 talk about Aristotelian metaphysics, it is not so much his ontological 
system that I am referring to, but rather the method of philosophising and the role of 
metaphysics in this method. Here we also have perhaps the best account of what 
metaphysics is: the first philosophy, study of the most fundamental nature of reality. 
Unfortunately, this rigorous and above all realist understanding of metaphysics was later 
dismissed. We need to see what can be salvaged. 
5 
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The new, revised understanding of metaphysics was of course due to Kant, whose take 
on the possibility of metaphysics wil l be examined in the second chapter. Kant was 
more of a sceptic when compared to the rigorous realism of Aristotle, but i f nothing 
else, he genuinely pondered the question of how metaphysics could be possible 'as a 
science', that is, how could it reach the certainty of science. He quickly dismissed the 
dogmatic type of metaphysics put forward by Leibniz and Wolff and concluded that 
knowledge of the world an sich is unreachable. I wi l l argue that what drives Kant to this 
sceptical conclusion is a too strict notion of the a priori. As we know, he thought that a 
priori truths are necessary truths, and this contention later seemed to undermine his 
account, as some of his examples of these supposed necessary truths turned out not be 
even actual. But we should not dwell on this, Kant's project has a lot to offer to realists 
as well, i f we make some minor amendments. With a revised conception of the a priori, 
Kant would have been a step closer to Aristotelian metaphysics himself. After all, he 
also derived his categories of understanding from Aristotle's categories. 
The same cannot be said about Rudolf Carnap, whose anti-metaphysical project wi l l be 
the subject of the third chapter. Carnap's project is a good representative of the ideas of 
the philosophers associated with the Vienna Circle. In general, logical positivism is 
perhaps the widest and certainly most systematic attack against realist metaphysics. The 
effects of this 'linguistic turn' are quite apparent in contemporary philosophy as well, 
and in the course of this thesis we wil l return to the same issues over and over again. 
The initial target of the attack, however, was the sort of dogmatic metaphysics that 
already Kant was suspicious about. Carnap specifically mentions Spinoza, Schelling and 
Hegel; the latter two were a part o f the counter-reaction towards Kant. The crucial issue, 
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again, wi l l be a priori knowledge. Carnap's project, which is faithful to verificationism, 
is obviously hostile towards anything that is not empirically verifiable. For good 
reasons, such a radical approach is not very popular now, but it wi l l serve us well to 
examine Carnap's position in detail, as the same ideas have been later repeated in subtler 
forms. 
It should come as no surprise that the next, fourth chapter wi l l deal with Quine. Our 
discussion of Quine wi l l not be exhaustive by any means, but there are some issues that 
have to be addressed. First of all, Quine has quite a bit to say about Carnap's project and 
there are some remarks that might be of use to us. Secondly, Quine is sometimes said to 
have made metaphysics possible again and we would do well to see to what extent this 
is true. Finally, the famous papers that Quine wrote about ontological commitments and 
ontological relativity are unavoidable in this connection, and of course very hostile 
towards the Aristotelian conception of metaphysics. Again, it is impossible to even start 
to cover all the related issues, but I wi l l suggest one line of thought that helps us to turn 
Quine's own tools against him: his blind trust in science is the weak spot. 
There are a number of routes that our discussion could take after Quine. Limitations of 
space force me to skip the majority of them, so in chapter five I merely summarise 
where Quine has left us and what we should focus on when moving on to the second 
part of the thesis. 1 wi l l start the second part of the thesis by discussing the views of a 
number of contemporary figures in metaphysics. My choices in this regard could 
certainly be questioned, but they are in line with what follows in the later chapters, as all 




The first contemporary figure that wi l l be discussed is Hilary Putnam. His critique of 
metaphysical realism is no doubt among the most influential ones. As with Quine, so 
with Putnam: it is impossible to cover his extensive production fully. We wi l l return to 
Putnam in many of the chapters that follow, but the first one is concerned with a very 
specific objection: metaphysical realism presupposes a 'ready-made' world. This 
objection is largely independent of Putnam's relativistic framework and because of this 
it deserves to be discussed separately. Putnam's discussion in this regard is based on a 
critical examination o f metaphysical realism's take on causation and essentialism. 
Given the enormous influence that Putnam's own project, pragmatic or internal realism, 
has had, it would not be wise to ignore it altogether. The main theme of chapter two is to 
examine what kind of a threat Putnam's own project poses to metaphysical realism. We 
wil l also look at the views of Michael Dummett and Nelson Goodman, which are on the 
same lines. The principal argument derived from this tradition is that metaphysical 
realism is unable to offer a plausible theory of truth, as direct correspondence is 
unsatisfactory. However, at this point it must be noted that even though the Putnam-
Dummett-Goodman understanding of metaphysical realism might be closer to the 
Aristotelian conception than Carnap's was, it is still not clear that their critique succeeds 
to grasp, not to mention challenge, the core of Aristotelian metaphysics as I have 
defined it. Thus, chapter two wi l l also be an enquiry into what metaphysical realism in 




A different, but equally serious threat to metaphysical realism has been put forward by 
Frank Jackson. This critique is based on the idea that metaphysics, and indeed 
philosophy, is merely conceptual analysis. In chapter three we w i l l examine this view as 
it has been defended by Jackson. Some of the themes of the discussion are derived from 
Putnam, as his Twin Earth scenario is Jackson's main example. The issue reduces to a 
discussion about in what sense conceptual analysis gives us a priori results and what 
they amount to. A crucial part of the argument relies on two-dimensional modal 
semantics, a framework used also by David Chalmers and others. There are some very 
subtle issues here, which we wil l discuss in detail and return to later in chapter nine. In 
chapter three I wi l l argue that Jackson's project fails, because he gives us no good 
reasons to adopt the understanding of modality that his framework requires, i.e. that all 
modality is conceptual modality, and is also unable to give a satisfactory account of a 
posteriori necessities. 
In chapter four 1 wi l l consider an example of the sort of metaphysics that we would get 
i f Jackson's arguments were correct: a watered-down metaphysics. One of the most 
eloquent proponents of this sort of metaphysics is Eli Hirsch. It is plausible that the 
tendency towards watered-down metaphysics - metaphysical problems understood as 
linguistic problems - is rooted in the 'linguistic turn'. Here we can see that Carnap's 
tradition is alive and kicking. These modern challengers are more slippery though: most 
of the time they acknowledge the logical conclusion of their views, that is, relativism. 
Then again, Hirsch claims that he can nevertheless offer us answers to our metaphysical 
problems. However, as we wi l l see, it is very hard to provide any intelligible answers to 
metaphysical problems from these grounds. For instance, Hirsch's account of 
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persistence and identity falls short because of some very rudimentary category-
mistakes. We w i l l return to Hirsch and the idea that metaphysical debates might be 
linguistic in chapter thirteen. 
The next three chapters wi l l deal with the relationship between metaphysics and natural 
science. In the f i f th chapter I wi l l show, with the help of several examples from natural 
sciences (mainly physics), that there is a distinct element in the formulation of scientific 
hypotheses and it appears that we have good reasons to think that it is an a priori 
element. The examples range from Democritus and Galileo to Newton and Einstein, the 
crux wi l l be quantum mechanics. Already here 1 wi l l suggest that the sharp distinction 
between a priori and a posteriori knowledge - the former usually associated with 
metaphysics and the latter with natural sciences - is groundless. 
The sixth chapter wi l l directly continue on the theme of the f i f t h . We w i l l take a closer 
look at scientific and philosophical thought experiments and examine their relationship. 
There is some recent literature that has to be acknowledged here, arguments for and 
against my suggestion wi l l be considered. I wi l l further motivate the connection 
between thought experiments, theory-forming in general and a priori reasoning by 
clarifying the methodology behind this connection. In addition, it needs to be settled 
when thought experiments are good and when they are bad, as someone who is 
suspicious about my interpretation might claim that, for instance, philosophical thought 
experiments are always bad ones. I wi l l point out some bad thought experiments, but it 
wi l l be argued that there is no distinction between philosophical and scientific thought 
experiments, rather, they are all philosophical. Finally, the connection between the a 
10 
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priori grounds of thought experiments and metaphysical modality wi l l be introduced. 
To conclude the discussion about the relationship between metaphysics and science, 1 
wil l consider how the connection that was introduced in the two previous chapters 
affects metaphysics. So, in the seventh chapter it wi l l be examined what kind of 
influence science has, or should have, towards metaphysics. 1 w i l l suggest a distinction 
between a general and a specialised effect: the general a posteriori framework of science 
obviously affects metaphysics in that metaphysical theories have to be consistent with 
established scientific results. Additionally, there are more specialised cases of 
interaction, perhaps the most apparent cases are between neuroscience and the 
philosophy of mind. Furthermore, a number of interesting examples can be derived 
from quantum mechanics and we wil l consider how, why and when the results of 
quantum mechanics might require us to amend our metaphysical framework. 
As 1 have indicated above, 1 think that there is a great ambiguity about what a priori 
reasoning exactly is, and perhaps an even greater one about what is the relationship 
between a priori knowledge and metaphysics. In the eighth chapter I try to clarify these 
issues and to show that the traditional conception of the a priori as put forward by the 
early rationalists is untenable. It wi l l be argued that a plausible understanding of a priori 
and a posteriori knowledge has to acknowledge that they are in a constant bootstrapping 
relationship. It is also crucial that we distinguish between a priori propositions that hold 
in the actual world and merely possible, non-actual a priori propositions, as we wi l l see 
when considering cases like Euclidean geometry. Furthermore, contrary to what Kripke 
seems to suggest, a priori knowledge is intimately connected with metaphysical 
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modality, indeed, grounded in it. The task of a priori reasoning, according to this 
account, is to delimit the space of metaphysically possible worlds in order for us to be 
able to determine what is actual. It wil l also be shown that the modality that a priori 
reasoning is concerned with has to be genuine or metaphysical modality. The upshot of 
these results is that a priori reasoning is concerned with metaphysical possibility; its 
task is to delimit the space of metaphysically possible worlds. Consequently, we cannot 
reach knowledge about what is actual before we know what is possible. However, our a 
priori capabilities are integrated with established a posteriori results and this underlines 
the importance of dealing with these forms of knowledge in parallel. 
The next, ninth chapter wi l l examine the nature of modality. The main focus wi l l be on 
the debate over metaphysical modality and conceptual/epistemological modality. We 
wil l take a look at some recent accounts about these matters, such as Frank Jackson's 
and Kit Fine's views on modality. There appear to be three possible routes that we can 
take: 1) we can argue that the distinction between metaphysical and conceptual modality 
holds, at least to some degree, and that they are both 'genuine' types of modality, 2) we 
can hold that the distinction fails and that modality is grounded on concepts or 
something similar (cf. Jackson), or 3) we can try to show that metaphysical modality is 
the only genuine type of modality and conceptual modality is reducible to it ( i f indeed it 
is modality in the proper sense at all). I wi l l defend the third option. The obvious 
question that follows is: what grounds metaphysical modality? It wi l l be argued that Kit 
Fine's account, i.e. that metaphysical modality is grounded in essences, is the most 
promising approach. Finally, I wi l l examine how an essentialist view on modality can be 
coherently structured. It wi l l be useful to approach the issue via some classic examples 
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of metaphysical necessities, such as 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. Even though Kripke 
pointed out something important about examples like these, namely that they are a 
posteriori necessities, there is quite a bit more at issue here. It needs to be emphasized 
that there is an a priori part in a posteriori necessities, but this is not all - the crucial 
issue is that this a priori part is not reducible to concepts. In fact, as I wi l l argue, the a 
priori part in a posteriori necessities is based on essences. Thus, here we have our route 
from a priori reasoning to essences, which is exactly what was needed to uphold the 
argument for the necessity of metaphysics. 
In the next chapter we wil l return to the issue o f truth, which was briefly discussed in 
the second chapter. The Putnam-Dummett-Goodman line of criticism against 
metaphysical realism is largely based on undermining the correspondence theory of 
truth. A potential response to this criticism is provided by the theory of truthmaking. In 
chapter ten I wi l l examine the plausibility of the truthmaker principle. My focus wil l be 
on how it could be combined with a realist metaphysics so that the problems familiar 
from recent literature can be avoided. The central issue here is whether truthmaking is 
compatible with radically different anti-realist approaches, such as pragmatism and 
idealism. Judging from the recent discussion it indeed appears to be so, but the question 
is: does this pose a problem for combining realism and truthmaking? 1 wi l l argue that 
there is little threat towards metaphysical realism from the debate over truth. I f it is 
agreed that the truthmaker principle is plausible and compatible with metaphysical 
realism, then it seems that its potential compatibility with anti-realist ontologies in 
addition causes no problems. The upshot of this is that truthmaking offers us an efficient 
way to counter the Putnam-Dummett-Goodman line of anti-realism, as it is largely 
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based on the criticism of direct correspondence and metaphysical realism's inability to 
put forward a plausible theory of truth. But i f the truthmaker principle is a plausible 
theory, as I wi l l argue, then we have a very straightforward way to deal with this 
objection. 
In chapter eleven 1 wi l l address a worry which has recently gained more and more 
ground: this is the worry over our core logical principles, especially the law of non-
contradiction. The idea that there are true contradictions in the world, which has become 
popular mainly due to Graham Priest's work, relies on familiar paradoxes such as the 
Liar, but also on paradoxes concerning motion, and even on quantum mechanics. I wi l l 
argue that none of these are sufficient to challenge the law of non-contradiction. After 
arguing that our core logical principles are relatively safe, 1 wi l l pursue a topic that has 
been very much neglected: the relationship between logic and metaphysics. My 
hypothesis is that, in most cases, metaphysics is prior to logic. The view that I wi l l put 
forward suggests that in a perfectly clear sense, there is a One True logic. However, this 
does not mean that there could not be several compatible representations of it, nor that 
we could ever reproduce it with ful l accuracy. The basic idea here is that logical 
principles are approximations of the governing features of reality, inasmuch as they 
attempt to say anything about reality at all. This is the crucial point: many logical 
systems are closed mathematical systems that do not necessarily have any bearing on 
the world, such as paraconsistent logics. This is fine, but we must be wary of any 
attempts to derive ontological conclusions from these systems. For the purposes of 
metaphysics, our logic must reflect reality as accurately as possible. 
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A very common view about logic is that it is grounded in language or grammar. But 
language does not appear to be very fundamental, indeed, we can ask: what grounds 
language? In chapter eleven I argue that logic is grounded in mind-independent reality 
rather than language, and in chapter twelve I wi l l suggest that so is language. In fact, the 
common features o f logic and language are plausibly due to their similar origin. A 
detailed study of language belongs to the department of linguistics, and it is quite likely 
that many features o f language are not easily reducible to the common features of 
reality, as language is constantly under both artificial and natural development. 
Nevertheless, we can clearly see that especially the semantics of natural kind terms 
reflect, or should reflect, the features of the reality, that is, the general essences of 
different kinds of entities. The main purpose of chapter twelve is to defend this claim by 
looking at familiar examples about the semantics of natural kinds, mostly due to 
Putnam. 
There is another language-related worry that must be addressed, for it is sometimes 
suggested that at least some metaphysical debates are merely linguistic or non-
substantial. Chapter thirteen wi l l focus on this issue. In this case, I wi l l take the middle 
way, as it seems to me that some debates are really non-substantial, although the 
majority are over genuine issues. The problem that we are faced with here is how to 
determine whether a debate is substantial or not. I wi l l examine some well-known 
debates which wil l serve as examples of what kind of criteria we might have to settle 
this problem. There are three sorts of cases. Firstly, a debate can be underdetermined 
and thus compatible with several different accounts. In this case it is obvious what we 
must do: the initial formulation of the problem has to be amended. Secondly, we might 
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have a debate that is sufficiently formulated, but we lack crucial empirical information 
to be able to settle whether there is a genuine issue at hand. Furthermore, even in cases 
where there is a substantial metaphysical question at issue, it is possible that the 
proponents of different views argue over non-substantial features of it. Thirdly, the 
debate can of course be genuinely substantial and well formulated. My examples cover 
all of these cases. I wi l l conclude that it is hard to give general criteria which would help 
us to determine whether a debate is substantial or not, as the conditions depend on the 
details of the issue. However, a common methodology would provide us a rigorous way 
to analyse each case individually. Thus, we should start by ensuring that we do have 
such a methodology and that there are no conflicting ancillary premises. The upshot of 
this chapter is the outline of a methodological tool, truthmaker latching, which helps us 
to determine when metaphysical debates are substantial. 
In chapter fourteen 1 wi l l discuss the requirements for a feasible methodology of 
metaphysics. My aim is two-fold: to point out the need to discuss methodological issues 
in metaphysics as well as the way this should be done and to make some suggestions as 
to what would be the correct methodology for metaphysics. It wi l l be argued that this is 
indeed a worthwhile topic and that we can draw some basic guidelines. However, any 
exhaustive attempts to map the methodology of metaphysics are bound to introduce 
ontological commitments and it is important to recognise their role. I wi l l point out five 
issues, which, as wil l be argued, must be addressed i f a rigorous methodology is to be 
established. These concern the most basic laws of thought and rational inquiry, the 
target of metaphysical inquiry, the method of this inquiry, the degree of certainty that 
can be reached with this method and the modal status of any results that might be 
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reached. 1 wi l l examine how these issues are related to the debate over realism, and 
briefly consider two recent contributions to the discussion, due to Kit Fine and Ted 
Sider. 
Finally, in chapter fifteen I wi l l assemble the main argument of the thesis. It wi l l once 
again be shown how the topics that we have discussed are related and what kind of 
ramifications they have. The most important one o f these is of course that metaphysics 
is a necessary discipline which precedes all rational activities. Given my discussion 
about the a priori and modality, among other things, I wi l l be in the position to provide a 
rigorous argument for the necessity of metaphysics and wi l l conclude the chapter with a 
detailed analysis of its steps. 
17 
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1. The Aristotelian Method and Aristotelian Metaphysics 
The conception of metaphysics that I wi l l defend in this thesis is what could be called 
'Aristotelian', as opposed to 'Kantian'. It is my purpose in this chapter to clarify what it 
means when I say that I defend Aristotelian metaphysics. Also, many of the issues that 
wil l be discussed later can be traced back to Aristotle's metaphysics and it is thus worth-
while to examine what Aristotelian metaphysics amounts to and what is its relationship 
with contemporary metaphysics. The first thing that should be noted is that we are not 
so much dealing with the details of Aristotle's metaphysical theory - although these as 
well are relevant at times - but rather with the method that Aristotle used to pursue 
metaphysical topics. The most important aspect of the Aristotelian method is that meta-
physics lies at its heart, i.e. the metaphysical considerations that Aristotle makes affect 
all other aspects of his philosophy. The idea that metaphysics is necessary for all other 
philosophical activities is indeed the key point in my conception of metaphysics as well. 
The upshot of Aristotelian metaphysics is that metaphysics is the first philosophy, the 
starting point for all our philosophical and scientific projects. In what follows we wil l 
see how the idea emerges in Aristotle's work. His key works in this regard are Categor-
ies, De Interpretatione, Physics and Metaphysics. 
The way Aristotle approaches his topics is evidently very closely tied to the basic fea-
tures of his metaphysics. This can be seen for example in the very beginning of his 
Physics (1984a: 184a 10-184b 14), where Aristotle notes that the best way to reach in-
formation about the 'science of nature' is to advance from universals to particulars, be-
cause universals are easier for us to grasp with the help of our senses.' Universals and 
I For discussion about Aristotle's method in Physics see Bolton (1991). 
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particulars he introduces in De Interpretatione (1963: I7a38). Whether or not Aristotle 
is right about the role of universals and particulars in our inquiries about the reality, it is 
clear that his account is based on prior considerations about the governing features of 
reality, namely the contention that our objects of inquiry include both particulars and 
universals. Many of these prior considerations are laid out in Categories (Aristotle 
1963), which is the precursor of category-theory in modern ontology, discussing notions 
like 'substance' (2al3f), 'quantity' (4b20f) and 'relation' (6a37f). Notions like these are 
unavoidable in any scientific or philosophical activities2 and it should be quite uncon-
tentious that philosophers ought to give some kind of an account of them. The manner 
by which Aristotle handles them is, however, nothing like how Kant does. However, 
Kant's understanding of the ontological status of these kinds of notions, or categories, 
became the predominant one. As I wil l argue in more detail in the next chapter, Kant's 
conception of these notions as a part of us rather than as a part of reality continues to 
burden contemporary metaphysics. The problem is that when his route is taken, we are 
conceding the idea of an unbreakable barrier between us and reality - an idea which ef-
fectively leads to relativism. So, what we are faced with now is to consider how the Ar-
istotelian method might be applied to the modern debate and whether the kind of real-
ism that we see in Aristotle is able to cope with the anti-realist tendencies in metaphys-
ics which emerged after Kant. 
Aristotle starts De Interpretatione with an observation that might be of interest to us. In 
the following passage he seems to put forward a version of direct correspondence: 
[S]poken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken 
2 In fact, concepts like these are usually presupposed, at least in scientific contexts. 
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sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But 
what these are in the first place signs of - affections of the soul - are the same for all; and what 
these affections are likenesses of-actual things - are also the same. (Aristotle 1963: 16al.) 
We must not let the rather mystical sounding phrasing 'affections of the soul' confuse us. 
Quite simply, 'affections of the soul' are thoughts, or, i f you like, propositions, whether 
or not they have been uttered. So, Aristotle suggests that while these propositions can be 
uttered in a number of ways, say in different languages, the correspondence relation 
from 'affections o f the soul' to the actual things always holds between the same terms.3 
Direct correspondence like this surely has its problems, but I think that Aristotle's 
account is no less tenable than any of its modern alternatives. It is not our task here to 
argue for this, nor do we need to look at all the details of Aristotle's account, but we 
ought to keep this background in mind when we examine the Aristotelian method. 
Aristotle is foremost interested in the organisation of actual things, and what he presents 
in De Interpretatione (1963) is the method by which we discuss them and some 
restrictions that apply, for example, to the introduction of modalities. Actual things, 
according to Aristotle, include particulars and universals (17a38f). In Aristotle's 
ontology, particulars and universals are mind-independent categories in the world, and 
we refer to them whenever we make affirmations such as 'every man is white' (ibid.). 
This would be an example of stating something universally of a universal (i.e. 'man'), as 
Aristotle puts it. This is, very roughly, the connection between his ontology and our 
language. The importance o f De Interpretatione to us is just this: whenever Aristotle 
3 However, Aristotle (1963: 16a 10) notes that not every affection of the soul is true or false. Later 
(17a8f) he specifies that a statement-making sentence, i.e. a sentence that has a truth-value must 
contain a verb. Aristotle introduces some other restrictions as well, but the main line of thought is very 
clear: certain 'affections of the soul' have truth-values and they express propositions. 
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mentions a problem in the terms that he introduces in De Interpretatione, we know that 
he wants to say something about the actual things in the world. This is especially 
important i f one wants to make any sense of his Physics. 
As we noted above, Aristotle starts Physics by reminding us about the 
universal/particular distinction and suggests that we should approach the problems at 
hand from universals to particulars (contrary to what Plato suggested). It should be quite 
uncontentious that Physics is deeply involved in what we would certainly call 
metaphysics. For instance, one of Aristotle's initial concerns is the number of basic 
principles that govern different kinds of objects (1984a: 184b 15 f f . ) . He dismisses the 
possibility o f there being only one and concludes that there must be three of them 
(I91a20-21). The fact that Aristotle's predecessors thought that the principal elements 
could include water, fire, air and earth, should not mislead us, although it might render 
parts of the discussion obsolete. The importance of this passage lies in the attempt to 
find common grounds for all (material) existence. The suggested explanations might not 
be correct, but they are logically sound. 
So, already on the opening pages of his Physics Aristotle is very deeply involved with 
metaphysical questions of the most fundamental sort. There is an obvious explanation 
this metaphysical tendency in Aristotle's discussion of natural science. As Aristotle puts 
it in his Metaphysics (1984b: I026al3f), natural science is not the first philosophy. 
There is something prior, an immovable substance, which has to be examined before 
natural science, which is concerned with movable things, can be pursued. The motive 
behind this is of course Aristotle's account of tracking movement into the immovable 
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first mover - a view that might be logically sound, but which perhaps seems 
problematic in the light of modern physics. 
Aristotle's Metaphysics is especially interesting for us because in Metaphysics he 
considers a number of fundamental questions about the nature of metaphysics as a 
discipline: what are its tasks, method and basis. For Aristotle, metaphysics is the study 
of the essence of being, being as it is in itself. This is strongly contrasted with 
something like the Quinean idea that metaphysics should just make a complete list of 
what there is.4 Rather, Aristotle is interested in what grounds the existence of different 
kinds of entities, why are they what they are? Furthermore, as Vasilis Politis has noted, 
we must be careful to correctly appreciate what kind of questions Aristotle considers to 
be relevant for metaphysics: 
In general, we must not confuse questions of the type, (1) 'Why are there things that are F?', with 
questions of the type (2) 'Why are the things that are F F?' The basic question in the Metaphysics, 
'What is it for something, anything, to be?', is associated with questions of type 2, not type 1. 
(Politis 2004: 4.) 
Aristotle's view is that natural science is concerned with material, moveable entities. 
Mathematics, on the other hand, concerns abstract objects.5 However, neither of these 
disciplines is universal, as they are restricted to certain categories of being. It wi l l then 
be the task of metaphysics to pursue being qua being, to examine what kinds of 
metaphysical constraints govern different kinds of entities. Aristotle proceeds to 
investigate what being qua being might involve and is convinced that the most 
4 Quine's take on metaphysics will be discussed in chapter four. 
5 This can of course be challenged, but it is not my concern here to discuss the nature of mathematics. 
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important category in this investigation is that of substance (1028a30-35). Of the 
possible ways of how substance relates to entities, Aristotle notes four: via essence, the 
related universal, genus or substratum (1028b33-35). What follows is a detailed account 
of these features of being. Perhaps of the greatest interest to the modern reader is 
Aristotle's account of essence, which is clearly the predecessor of the contemporary 
essentialist views: 'The essence of each thing is what it is said to be in virtue of 
itself (1029bl 3-14). It is through the essences of things, and only them, that we can 
acquire further knowledge about reality. To be able to determine, for instance, how 
many objects there are, we must first know what the essences of the objects in question 
are. It is no surprise then, that essence is what Aristotle calls 'the primary being' (ousia) 
(cf. Politis 2004: ch. 7, Loux 1991). It must be noted here though that Aristotle's 
account, that of metaphysics as the science of essences, is itself a metaphysical answer 
to the question about the nature of metaphysics. He does consider other possible 
answers to the question as well, namely that the primary being is either the particular or 
the universal (and indeed, in the Categories, he proposed a different answer). But even 
i f one disagrees with Aristotle about essences being at the centre of metaphysics (which 
1 do not), his method is still very much worth attention. Furthermore, it should be made 
clear that there are a number of different ways to understand essences. Aristotle's 
conception is no doubt what could be called 'metaphysical' as opposed to 'semantic' 
essentialism: essences are not analytic; they are 'what is expressed by a complete 
account of what it is to be for a certain kind of thing' (Loux 1991: 75; see also Politis 
2004: 16 f f . ) . 
So much about the object of inquiry of the first philosophy. This quick overview hardly 
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does justice to Aristotle, but an exhaustive account of Aristotelian essentialism is not 
necessary for our purposes. We wil l now turn to the relationship between Aristotelian 
metaphysics and other disciplines, most notably natural science. Before the inquiry into 
the second philosophy i.e. natural science can start, we must already have done some 
work in metaphysics. Nevertheless, the topics discussed in Physics are of great 
importance for Aristotle and it is only because natural science is dependent on some 
more fundamental principles that we have to focus on metaphysics first. We certainly do 
not have to agree with Aristotle on the details of these principles, although it seems that 
much of what he contributed to the discussion about essences and universals still 
survives in contemporary metaphysics. In any case, Aristotle's view about the 
relationship between the first philosophy and special sciences goes as follows: 
There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in 
virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none 
of these others deals generally with being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the 
attributes of this part - this is what mathematical sciences for instance do. Now since we are 
seeking the first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be some thing to which these 
belong in virtue of its own nature. (Aristotle 1984b: 1003a22-28.) 
The above passage is perhaps even more accurate now than it was when Aristotle wrote 
it. Special sciences in Aristotle's time were certainly fewer and a lot closer to what 
Aristotle himself was doing than special sciences and philosophy are now. However, it 
is not that the special sciences would be entirely separate from the first philosophy; 
rather, they concentrate on parts of being that have been cut o f f from the complete list of 
entities. Aristotle's example is mathematics - certainly a part o f the science of being, but 
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concerned only with a small section of it. 
Once the limitations of special sciences are acknowledged, it becomes clear that even 
sciences like physics lack the ability to deal 'generally with being as being'. We then 
have the tools to effectively combine our results in metaphysics and special sciences. 
But how should this be done? Well, in the lines of the Aristotelian method, we should 
first focus on the most general principles that govern all being and proceed into the 
details of these principles, such as particular essences and universal attributes of 
different kinds of entities. After these ontological matters have been settled, we can 
interpret the perceptible reality accordingly, i.e. to make sense of the results that we 
reach in special sciences. 
Note that something very important is being said about the basis of metaphysics itself 
here as well. The way that Aristotle approaches metaphysical topics is in the form of 
aporiai, philosophical puzzles.6 While metaphysics is about the question 'What is being 
qua being', it is also about the very nature of this question, the possibility o f 
metaphysics. As Politis (2004: 80) notes, it would be a mistake to think that these 
questions are genuinely separate in Aristotle. For i f they were, this would seem to 
suggest that you can somehow step outside metaphysics, which is not what Aristotle 
thinks. The importance of this cannot be stressed excessively: Aristotle sees 
metaphysics as an unavoidable, primary discipline; the questions about the nature of 
metaphysics are metaphysical themselves and should be treated accordingly. No other 
discipline - physics, semantics, or even logic - can accommodate the most fundamental 
questions about the nature of metaphysics, for this would imply going outside the 
6 See Politis 2004: ch. 3 for an extensive account on aporiai. 
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framework of metaphysics. This has numerous important ramifications, for instance, 
Aristotle's defence of the law of non-contradiction (henceforth LNC) respects this 
framework, as it is his claim that LNC is the most secure statement about how things are 
in the world.1 In other words, it is not a statement about how we think about things or 
how we talk about them, that is, it is not a logical principle, but a metaphysical one. The 
upshot of this is that according to Aristotle, logic is grounded in metaphysics, in the 
ways that things are in the world. Indeed, Aristotle's line of thought suggests that the 
link that is often taken to exist between language or grammar, and logic, is in fact 
between reality and our thoughts:8 
Aristotle argues [in Metaphysics IV.4] that if [L]NC were not true of things, then we could not use 
thoughts and words to signify things, and in general we could not think and speak about things. He 
concludes that if [L]NC were not true of things, then thought and language about things would be 
impossible. (Politis 2004: 135.) 
Metaphysics, then, is indeed the first science or the universal science. Yet it is worth 
emphasising that although metaphysics concerns all that is and is universal in this sense, 
it does not mean that its goal is to reach complete descriptions about all things. The 
universality o f metaphysics is based on the fundamental nature o f it, it examines being 
qua being, the preconditions of all being and the governing principles, such as LNC, 
which affect all being. It is the task of special sciences to complete the descriptions, 
each in their respective field - metaphysics is the study about the common features that 
range across all disciplines. The question at hand here concerns 'the metaphysics of 
metaphysics'; it is about the nature of the question 'what is being'. Only after this 
7 The metaphysical status of L N C is one of the main concerns of chapter II: 11. 
8 But see Bolton (1994: 350-351)foran important clarification. 
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question has been settled can Aristotle offer his answer to the original question of 
metaphysics, 'what is being'. His answer to the latter question is of course that 
metaphysics is the science of essences. This is the distinction between the Aristotelian 
method and Aristotelian metaphysics - often we are referring to the former although we 
talk about Aristotelian metaphysics. For my purposes this does not have very serious 
implications, as I happen to agree both with the Aristotelian method and with the 
particular answer to the question 'what is being' that Aristotelian metaphysics proposes. 
What kind of a bearing does the method described above have on contemporary 
metaphysics? And what about the level of detail that modern physics has reached, could 
it not be said that all that is left to do is perhaps to establish the complete, final theory of 
physics, which would arguably reach the general level of being qua being? I think not. 
For one thing, it appears that a final theory of any kind is an impossibility. That is not 
how science - or metaphysics, for that matter - works. In fact, the whole concept of a 
final theory is contradictory. A theory is never final, as it should always be open to 
revision. I should not need to add that in the history of science we have seen plenty of 
'final' theories which proved out not to be quite so final. Secondly, even i f the best 
approximation o f a final theory in physics were to be reached, it would in no way render 
metaphysics redundant. There are two reasons for this: on the one hand metaphysics is 
necessary for interpreting any results reached in special sciences, as some kind of 
categorisation o f the results is needed. On the other hand, metaphysics is and must also 
be the starting point of any such theory, because surely a theory that claims the title 
'final' must deal with being qua being on the most general level possible, i.e. on the 
level of the essences of entities rather than on the level of their observable features.9 
9 1 will discuss a number of related issues in chapters II: 5-7. 
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A more serious problem in any attempt to reconcile Aristotelian metaphysics with 
contemporary metaphysics is perhaps his idea of the immovable substance. Other details 
of his ontology and organisation of categories that we might not like can easily be 
dismissed in favour of something else, but the immovable substance seems to be 
Aristotle's motivation to pursue these topics in the first place and abandoning it would 
seem to introduce some problems. Perhaps a quick look into the reasons of why 
Aristotle postulates the immovable substance wil l help. Clearly, Aristotle is puzzled by 
motion and one of his basic principles is that there must be a cause for all motion: 
'Everything that is in motion must be moved by something' (Aristotle 1984a:24Ib34). 
Now, this is indeed a problematic assumption and very hard to establish in terms of 
modern physics. Nevertheless, this assumption combined with the assumption that we 
cannot have an infinite line of movers, which Aristotle (1984a: 241b34 f f . ) argues for at 
some length, produces the conclusion that there must be an immobile first mover. 
Perhaps this line of thought seems quite untenable now, but 1 do not think that we can 
blame Aristotle, for as far o f f as his line of thought appears to be, modern physics might 
not do much better. For consider: how does motion emerge according to modern 
physics? 
Well, presumably, all kinds of motion can be tracked to material entities. Our current 
knowledge of all material entities is based on quantum particles: quarks and leptons. 
Motion enters the picture via forces which are manifested by certain exchange particles. 
There are four fundamental forces: nuclear strong force, electromagnetic force, nuclear 
weak force and gravity. For example, the electromagnetic force is manifested through 
the exchange of photons. A thorough introduction to quantum motion is not necessary 
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here, but quite generally, all the fundamental forces are exchange forces, as they are 
manifested through the exchange of one or more particles. And this of course implies 
motion. But wait a minute, what exactly is the cause of motion according to this theory? 
There does not seem to be a very straight-forward answer. I f we were to look into the 
details we would find out that there are some dubious cover-ups in effect here. For 
instance, the exchange particles are called 'virtual', as they only exist in the exchange 
process, and in the case of gravity the exchange particle, called 'graviton', has not even 
been directly observed (and it has a rest mass of zero!).1 0 
Curiously, as sophisticated and accurate as our current understanding of motion might 
be, it is blatantly incapable of answering the question that Aristotle asked: how does 
motion originate? Modern physics provides a number of interesting observations; in the 
case of motion originating from the electromagnetic force, the motion occurs because 
there are electrically charged particles present; in the case of motion originating from 
gravity, the cause of movement is the presence of a body of matter which attracts other 
bodies of matter nearby. But these are not explanations - they are descriptive accounts 
about our perceptible surroundings. As far as physics is concerned, there might very 
well be an immovable first mover which is the one common cause for all motion. What 
1 am saying is that physics does not even attempt to answer the kind of questions that 
Aristotle puts forward. And this is as it should be, because natural science is, after all, 
only the second philosophy. There are at least two reasons why one might be unable to 
grasp this at first. Firstly, the Kantian tradition has made us too sceptical about the 
possibility of ever answering these kinds of questions. Secondly, modern science has a 
peculiar way to not answer the initial question, but to answer something else instead, 
10 See for example C.R. Nave (2006) Hyperphysics for details. 
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making us forget what we asked in the first place - quite like a politician might! 
However, 1 think that there cannot be any doubt as to whether we should ask 
fundamental questions or not. Answering them is the task of metaphysics. 
This offshoot to modern physics demonstrates the gap between metaphysics and the 
special sciences and should help us to see what motivated Aristotle towards the 
conclusion that metaphysics deserves a primary status. His method, based on the 
aporiai, philosophical puzzles, is revealing in this regard: special sciences do not raise 
general questions about being as such; instead they presuppose that there are different 
kinds of things ordered in a certain manner. A scientist makes inductive inferences based 
on perceptual evidence, but by doing so she relies on the orderly nature of reality, she 
assumes that by certain methods she can come up with veridical judgements about the 
world. But a metaphysician starts with an abstract puzzle, not an observation - a 
metaphysician is puzzled about how the scientist can reach knowledge in the first place, 
how can we know anything about being qua being? This is one of the key questions of 
metaphysics, and we have seen Aristotle's solution above - his defence of the principle 
of non-contradiction is especially important in this regard. So, the type of questions 
raised in special sciences and metaphysics are radically different. But this is not strictly 
a difference in their status in regard to the a priori/a posteriori distinction, as one might 
think. In fact, it would be a mistake to think either that metaphysics is ful ly in the realm 
of a priori knowledge or that special sciences are thoroughly a posteriori." Aristotle 
seems to think that metaphysics and the special sciences are fundamentally linked, for 
metaphysics is the study of the a priori principles that special sciences presuppose. 
Furthermore, although metaphysics as a discipline is 'furthest from the senses' (Aristotle 
11 An issue which we will return to in chapters II: 5-8. 
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1984b: 982a25), it is nevertheless continuous with special sciences, and could not 
operate exclusively in the realm of a priori knowledge. 
We are now in the position to see how the Aristotelian method and Aristotelian 
metaphysics copes with the contemporary challenges to metaphysical realism. 
Aristotle's central concern is the relativist challenge to fundamental metaphysical 
principles, such as the law of non-contradiction. As we saw above, Aristotle thinks that 
LNC is indeed a metaphysical principle, not a logical principle in the sense that it would 
only be true o f things insofar as language or thoughts are concerned. What this means is 
that LNC is one of the constraints that govern mind-independent reality. For Aristotle, 
reality is unitary, yet there are different kinds of entities with different essences in the 
world. LNC is perhaps the most general constraint for the organisation of these different 
kinds of entities. Plausibly, LNC rules out certain combinations o f properties that an 
entity might have, for instance, no entity can be both green and red all over at the same 
time, or solid and liquid, or have both a negative and a positive charge at the same time. 
The relativist challenges this essentialist, unitary view of the reality by questioning 
LNC. The modern roots o f the relativist challenge can be found in Kant, but Aristotle 
was well aware o f the possibility of such a challenge (cf. Politis 2004: ch. 6). 
Aristotle's defence of LNC against the relativist is, as he puts it, a 'negative' one: he 
demonstrates that the opponent's view is inconsistent (Aristotle 1984b: 1006al2). In 
fact, he goes on to show that the opponent must be committed to LNC at least in the 
sense that it is true of our thoughts and language (1008b3-1008b32). This is, of course, 
not enough as such. What needs to be added is that i f LNC is true of our thoughts and 
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language, it is also true about the world. Furthermore, the opponent can challenge LNC 
by pointing out that it often appears - appears to the senses, that is - that the orderly 
nature of the world required by LNC is violated. To these concerns Aristotle replies as 
follows: 
[I]f only the sensible exists, there would be nothing if animate things were not; for there would be 
no faculty of sense. The view that neither the objects of sensation nor the sensations would exist is 
doubtless true (for they are affections of the perceiver), but that the substrata which cause the 
sensation should not exist even apart from sensation is impossible. For sensation is surely not the 
sensation of itself, but there is something beyond the sensation, which must be prior to the 
sensation; for that which moves is prior in nature to that which is moved, and if they are correlative 
terms, this is no less the case. (Aristotle 1984b: 1010b30-101 la2.) 
This is a very dense passage and it is impossible to analyse it thoroughly here. But, 
clearly, Aristotle is here advocating a realist, causal theory o f perception (cf. Politis 
2004: 183). He also adds that in fact we never observe a direct violation of LNC in the 
senses (1010b34-101 l a l ) . This is a crucial qualification, for Aristotle can now 
justifiably ask, even i f the opponent denies the theory of perception that he proposed: 
how does the relativist explain the orderliness in the world, that is, the observed validity 
of LNC, which is experienced and apparently true? We must appreciate the weight of 
this challenge given the context in which Aristotle raises it, for he has argued at length 
that metaphysics, the science of being qua being, is first and foremost concerned with 
this very question. Now, i f the relativist is to give any kind of a response to Aristotle's 
challenge, as he must do i f he is to avoid being compared to plants [sic] (1006al5), then 
he is already involved in metaphysics. This is indeed a master argument, for Aristotle 
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has shown here that the only way for the relativist to be involved in a philosophical 
discussion of any kind is to accept the Aristotelian method and engage in metaphysics. 
So, regardless of what we might think about his particular answers to some 
metaphysical questions, the Aristotelian method certainly prevails. It is in the spirit of 
this method that 1 w i l l put forward my argument for the necessity of metaphysics. 
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2. Kant and the Possibility of Metaphysics 
In the previous chapter I suggested that my conception of metaphysics is Aristotelian 
rather than Kantian, and we saw what Aristotelian metaphysics in fact amounts to. In 
what follows I w i l l examine Kantian metaphysics, and Kant's critique of metaphysics, in 
a similar manner. As with Aristotle, I must again emphasise that Kantian metaphysics 
does not necessarily have much to do with Kant's own conception of metaphysics or the 
details of his theory - whatever Kant's own views might have been, it is clear that he 
has had an enormous influence on all metaphysicians since. We wil l see that Kant can 
even be read in a manner that is not very hostile towards what I previously called Aris-
totelian metaphysics. It is worth keeping in mind, then, that when I refer to Kant's neg-
ative influence on metaphysics - as I wi l l do throughout this thesis - my quarrel is not 
so much with Kant as such, but rather with certain interpretations of what his critique of 
metaphysics, among other things, amounts to. 
One topic that Kant contributed to and which is certainly very agreeable with the Aris-
totelian line of thought is the nature of metaphysics as a discipline. Indeed, it is Kant's 
question 'How is metaphysics as a natural predisposition possible?' (B 22), which is still 
one of the most difficult questions for metaphysicians. Kant's answer is, of course, fa-
miliar enough: it all comes down to the possibility of a priori synthetic judgements. This 
route, however, although the motivation behind it is noble, is not quite satisfactory for 
someone who wishes to stay in the realm of realist metaphysics. For despite Kant's at-
tempt to abandon dogmatic metaphysics, his conception of the a priori leads him to an 
awkward position. By this I refer to nothing else but the familiar problem of stating that 
35 
2. Kant and the Possibility of Metaphysics 
Euclidean geometry is a priori, which, by Kant's understanding o f the a priori, means 
that it is in fact necessary. But as is well known, the theory of relativity and quantum 
mechanics raise a number of problems for Kant's allegedly necessary a priori truths and 
there seems to be 'no particularly Kantian way of dealing with this', as Penelope Maddy 
(2000: 102) puts it. However, this should certainly not be considered to force us to aban-
don Kant altogether, for it seems, as we wi l l shortly see, that it is merely Kant's concep-
tion of the a priori which fails here. Unfortunately, this does lead to unnecessary scepti-
cism about our ability to reach knowledge about the world an sich, but once it is estab-
lished that it is the hopeless pursuit of necessity which leads us to this scepticism, we 
can see that Kant's project does have a lot to give for realist metaphysics as well. 
First, let us examine what Kant's conception of metaphysics actually consists of. 
Already in the preface of The Critique of Pure Reason Kant gives an account of what 
metaphysics is: 
Metaphysics — a wholly isolated speculative cognition of reason that elevates itself entirely above 
all instruction from experience, and that through mere concepts (not, like mathematics, through the 
application of concepts to intuition), where reason thus is supposed to be its own pupil - has up to 
now not been so favored by fate as to have been able to enter upon the secure course of a science, 
even though older than all other sciences, and would remain even if all the others were swallowed 
up by an all-consuming barbarism. For in it reason continuously gets stuck, even when it claims a 
priori insight (as it pretends) into those laws confirmed by the commonest experience. (B xiv.) 
In this passage Kant expresses his hostility towards the kind o f dogmatic metaphysics 
that Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten had been involved wi th . 1 2 The problem that Kant 
12 For discussion about Kant's critique of traditional metaphysicians like the ones mentioned, see 
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sees with the projects of these 'traditional' metaphysicians is that they can never reach 
'the secure course of a science'. To make it possible for metaphysics to advance to the 
level of science, something has to be done. Frustrated by the utter failure of dogmatic 
metaphysicians to reach any kind of consensus or convincing results, Kant introduces 
his infamous revolution and suggests that perhaps we should give up the task of trying 
to reach objects with the help of a priori reasoning and rather assume that the objects 
must 'conform to our cognition' (B xvi). I called this revolution infamous because it 
seems to me that this is precisely the turning point where scepticism wins over realism, 
for here Kant abandons the idea that we could ever reach knowledge of the external 
world. But this is a too hasty conclusion. 
To gain some insight into what is going on here, we should consider why Kant chose the 
sceptical path in the first place. I believe that two things contributed to this: the 
conception of the methodology of metaphysics as Kant had learned it from dogmatic 
metaphysicians like Leibniz and Wolff, and the over-optimistic view of the powers of a 
priori reasoning. The first of these is apparent in the quoted passage above: Kant 
conceived metaphysics as a discipline which is entirely a priori, consisting of reasoning 
which includes only mere concepts. Perhaps there are still some metaphysicians who 
would be inclined to say that this is what metaphysics is 1 3 , but most modern 
metaphysicians surely admit a posteriori elements in their theories. It is exactly the 
hopelessness o f the conceptualist approach which is behind this, and it is no wonder that 
Kant found it to be impossible for metaphysics to reach the status of a science when 
conceived like this. However, this does not explain why Kant took the path he in fact 
Ameriks(1992). 
13 Frank Jackson conies to mind, see chapter II: 3 for further discussion. 
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did, for he could just have revised his conception of metaphysics by admitting a 
posteriori elements in it. But for Kant there was at least one discipline which was 
completely a priori, but still successful: mathematics (although he does specify that 
mathematics proceeds by applying concepts to intuition, contrary to metaphysics). It 
might have been hard to imagine why metaphysics could not be wholly a priori, i f 
mathematics was. Be that as it may, this is still not enough to explain the need for Kant 
to abandon all hope of reaching knowledge about the external world. 
The explanation we are looking for might be found from Kant's blind trust in our a 
priori capabilities. It is precisely mathematics which Kant uses in his examples of the 
powers o f a priori reasoning. I wi l l not discuss here whether mathematics is in fact an a 
priori discipline or not, but for me it is very plausible that it contains at least some a 
priori elements. The problem, however, is not whether mathematics is a priori or not, 
but whether a priori reasoning is able to reach necessities. Kant puts his view as follows: 
A new light broke upon the first person who demonstrated the isosceles triangle [...]. For he found 
that what he had to do was not to trace what he saw in this figure, or even its mere concept, and 
read off, as it were, from the properties of the figure; but rather he had to produce the latter from 
what he himself thought into the object and presented (through construction) according to a priori 
concepts, and that in order to know something securely a priori he had to ascribe to the thing 
nothing except what followed necessarily from what he himself had put into it in accordance with 
its concept. (B xi-xii.) 
So far so good: for Kant, a priori reasoning deals strictly with necessities. And as the 
dogmatic metaphysicians did not seem to reach the consensus that they obviously 
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should have i f necessities were involved, it became apparent that something had gone 
wrong at a fundamental level. As Kant saw it, the only way to uphold the necessity was 
to turn the picture upside down and acknowledge that we just cannot reach knowledge 
about the objects themselves. The only certainty is that our cognition adapts to these 
objects in a certain way. 
Of course, now we are very well aware that the Euclidean axioms concerning the 
isosceles triangle are by no means necessary. This leaves us two options: either we have 
to say that Euclidean geometry was not a priori after all, or we have to give up the 
necessity involved with the a priori. Thus, the path that Kant wants to take is not open 
any more: his transcendental idealism is not able to uphold the distinction between a 
posteriori and a priori knowledge (Maddy 2000: 102). This leaves matters unsettled 
indeed, for the necessity that Kant so much craved for comes tumbling down and we 
seem to be in a situation where we have to choose between pure empirical realism or 
genuine scepticism. 
Fortunately, we do not have to take this route. There is a lot that is useful in Kant's 
project and it would be a pity to throw that away. 1 think that we can save all this, i f we 
throw away the old fashioned conception of the a priori instead. There are in fact other 
reasons to do this as well, for it seems that the traditional (Cartesian) conception of the a 
priori is very vulnerable to objections. This is hardly surprising, as we have just seen 
where it leads. However, I would still be willing to defend a view of metaphysics which 
relies very heavily on the a priori. Perhaps not quite as heavily as Kant suggested, for 
we should certainly admit a posteriori elements in metaphysics, but nevertheless, it is a 
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priori reasoning which is at the centre of metaphysics. 
How then, should we change our conception of the a priori? Well, it is clear that 
somehow we have to avoid the dead-end that we saw in Kant. In other words, we have 
to deal with the fact that Euclidean geometry is not quite as necessary as Kant thought it 
was. We could try to deny the apriority of Euclidean geometry altogether, but I do not 
really see how this could be done. For even i f we concluded that in this case our 
psychological capacities, or something like that, failed, and produced the 
misconception, it would not explain the fact that in most cases Euclidean geometry is 
quite sufficient. It seems obvious that something was grasped, and this something was 
grasped without the help o f empirical knowledge. Surely, it must have been a case of a 
priori reasoning. So, we might do better i f we acknowledged that even information 
reached with the help of a priori reasoning is revisable. Obviously, this has some 
important ramifications, for it means that no discipline, be it a posteriori or a priori, not 
even metaphysics, can reach certainties. For some, this might be hard to accept, but 1 
really do not see why this would be a bad thing, after all, this is something that science 
has to live with all the time. Indeed, I believe that here is our answer to Kant's question, 
i.e. how is metaphysics possible as science?. Well, metaphysics is possible as science 
only i f its revisability and defeasibility are acknowledged.14 
1 find it slightly puzzling that a solution like this never occurred to Kant, as he starts his 
examination exactly by considering how metaphysics could possibly reach the secure 
path of science. He repeatedly uses mathematics and physics as his examples and he 
14 The nature of the a priori is a recurring theme in this thesis. This serves as an initial sketch, but the 
main discussion will have to be postponed until chapter II: 8. Also, see Friedman (2000) for 
discussion about the reconciliation of modern science and the Kantian a priori. 
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seems to have an enormous trust in both of them, especially mathematics. But no matter 
how secure this path of science might seem, it has to be revisable. Perhaps we needed 
Einstein and quantum mechanics to realize just how many things could go wrong even 
in the most elaborate passages of a priori reasoning, but it seems clear that the type of 
necessity that Kant wanted to associate with it is forever lost. 
Having said that, 1 must add that 1 find Kant's project quite frui tful for metaphysics, 
even though it has certainly motivated some very anti-metaphysical attitudes as well. 
Let me illustrate some of the positive aspects. First of all, Kant more or less cured 
metaphysics of the dogmatism that had prevailed for quite some time, albeit Kant 
himself credits Hume for this. Secondly, his attempt to solve i f and how metaphysics 
could take the secure path of science is methodologically of utmost importance, even 
though he does not spend very much time with the methodological issues. This is 
something that modern metaphysicans' theories too often lack. Thirdly, I think that he 
does some very important ontological work, never mind the fact that he does it in the 
framework of the world as it appears to us. Different readings of Kant aside, there ought 
to be something for realist metaphysicians in Kant's theory. Above I have been 
assuming a rather harsh reading of Kant, but i f the point can be made with that reading, 
then it can certainly be made i f Kant is interpreted a bit less sceptically. 
What makes Kant's theory ontologically interesting is that his categories can be taken to 
reflect the actual categorical structure of reality. After the revisability of the a priori has 
been admitted, this move is quite easy: we can do only so much with the help of the a 
priori before we have to turn to empirical information to verify our a priori results. But 
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this means that to get to the actual structure of reality, we also have to see how things 
appear to us empirically. So, whichever route we take here, the basic procedure of 
reaching any kind of rational information is always the same, i.e. testing whether our a 
priori results f i t the empirical picture. Without much contemplation, it emerges that this 
is exactly how science proceeds. 1 do not think that Kant would deny this either, for in 
regard to mathematics and natural science he says the following: 'About these sciences, 
since they are actually given, it can appropriately be asked how they are possible; for 
that they must be possible is proved through their actuality' (B 20). In the light o f this 
quote, it seems clear that Kant is very confident about the possibility of 'pure 
mathematics' and 'pure natural science', as he calls them - and these 'pure' disciplines 
are, as I understand, a priori in nature. But what guarantees that they are possible is that 
they are actual. I have no quarrel with this, as it is exactly what I suggested above. It 
seems, though, that metaphysics is no different in respect to this arrangement between 
the a priori and actuality. Indeed, the methodology is identical: we map the ontological 
possibilities a priori and then see which of them are actual. This implies that 
metaphysics and science walk hand in hand.15 
Some support for this reading can be found from Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science. In the preface, Kant suggests that: 
A rational doctrine of nature thus deserves the name of a natural science only in case the 
fundamental natural laws therein are cognized a priori, and are not mere laws of experience. One 
calls a cognition of nature of the first kind pure, but that of the second kind is called applied 
rational cognition. Since the word nature already carries with it the concept of laws, and the latter 
15 We will return to these issues in much greater detail in chapters 11:5-7 & 9. 
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carries with it the concept of the necessity of all determinations of a thing belonging to its 
existence, one easily sees why natural science must derive the legitimacy of this title only from its 
pure part - namely, that which contains the a priori principles of all other natural explanations -
and why only in virtue of this pure part is natural science to be proper science. (4: 468-469.) 
Here we see quite clearly that Kant shares with Aristotle the view that natural science 
has a metaphysical, a priori grounding. Kant was quite inspired by the developments in 
science towards the end of the 18 th century and in the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science he attempts to characterise some of the a priori principles that govern 
the study of nature, such as the infinite divisibility of matter (4: 503). Again, Kant 
stresses that the principles that ground the natural laws must be necessary. Strongly 
influenced by Newton's recent success, he considered the a priori part in science to be 
largely mathematical and this, for him, guaranteed the necessity of the metaphysical 
foundations of science. Later I wil l demonstrate how a perfectly feasible account of the 
metaphysical foundations of science can be put forward in fallibilistic terms, but we 
must be fair to Kant and take into account the scientific context of his time, which 
strongly suggested that a complete description of physical reality was just behind the 
corner. 
Had Kant been aware of the scientific revolutions that were to follow, 1 suspect that he 
as well would have amended his views radically. This only underlines the fact that 
metaphysics and science are a package deal, and although I certainly sympathise with 
Kant's idea that there are metaphysical foundations for natural science, it seems that the 
relationship between these disciplines has to go both ways. But these matters wi l l be 
discussed in more detail later. For now, it is sufficient to note that while Kant's pursuit 
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of certainty might seem to have undermined metaphysics in its most naive form, his 
work as a whole does, on the contrary, offer a very ambitious, i f a bit too ambitious 
view of the nature of metaphysics and its relationship with natural science. I hope to 
have shown, then, that Kant should not perhaps be seen so much as an adversary of 
metaphysical realism, but rather a metaphysical realist extraordinaire, even though 
misguided as he was in his requirement for absolute certainty. 
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3. Carnap's Anti-metaphysical Project 
It is quite natural to move from Kant to Carnap, as in Carnap, at least arguably, we can 
see the culmination of Kant's anti-metaphysical influence. Carnap's anti-metaphysical 
project, which is closely connected with the Vienna Circle and the now not so popular 
verificationism, is perhaps the most influential anti-metaphysical project of the 20"1 
century. The fundamental idea behind Carnap's and logical positivism's hostile attitude 
towards metaphysics is clear enough: only empirical, verifiable information is relevant, 
the rest is mumbo jumbo. Of course, Carnap's project was in fact a lot more 
sophisticated than this. Fortunately for us, Carnap at least explains what he means by 
'metaphysics' rather explicitly: 
1 will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to represent knowledge about 
something which is over or beyond all experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about 
Things in themselves, the Absolute, and such like. (Carnap 1935: 461.) 
Perhaps this definition fits, roughly, the kind of metaphysics that the three 
metaphysicians that Carnap mentions - Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel - are involved 
with (ibid.). As it happens, I am not too happy with metaphysics understood like this, as 
should be obvious from the previous chapters. However, the question that remains is 
whether Carnap's project causes problems for metaphysics as I understand it. Certainly, 
1 think that a priori knowledge is crucial for metaphysics, and as it is 'beyond all 
experience', 1 would imagine that Carnap would not appreciate metaphysics in the 
Aristotelian sense either. This, presumably, includes talk about essences and things in 
themselves, although these notions would need to be clarified before any conclusions 
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can be drawn. It seems, anyway, that the conception of 'over or beyond all experience' 
in Carnap's sense is quite a lot stronger than the notion of the a priori which I associate 
with metaphysics.16 To clarify this, let us look at another passage: 
The decision of the main questions about metaphysics, namely, whether it is meaningful at all and 
has a right to exist and, if so, whether it is a science, apparently depends entirely on what is meant 
by "metaphysics". (Carnap 1967: 295.) 
Indeed, this is true. It is also still true that 'Nowadays, there is no unanimity whatever on 
this point' (ibid.), as Carnap adds a moment later. Carnap goes on to refute the view that 
metaphysics is a conceptual science, and, following Bergson, ends up using the name 
'metaphysics' for nonrational, intuitive processes. This is of course not at all similar to 
how I have characterised metaphysics, but then again, my conception of metaphysics 
would not fit in what Carnap calls science either. It seems thus that Carnap neglects a 
certain route between his strict logical positivism and the utterly nonrational 
metaphysics. For this route, now that the name 'metaphysics' is at issue, I cannot think 
of a better name than 'Aristotelian', in the sense that I demonstrated in the first chapter. 
Incidentally, Carnap does not say too much about Aristotle, but he does stack the pre-
Socratics and Plato with Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel. 
Some of Carnap's arguments against metaphysics are so opinionated that I doubt that 
they work against any kind of metaphysics whatsoever: 
Metaphysicians cannot avoid making their propositions non-verifiable, because if they made them 
16 I will return to this issue in chapter II: 8. 
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verifiable, the decision about the truth or falsehood of their doctrines would depend upon 
experience and therefore belong to the region of empirical science. This consequence they wish to 
avoid, because they pretend to teach knowledge which is of a higher level than that of empirical 
science. Thus they are compelled to cut all connection between their propositions and experience; 
and precisely by this procedure they deprive them of any sense. (Camap 1935: 462.) 
I do not know which philosophers Carnap has in mind here, but I f ind it hard to believe 
that even the ones he mentions would be as dishonest as he here claims. I am sure that 
any self-respecting philosopher would be quite happy to welcome empirical results 
which would support his theory. And of course, he would have to welcome results 
which would falsify his theory as well. It might be true, however, that the theories of the 
metaphysicians which Carnap mentions are, i f not impossible, at least quite hard to 
verify or falsify. But to claim that this is due to these philosophers being afraid that their 
doctrines would fall in the realm of empirical science is a bit far-fetched. Of course, this 
makes sense to Carnap, as he is trying to put metaphysics in with poetry and arts. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that this aspect of Carnap's anti-metaphysical project does not 
have a bearing on the kind of metaphysics that I am defending. 
The originality of Carnap's project is of course elsewhere. First o f all, he distinguishes a 
representative and an expressive function of language. The representative function of 
language is the function which empirical science and logic use. To put it simply, the 
representative function of language consists of sentences which assert a certain 
proposition. The expressive function of language obviously includes the representative 
sentences as well, for they too express something, but according to Carnap there is a 
vast amount of sentences which are only expressive, void of any truth value. It is easy 
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enough to see that poetry and other arts belong to this group, and, in Carnap's sense, 
metaphysics as well. His hostility towards metaphysics, though, is due to its alleged 
deceptive character, for metaphysics gives an illusion of knowledge: it claims to assert 
something when it only expresses, i.e. gives the false impression of asserting a 
proposition. (Carnap 1935: 465-467.) 
These remarks can be contrasted with Carnap's later essay 'Empiricism, Semantics, and 
Ontology'. Most notably, we are interested in Carnap's linguistic frameworks. Whenever 
we wish to speak of a new kind of entity, he says, we must construct a new linguistic 
framework (Carnap 1956: 14). After the introduction of this new framework, a new set 
o f rules, we must distinguish between questions within this framework - internal 
questions - and questions about the whole system of entities - external questions. The 
distinguishing feature of internal questions is that they can be answered with the help of 
empirical investigation: 'The concept of reality occurring in these internal questions is 
an empirical, scientific, nonmetaphysical concept' (ibid.). I w i l l have one or two things 
to say about this quotation later, but for now it suffices to say that the internal questions 
are obviously meant to be 'scientific' questions. Whereas external questions, questions 
about the world itself and its reality, are questions of philosophy, or as it were, 
metaphysics.17 
Carnap gives some examples of the implications of this. In regard to the world of things, 
namely the physical objects in the space-time world, we are able to answer all kinds of 
empirical questions once the appropriate linguistic framework is accepted. The process 
17 It is impossible to go into the vast literature about the internal/external distinction here, but see for 
instance Bird (2003) and Eklund (forthcoming) for further discussion; both of them reject Quine's 
(1951) claim that the distinction would be a derivative of the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
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of acceptance may depend on factors such as 'efficiency, fruitfulness, and 
simplicity' (Carnap 1956: 15), but not, as you can see, on correspondence with reality. 
Any external questions concerning the reality of physical space and time are, according 
to Carnap, pseudo-questions. Questions concerning something like numbers, however, 
are a bit more complicated, or at least seem to be, as the ontological status of numbers is 
debatable. Yet, for Carnap, there is no such question as 'What is the ontological status of 
numbers?', for he thinks that this as well is an external question and cannot be given a 
formulation in scientific language (ibid.). 
The picture that Carnap presents to us is fairly clear: we can only operate within the 
framework of empirical science (and logical analysis), any questions external to that 
framework are pseudo-questions. Thus, the introduction of a new linguistic framework 
does not require answering any ontological questions about the entities that it concerns. 
This is because Carnap thinks that the introduction of a new framework does not make 
any assertions about reality. From all this, Carnap draws his well known conclusion: we 
should be tolerant in regard to different linguistic frameworks. It is easy to agree with 
this point, but to claim that these different frameworks do not make any assertions about 
reality is strange indeed, for this is not how people use them. 
Furthermore, we should take a closer look at Carnap's notion o f reality: the empirical, 
scientific, nonmetaphysical reality. What kind of reality is this? Carnap is quite happy to 
accept that empirical science is involved with reality in some sense - at least we can say 
that unicorns are not real. And the questions involved with empirical science are 
presumably internal questions. However, it would be peculiar if , say, physicists would 
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agree with Carnap's claim that the questions about the reality of physical space and 
physical time are pseudo-questions. Surely, in a very clear sense, scientists think that the 
subject-matter of their discipline is reality and that they make substantial assertions 
about the nature of this reality. As Carnap puts it, i f these questions are taken to be 
internal, then they are 'analytic and trivial', any other understanding of these questions 
renders them, at best, pragmatic (Carnap 1956: 17). But how could this be all that there 
is to it? 
When we ask whether something is real or not, we just want to know i f such and such 
an entity exists. When physicists introduce a certain new particle, existence of which 
seems to be supported by, say, indirect empirical evidence, but has nonetheless never 
been seen, we want to ask: is this particle real or not? It is hard to see how this could be 
an internal question, but it surely is not a pseudo-question either, as some day we might 
be able to verify or falsify the reality of that very particle. And the same applies to most 
of the questions that Carnap claims to be external, perhaps with the exception of 
questions about abstract objects such as numbers and their reality. The problem is that 
Carnap applies the same idea to questions about abstract and concrete objects, while 
these are two different questions. 
It seems to me that Carnap is having a free lunch here. He denies all talk about 
ontological questions, but he happily takes empirical science for granted. This might be 
the attitude of a naive non-philosopher, but a philosopher should certainly see that there 
are serious ontological questions to be settled before we can welcome empirical science 
with open arms. Indeed, why else would there have been a two thousand year project to 
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find metaphysical foundations for science? 
Of course, Carnap is not ignorant about this kind of discussion and he does have 
something more to say. Carnap talks about 'empirical reality', which concerns, 
unsurprisingly, physical objects (Carnap 1967: 273 f f . ) . This notion of reality is 
supposed to be able to separate real physical objects from nonreality such as dreams or 
inventions. However, he does acknowledge that reality is not exhausted with physical 
objects: there are also what he calls psychological objects and cultural objects, which 
also involve real and nonreal objects. We are not interested in the details of these, but be 
it noted that Carnap is in some trouble when trying to determine which objects are real 
and which are not, as he tries to ground it all in linguistic usage and convention, which, 
of course, makes it arbitrary, as Carnap notes himself (Carnap 1967: 280). One of 
Carnap's examples of problematic cases concerning physical objects is the collective 
consisting of 'the present vegetation of central Europe' (Carnap 1967: 278). Quite 
clearly, any inquiry into the reality of an object like this wi l l be very problematic i f all 
we have to rely on is linguistic usage. 
Let us now proceed to 'The metaphysical problem of reality' and see what Carnap has to 
say about it (Carnap 1967: 281 f f . ) . Carnap understands 'metaphysical reality' as 
follows: something is real in the metaphysical sense i f it exists independently of 
consciousness. Three philosophical schools emerge from the different ways that one 
might approach this question, namely realism, idealism and phenomenalism. Carnap 
goes on to examine whether any of these views is compatible with his conception of 
empirical reality, his hypothesis being that all of them belong to a nonrational discipline 
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which he calls metaphysics. However, he does admit that initially it seems that his 
empirically real objects would have to be called independent o f consciousness as they 
do not depend on one's w i l l . But Carnap refutes this line of thought on the basis that i f 
one holds a physical body in one's hand, it does change i f an appropriate act of wi l l is 
carried out. This apparently means something like dropping the object or throwing it 
against a wall. Well, this is of course correct, but clearly this counter-example does not 
quite grasp the notion of 'independent of consciousness', for the change that occurs 
when a physical object is, say, dropped and smashed, occurs because there are certain 
other real physical objects present which cause this to happen, namely the hand that 
drops the object and the ground that it hits. So, what would be needed to refute this 
account is an act of wi l l which causes a change without taking advantage of other 
physical objects, not even the hand which is holding the original object. Granted, this 
causes some further problems as it is presumably an act of w i l l which moves the hand 
and so on, but that is exactly the point: we end up in a highly detailed discussion about 
the metaphysical notion of reality and what it involves. No doubt this discussion would 
take us deep into the philosophy of mind as well. 
An important point that Carnap makes is that none of the three schools - realism, 
idealism or phenomenalism - are in contradiction with what he calls 'construction 
theory', i.e. empirical reality. However, I do not quite see how this is supposed to 
support Carnap's view, as the account of empirical reality that he puts forward is exactly 
what these different schools are trying to explain. In other words, empirical reality is 
more or less the starting point, and i f the different schools would be in contradiction 
with that, then they would surely fail . Of course, these different schools do contradict 
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each other and Carnap notes this as well. He thinks that there is nothing epistemological 
in these accounts: they are purely in the realm of metaphysics (Carnap 1967: 286). In 
fact, this is something that 1 almost agree with, as I find, for a number of reasons, that 
epistemology is too often done without acknowledging the metaphysical commitments 
in the background. But of course 1 do not agree with the claim that metaphysics is 
nonrational. Consider what Carnap allows in the realm of epistemology: 
[Ultimately, all knowledge goes back to experiences, which are related to one another, connected, 
and synthesized; thus, there is a logical progress which leads, first, to the various entities of my 
consciousness, then to the physical objects, furthermore, with the aid of the latter, to the 
phenomena of consciousness of other subjects, i.e., to the heteropsychological, and through the 
mediation of the heteropsychological, to the cultural objects. But this is the theory of knowledge in 
its entirety. (Carnap 1967: 286, italics his.) 
This sounds very suspicious, and my suspicions grow exponentially when Carnap 
admits that there might seem to be realism at the bottom of the practical procedures of 
the empirical sciences (ibid.). In his defence, Carnap says that we must be careful to 
distinguish linguistic usage and actual asserting, as it is the first kind of realism which is 
involved with physics and such. This is hardly convincing; see again the passage quoted 
above. Does it not seem that there is quite a leap between 'various entities of my 
consciousness' and 'physical objects'? It should, as this is exactly the leap that is usually 
questioned by opponents of realism. And this, indeed, is the ontological free lunch that I 
think Carnap is trying to have: getting the good things of realism without making any 
commitments to the metaphysical background. Realism can hardly be grounded in 
linguistic usage and convention. Furthermore, Carnap insists that metaphysics is a 
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nonrational discipline and that the dispute between realism, idealism and 
phenomenalism thus cannot be solved by rational means, but it seems to me that Carnap 
himself is trying to give rational arguments for realism, although, sadly, grounding them 
in linguistic usage and making the case quite a bit less convincing. Thus, whether he 
wants it or not, Carnap is neck-deep in metaphysics - the Aristotelian sort. 
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4. Quine's Conception of Metaphysics 
It is sometimes suggested that Quine made metaphysics fashionable again after the long 
period of unpopularity that it had suffered, culminating in Carnap and the Vienna Circle. 
I suppose that this is true at least in the sense that Quine pointed out some important 
shortcomings in Carnap's views and re-introduced some age-old metaphysical topics. 
However, although Quine does talk about matters metaphysical, his attitude towards the 
discipline is not that much more positive than that o f his colleagues who still lingered 
after the verificationist dream. Moreover, as we saw in the last chapter, Carnap's views 
were not really aimed against the sort of metaphysics that I wish to defend. In what 
follows 1 wi l l look at Quine's conception of metaphysics especially in regard to his two 
well-known papers, 'On What There Is' (1948) and 'Ontological Relativity' (1969). Here 
I aim only to put forward a very general overview of Quine's conception of 
metaphysics, but many of the themes introduced here wil l be discussed in much greater 
detail later on, especially in regard to Hilary Putnam's work. A second topic that I wi l l 
consider briefly is Quine's view about the relationship between philosophy and science, 
which, again, is a topic that wi l l receive considerable attention in Part I I . 
It might be helpful to start by examining the link between Carnap and Quine, as much 
of what Quine wrote is more or less in direct response to Carnap. The idea of linguistic 
frameworks' 8, which we have already discussed, is not appealing to Quine. He contrasts 
Carnap's understanding of ontological commitment with his own: Quine thinks that the 
question about the ontological commitments of a theory is the question of what there is 
according to that theory, i.e. to what entities does the theory commit itself (Quine 1951: 
18 Carnap talks about them in his paper 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (1956). 
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204). The follow-up to this is the question: how does a theory actually commit itself to 
certain entities? Not by the use of names, according to Quine, but through discourse and 
variables of quantification: 
Thus I consider that the essential commitment to entities of any sort comes through the variables of 
quantification and not through the use of alleged names. The entities to which a discourse commits 
us are the entities over which our variables of quantification have to range in order that the 
statements affirmed in that discourse be true. (Quine 1951: 205.) 
Quine summarised the view by coining the well known phrase 'to be is to be the value 
of a variable' and we wi l l take a closer look at the idea shortly, but first we should 
consider why Quine does not appreciate Carnap's linguistic frameworks. 
The idea with Carnap's frameworks, as we saw, is to separate internal and external 
questions. To put it shortly, internal questions are questions o f science, questions about 
the existence of certain entities within the framework of science, whereas external 
questions are in the realm of metaphysics, questions about the whole set of entities and 
not just the ones within a certain framework. This is, as Quine notes, not a question 
about what a given theory presupposes, but a question about what entities there really 
are (Quine 1951: 206). Quine tries to examine this distinction in his own terms and 
introduces a new distinction between category questions - questions that can be raised 
before the adoption of a given language - and subclass questions, which are internal. 
What Quine calls category questions are external, but internal questions also include 
category questions 'when they have trivially analytic or contradictory answers' (Quine 
1951: 207). Quine's worry here is that a distinction like this is rather trivial, because we 
56 
4. Quine's Conception of Metaphysics 
can throw the questions from one side to another just by using different styles o f 
variables for different ranges. 1 wi l l not go into the details of this, because it seems to 
me that Quine is completely missing Carnap's point here.19 Of course, Quine does 
acknowledge that Carnap does not have a trivial distinction in mind. The problem here 
is that Quine tries to analyse this distinction in the terms of his variable-centred 
ontology, while Carnap is clearly looking for a distinction which cannot be described in 
these terms. 
Quine wraps up his case against Carnap by recommending him to abandon the 
distinction between internal and external questions. Interestingly, Quine draws an 
analogy between the distinction at hand and the analytic/synthetic distinction and 
suggests that 
[I]f there is no proper distinction between analytic and synthetic, then no basis at all remains for 
the contrast which Carnap urges between ontological statements and empirical statements of 
existence. (Quine 1951: 211.) 
Quine, having argued that the analytic/synthetic distinction does fail , thus concludes 
that ontology, and even mathematics and logic, are continuous with natural science, the 
differences between these disciplines being only in degree and not in kind. Here we see 
the roots of Quine's conception about the relationship between science and philosophy, 
which he elaborates, for instance, in his 'Posits and Reality' (1955). We wi l l discuss this 
relationship in more detail shortly. 
19 To this extent I agree with both Bird (2003) and Eklund (forthcoming). 
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1 turn now to a central concern over Quine's view of metaphysics: the nature of 
existence and our commitment to it. 'On What There Is' is o f course the crucial text here, 
but the basis of Quine's view was already established in his 'A Logistical Approach to 
the Ontological Problem' (1939). A brief reminder of the well-known discussion over 
nonbeing between Quine and his imaginary opponents, McX and Wyman, is in order. 
McX's account is that Pegasus is an idea, Wyman's account suggests that Pegasus is an 
unactualised possibility and he basically reduces existence to actuality, but grants 
Pegasus its subsistence nevertheless. Quine suggests that Russell's singular descriptions 
might be of some use in trying to settle the debate (1948: 6 f f . ) . The idea is that we can 
paraphrase problematic cases so that 'the burden o f objective reference' is taken over by 
bound variables and thus we can get rid of the commitment to existence in cases like 
Pegasus (a name which has to be translated into a descriptive phrase before Russell's 
move can be made). So, Quine concludes, we do not commit ourselves to the existence 
of Pegasus when we say that it is not. 
Quine suggests that what caused McX and Wyman to err here is a confusion about 
meaning and naming, i.e. not quite grasping the Fregean story about the Evening Star 
and the Morning Star and them having a different meaning although they name the same 
object (Quine 1948: 7). It seems to me, however, that there is a more serious confusion 
at hand here. This is what Putnam showed us some 25 years after Quine's 'On What 
There Is': meanings just ain't in the head. Quine actually suggests that meanings could 
plausibly be explained as ideas in the mind, although he does not commit himself to this 
(ibid.). And while we are on the topic of commitment, let us see again how Quine's story 
goes: 
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We commit ourselves to an ontology containing numbers when we say there are prime numbers 
larger than a million; we commit ourselves to an ontology containing centaurs when we say there 
are centaurs; and we commit ourselves to an ontology containing Pegasus when we say Pegasus is. 
But we do not commit ourselves to an ontology containing Pegasus or the author of Waverley or 
the round square cupola on Berkeley College when we say that Pegasus or the author of Waverley 
or the cupola in question is not. (Quine 1948: 7.) 
So, Quine wants to separate meanings from entities and to get rid of the problem of 
nonbeing in the process. I wi l l discuss these issues in much greater detail later20, but a 
few things should be noted here. Firstly, Quine's understanding of ontological 
commitment is very strange. As others (see for instance Dilman 1984: 4-5) have noted, 
the question of whether Pegasus - that very entity - exists, has little to do with the fact 
that we can utter 'Pegasus exists'. Moreover, our talk is always guided by its context, 
that is, i f we are telling a story about Pegasus to a child, why would we think that 
anything we utter about Pegasus would commit us to anything ontologically significant? 
It is because of problems like this that it is very hard to see what Quine actually means 
when he talks about ontology and specifically ontological commitment. What is even 
more puzzling is how Quine could possibly combine this very loose way of fixing 
ontological commitments with the rigorous naturalism that he proposes in other 
connections. What I mean is: i f ontology and science are continuous, and further, 
science is primary, should we not judge ontological commitment in terms of the 
scientific claims that are being made? In the case of fictional entities like Pegasus the 
scientific story is quite straight-forward: fictional entities do not exist in the sense 
required by science, no matter how much we might talk about them outside scientific 
contexts. 
20 Especially in chapter II: 12. 
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From meanings, Quine jumps to a rather different subject: universals (1948: 8 f f . ) . He is 
of course sceptical about such things as universals, but again he suggests some very 
strange things. According to Quine it is obvious and trivial for McX that there are 
universals, but he claims further that it is characteristic of the proponents of metaphysics 
that they regard all true statements of metaphysics as trivially true: 
Ontological statements follow immediately from all manner of casual statements of commonplace 
fact, just as - from the point of view, anyway, of McX's conceptual scheme - 'There is an attribute1 
follows from 'there are red houses, red roses, red sunsets'. (Quine 1948: 8.) 
This seems like a rather catastrophic misunderstanding of how ontological theories 
emerge. Surely it is not a question of some trivial grasping, something that follows from 
a conceptual scheme without any need for further justification, as Quine suggests. 
Something like this would seem to imply what Quine came to suggest later: the 
relativity of ontology. However, the explanation for Quine's harsh understanding of 
ontological theories lies ahead: 
Now how are we to adjudicate among rival ontologies? Certainly the answer is not provided by the 
semantical formula 'To be is to be the value of a variable'; this formula serves rather, conversely, in 
testing the conformity of a given remark or doctrine to a prior ontological standard. We look to 
bound variables in connection with ontology not in order to know what there is, but in order to 
know what a given remark or doctrine, ours or someone else's says there is; and this much is quite 
properly a problem involving language. But what there is is another question. (Quine 1948: 10.) 
This explains a lot indeed, for some of Quine's remarks seem to suggest that he has 
completely missed the point of ontological investigation in the first place; and this is 
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exactly to try to find out what there is, not to find out what some theories claim there to 
be.21 Of course, we could have some doubts about whether Quine is right even about the 
case of finding out what a given doctrine says there is, but I wi l l leave that aside to get 
into the bottom of the more substantial case. Quine thinks that we might have reasons to 
stay on the 'semantical plane' in this case as well, but these reasons are mostly practical: 
we need to first f ind some 'common ground on which to argue' (ibid.). 
Quine hopes that on the 'semantical plane' we could still talk about the same things 
although we have fundamental disagreements in our conceptual schemes. This might 
grasp something relevant about ontological debates, as it turns out that we often are able 
to discuss metaphysical topics even though the conception of metaphysics differs 
fundamentally between the opponents. However, I do not see why this would make it 
necessary to reduce discussion about ontology to discussion about language. 1 do admit 
that some work would have to be done to clarify the language of metaphysics and there 
is certainly work to be done in the methodology of metaphysics, but these are not 
merely semantic matters.22 
Fortunately, Quine does admit that the question of what there is does not quite reduce to 
linguistics. Instead he puts it to us that our acceptance of an ontology is similar to our 
acceptance of a scientific theory (Quine 1948: 10). This is something that 1 find very 
appealing initially, but Quine quickly adds something that makes me refuse the idea: 
according to him this means that we adopt the simplest conceptual scheme into which 
21 Of course, this is, by no means, all that ontological investigation amounts to: the more interesting 
question is how the different kinds of things that exist are organised, that is, what is the categorical 
structure of reality. 
22 This is exactly what I propose to clarify in the course of this thesis, chapter II: 13 is especially relevant 
in this regard. 
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we can fit our empirical experiences. Now, to me, this sounds very much as i f he was 
after all trying to tell us a linguistic story, despite his promises: 
To whatever extent the adoption of any system of scientific theory may be said to be a matter of 
language, the same - but no more - may be said of the adoption of an ontology. (Quine 1948: 11). 
This sounds just fine to me, but the implication is that 1 disagree very strongly with 
Quine's conception of science [sic]. Surely, it is not a matter of language which 
scientific theory we adopt, the issue is how well it corresponds with reality. Quine 
appeals to simplicity, and of course he is right: we do prefer simpler conceptual 
schemes, but this is hardly relevant for the correctness of a theory. I f a scientist makes 
his choices on linguistic grounds, he is not a very good scientist. It seems then that this 
idea turns against Quine. 
It is not surprising, given that Quine reduces both ontology and science to conceptual 
schemes23, that he later put forward the idea of the relativity of ontology; indeed, it 
seems to me that this is the logical consequence of what we saw in 'On What There Is'. 
Some hints of what was to follow are present in Quine's 'Ontological Reduction and the 
World of Numbers' (1964), where he plays with the idea of reducing ontology to 
numbers and sets. But it is of course his 'Ontological Relativity' which is the most 
interesting paper for us. Quine's examples of the inscrutability of reference and 
indeterminacy o f translation are quite familiar, and given the connection between 
ontology and linguistics that we saw Quine to suggest above, the path from, as it were, 
the relativity of language to the relativity of ontology is somewhat straight-forward. 
23 Which, incidentally, bear remarkable similarity to Carnap's linguistic frameworks, which Quine 
supposedly abandoned. 
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Quine's resolution to the problems introduced by the inscrutability of reference rests on 
an idea about a background language: it is not meaningful to ask whether our terms or 
concepts refer to something 'absolutely', we can ask questions like 'Does 'rabbit' really 
refer to rabbits?' only relative to some background language which defines one or other 
sense of'rabbits' (Quine 1969: 53). But it is not just the need for a background language 
which is at issue here, for Quine suggests that similarly: 
What makes sense is to say not what the objects of a theory are, absolutely speaking, but how one 
theory of objects is interpretable in or reinterpretable in another. (Ibid.). 
Thus, we do not only need a background language, but a background theory as well. 
One implication of this, according to Quine, is that we cannot require theories to be 
'fully interpreted'; theories are always interpreted relative to an overall home theory. 
Quine has some worries that this wi l l be understood as making universal predication 
meaningless (or perhaps the other way around: the meaninglessness of universal 
predication implies the relativity), but this is not what he thinks (Quine 1969: 54-55). 
The real cause for the meaninglessness of ontological questions is supposed to be 
circularity. For some reason, Quine does not give too many arguments for this. In fact, 
his case is the following: a question like 'What is an F?' can only be answered by 
introducing another term: 'An F is a G.', and this is meaningful only relative to the 
'uncritical acceptance of "G" ' (Quine 1969: 55). 
In a trivial sense, Quine is right. When we answer questions like 'What is an F?', we 
indeed do it by recourse to some other terms. In this sense, our theories are relative to 
background theories and perhaps to some kind of a home theory. But does this imply 
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that ontological questions are meaningless? Well, I suppose that we could avoid this 
result by parting ways with Quine to start with, as I already suggested when we 
considered his conceptual schemes and the trouble that they caused. However, even i f 
we went a bit further with Quine, I believe that we could still save ontology proper. For 
it seems to me that all that Quine has showed with the need for a background theory is 
that we indeed need to stop the regress at some point and take something for granted. 
This would point out to the home theory, to which everything else falls back. The home 
theory, then, would have to be a theory about the most fundamental ontological 
preconditions, which are not relative to anything else. It is naturally arguable what these 
preconditions are, but we would at least have to agree that there are some, as otherwise 
we would have to take Quine's project to its logical end, which cannot be anything else 
than utter scepticism and anti-realism. It might be tempting for Quine and others who 
prefer desert landscapes to try to get the good things of the realist's ontology without 
committing to one, but this kind of an attempt is doomed to failure. Fortunately, we can 
quite coherently enjoy the benefits of realism before this 'home theory' is fully 
characterised, as it merely requires adopting the fallibilism of the scientific method. As I 
wi l l argue at length later24, this method is very much committed to the idea of a 
fundamental ontological structure in the background, a 'home theory' of sorts. The irony 
in Quine's approach is precisely that he has a very deep trust in science, but at the same 
time he is digging the ground under it. 
To be fair, despite Quine's remarks about the relativity of ontology, he seems to be quite 
happy to discuss ontological matters - after all, he continued to publish material which 
all but ignores his previous results after 'Ontological Relativity', as Koskinen (2004: 
24 Chapters II: 5-7 
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245) has also noted. Moreover, Quine seems to fall into the Aristotelian trap noted in the 
opening chapter: he defends the relativistic framework from metaphysical grounds and 
thus is already involved in a metaphysical discussion. Because of this and other 
reasons25, we could very well say that Quine is a metaphysician in a very fundamental 
sense of the word. 
To conclude, 1 wish to briefly consider Quine's conception o f philosophy more 
generally, and especially his views about the relationship between science and 
philosophy. As an idea, the continuity of science and philosophy is very appealing to me 
- 1 hesitate to use the word 'naturalism', but, i f this word is correctly understood, the 
conception o f metaphysics that I wi l l put forward in this thesis is very naturalistic 
indeed: 1 consider natural science to have metaphysical foundations, to which it is 
completely reducible. But Quine would not like the sound of this, for he expresses the 
continuity between science and philosophy quite differently: 
The scientific system, ontology and all, is a conceptual bridge of our own making, linking sensory 
stimulation to sensory stimulation. [...] But I also expressed [...] my unswerving belief in external 
things - people, nerve endings, sticks, stones. This I reaffirm. I believe also, if less firmly, in atoms 
and electrons and in classes. Now how is all this robust realism to be reconciled with the barren 
scene that I have just been depicting? The answer is naturalism: the recognition that it is within 
science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described. 
(Quine 1981.) 
Naturalism, in Quine's terms, is science through and through. Science, then, is a 
conceptual tool for organising sensory stimulations. But how does one defend a 'robust 
25 Koskinen (2004) has made a book-length case for this. 
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realism' with the help of a conceptual tool? Any conceptual mapping from one sensory 
stimulation to another is not going to say anything about its reality - its existence 
conditions. Yet Quine insists on believing in external things. Presumably this means that 
he believes that peoples and stones exist. Given his previous remarks about ontological 
commitment, all that Quine means by exists is that he talks about these entities. But this, 
as I argued, is a very strange way to think about existence. Certainly, this is not a 
scientific way to think about existence, for it implies that winged horses and centaurs 
exist. What seems to be amiss here is that Quine is unwilling to acknowledge the fu l l -
blown realism that is required to separate existence proper from a very confused 
pseudo-existence. Implicitly, of course, he is very much committed to the realist 
framework, as is natural science, and indeed helped to advance the research for the 
metaphysical foundations of natural science. There is much more to say about all this, 
but the theme is recurring in Part II and perhaps I have said enough for now. It seems, in 
any case, that Quine as well is on the same metaphysical boat. 
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I have now discussed the views of certain philosophers who have undeniably been some 
of the most influential in terms o f amending our conception o f metaphysics. I could 
have discussed a number of other, arguably at least as influential philosophers as Aris-
totle, Kant, Carnap and Quine. But a survey of the history of philosophy, or metaphys-
ics, is not all I wish to do here, for 1 have something to contribute to the discussion my-
self. In Part I I we wi l l return to many of the issues that have previously been mentioned 
in passing. The purpose so far has been to examine the baggage that we bring to the dis-
cussion when we introduce any of these topics, and there is a lot of it. Nevertheless, I 
hope that in most cases the original problem is clear enough and I wi l l certainly attempt 
to address that problem, and not merely repeat what the great dead philosophers have 
said. 
In the Introduction I already summarised what I am going to say in Part 11, but a brief 
recap might be in order. The first four chapters are concerned with contemporary views 
in metaphysics, such as Hilary Putnam's, Michael Dummett's, Nelson Goodman's, Frank 
Jackson's and Eli Hirsch's. My approach wi l l be slightly different from Part I , as I wi l l 
be actively criticising all of these philosophers. Again, a number of philosophers, espe-
cially those with whom I have more sympathy, such as David Lewis and David Arm-
strong, wi l l be largely omitted. In later chapters I wi l l return to the views of these and 
other philosophers in regard to the specific issues that I wi l l discuss. From chapter five 
onwards the focus wi l l be on particular issues rather than the views of individual philo-
sophers. A l l of these have already been discussed, i f only very briefly. 
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Before I launch into the next part, it might be helpful to consider where Quine and the 
route to him has left us. Most importantly, the seed of scepticism that Kant planted 
seems to prevail. With Carnap and the Vienna Circle it reached its fu l l potential, but the 
same hostility towards metaphysical realism is still very much present in Quine - and 
equally in Putnam, as we wi l l shortly see. This is an issue that we w i l l have to tackle 
constantly and 1 w i l l devote plenty of time - more than I would like to - to address it. 
Another theme which 1 wi l l discuss at some length is the relationship between philo-
sophy and science. Aristotle talked about it, Kant most certainly did, and by Carnap and 
Quine philosophy had almost been swallowed by science. Strangely, the major chal-
lenge for metaphysics according to Carnap (and Quine) is that it lacks the rigour and 
certainty o f science. Quine further suggested that philosophy is really a part of science. 
This is of course very peculiar by Aristotelian lights: for one thing, it was never even 
suggested that metaphysics would not be continuous with science, it almost goes 
without saying that it must be. But it should be equally clear that any sort of a ground-
ing relation can only go one way here, that is, we should rather be looking for meta-
physical foundations of natural science. Kant, as we saw, acknowledged this picture, but 
sadly his project is usually twisted by a very sceptical reading. In Part I I , as I have re-
peatedly mentioned, 1 wil l discuss the nature of the relationship between metaphysics 
and science and suggest that the Aristotelian story is indeed the most plausible one. 
It wil l be useful to keep the roots of these issues in mind when we launch into the con-
temporary discussion. A l l too often the real issue at hand is forgotten and clouded by 
technical jargon. It is not an entirely unfamiliar sight that the core issues, such as the 
question over realism, are dubbed as 'metaphilosophy' and thus unimportant - perhaps 
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suitable to pursue after one retires. But 'metaphilosophy', should be the very first of our 
concerns. How are we supposed to reach any agreement i f we are not in agreement on 
what it is that we are trying reach agreement on! Although I wi l l discuss a number of 
specific technical issues in Part 11, 1 wil l attempt to do it in the framework of this more 
general problem. Indeed, it is my purpose to show that in all of the seemingly different 
areas of philosophy we are operating within the very same framework - the one that I 
call 'metaphysical' in the Aristotelian spirit. So, now that the history and purpose of this 
project have been examined, it is time to pursue the nature of metaphysics. 
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1. Putnam's Critique of Metaphysical Realism 
Hilary Putnam is a philosopher who has contributed much to metaphysics, but he has 
also endorsed views which metaphysical realists do not find very appealing. His 
influence on contemporary metaphysics, in any case, is undeniable, so it is appropriate 
to start the pursuit of the real nature of metaphysics with Putnam. Needless to say, we 
wi l l return to him repeatedly during the course of this thesis. Before we start, something 
must be noted about Putnam: as is well known, it is particularly hard to pinpoint what 
exactly are his views at any given time. It is often said that he is more interested in 
getting the story right than defending his previous views. Be that as it may, it should be 
noted that when I talk about Putnam, I usually talk about the Putnam of a certain period. 
In fact, one should not think that I am talking about Putnam's views specifically, but 
rather about views that Putnam once put forward and which even now enjoy wide 
support from a number o f his followers, although not necessarily from Putnam himself. 
In what follows 1 wi l l examine some of Putnam's views about the possibility of 
metaphysical realism. The paper that 1 wil l focus on here, 'Why there isn't a ready-made 
world' (1981) represents Putnam's 'sceptical' period, roughly from 1975 to 1994 (cf. 
Norris 2002), during which he questioned his earlier views on scientific realism and put 
forward the view known as 'internal realism'.2 6 During this period Putnam was 
particularly hostile towards metaphysical realism. The way he understood metaphysical 
realism at the time should be clear from the following quote: 
What the metaphysical realist holds is that we can think and talk about things as they are, 
26 We will take a look at the post-1994 Putnam in the next chapter. 
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independently of our minds, and that we can do this by virtue of a 'correspondence' relation 
between the terms in our language and some sorts of mind-independent entities. (Putnam 1981: 
205.) 
I should point out that I am not quite happy with this definition of metaphysical realism, 
but it is not my concern at the moment to put forward a better one, we should merely 
see where Putnam takes us. This definition leaves it open what the 'correspondence' 
relation between the language and the world is. Putnam immediately abandons the 
Moore-Russell view that sense data are the mind-independent entities in the world 
required by metaphysical realism and instead focuses on the view that these mind-
independent entities are material objects and the 'correspondence' relation is some sort 
of a causal relation between our language and these entities (ibid.). What he then 
suggests, to put it shortly, is that metaphysical realism is incompatible with the denial of 
essences, and this is why some materialists (as it is materialists who support what 
Putnam calls metaphysical realism) have revived the talk of essences. What Putnam 
then argues is that the kind of metaphysical realism that mixes materialism and 
essentialism is not consistent (Putnam 1981: 207). We could certainly say a few things 
about this initial construction as there is arguably quite a bit that not all metaphysical 
realists would be content with (indeed, Putnam constructs something like a straw man 
here), but let us humour Putnam and follow his argumentation for now. 
First of all, Putnam tries to motivate his case of focusing on materialism. He thinks that 
materialism and scientism somehow reflect our 'desire' for speculative metaphysics. For 
one thing, this can supposedly be seen in the blind trust in science or physics, which 
serves as the closest thing to a single true ontological theory. Another important aspect 
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of this interpretation is that metaphysics understood like this can be considered as open 
ended, a revisable discipline. Putnam correctly acknowledges the appeal of this sort of 
view, but he is very worried about this being just a contemporary form of scientism, 
which has replaced positivism and pragmatism. (Putnam 1981: 210-211.) 
Putnam has indeed grasped something relevant here, as it seems to me that the sort of 
natural metaphysics which preserves the fallibility of science is the only kind of 
metaphysics that we can have. Of course, Putnam thinks that we cannot have even this 
very restricted form of speculative metaphysics. What we need to consider now is how 
and why does Putnam refute this view that initially sounds so promising. His hatred 
towards scientism seems to be an important factor here. I can certainly sympathise with 
this i f scientism is understood in the sense that it is often associated with Quine, but 
Putnam does not seem to have this in mind. We have to go into little more detail to get 
to the bottom of this. 
What Putnam considers to be crucial for metaphysical realists is that the coherence of 
their theory requires a so called 'ready-made' world (Putnam 1981: 211). The idea 
behind this is that there has to be a certain structure in the world with which our 
language can correspond. This is required for the very intelligibility of the idea of 
correspondence. Putnam then suggests that many materialist metaphysicians take causal 
relations to be an example of this structure, but he also raises a question: is causation a 
physical relation at all, i.e. is it compatible with materialism (ibid.)? He constructs quite 
an original case to show that, in either case, causation does not do the trick that 
materialists hope. According to Putnam, we are often simply relying on our intuitive 
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notion of explanation when we say that something caused something; this might be a 
part of the total cause, but we can hardly ever list all the parts in the total cause and 
could thus never use it properly, or so the argument goes (Putnam 1981: 213). 
The idea behind Putnam's criticism is, of course, not all that original after all. He simply 
puts Kant's ideas in modern clothes: 
[SJalience and relevance are attributes of thought and reasoning, not of nature. To project them into 
the realist's 'real world', into what Kant called noumenal world, is to mix objective idealism (or, 
perhaps, medieval Aristoteleanism) and materialism in a totally incoherent way. (Putnam 1981: 
215.) 
In spirit, Putnam's account seems to be little more than neo-Kantianism. However, he 
does raise some important questions, which might indeed be problematic for the 
metaphysical materialist that he opposes. But I am not quite convinced that we have to 
follow the path that Putnam lays ahead of us i f we want to be metaphysical realists. The 
only thing that we really need is the so called 'ready-made' world. We can certainly 
agree about salience and relevance being in the mind rather than in the 'real world', I 
guess that this could be said even about causality as it is some times defined. But it is 
the single, coherent structure of the world that metaphysical realists need, and this is 
something that Putnam has not yet motivated us to abandon. In fact, his case is based on 
the critique of causality, which is supposed to be a proof of the needed structure. I wi l l 
not go into the details of causation here, although 1 do believe that we might be able to 
explain it properly in regard to a single coherent structure of reality. But causation is 
certainly not the only example of a 'built-in' structure in the world. In later chapters I 
wi l l argue that the only way to explain the success o f science is to acknowledge a 
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structure like this. However, it should also be noted that there is nothing here that 
necessarily commits us to materialism, at least not in the way Putnam uses the word. As 
far as we know, there might be nothing materialistic about the fundamental structure of 
reality, but its structure certainly imposes certain conditions, laws i f you like, for the 
entities that it consists of. Thus, it seems to me that the problems that Putnam raises 
with his critique of causation are not as serious a threat to metaphysical realists as he 
suggests. 
It might be that Putnam's comments on essentialism are more threatening. According to 
him, metaphysical realists need essences because denying them would be denying 
intrinsic properties, which in turn would threaten the correspondence between our 
thoughts and things. The upshot is that we would not be able to pick out any single 
correspondence relation between our language and the world: 'reference becomes an 
"occult" phenomenon', as Putnam (1981: 207) puts it. I think that we could once again 
argue that metaphysical realism does not necessarily have to take this route to start with, 
but as my sympathies lie with essentialism and there indeed seems to be a connection 
with essentialism and metaphysical realism, we probably ought to see where Putnam 
goes with this. 
He starts by applying Kripke to the classic case of the statue and the piece of clay that 
the statue was made of, the moral being of course that these are two distinct objects with 
different essential properties (Putnam 1981: 218 f f ) . Kripke's ideas of the matter are of 
course quite widely accepted and Putnam does not disagree with him here. His question, 
instead, is whether the Kripke-type essentialism can be of any help to materialism. In 
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fact, the question is a bit misleading, as the problem that Putnam here raises is really 
about whether essences are 'in the world' or just linguistic conventions: 
No one doubts that the concept 'that statue' is a different concept from the concept 'that piece of 
clay'; the question is whether there is some individual in the actual world to which one of these 
concepts essentially applies while the other only accidentally applies. (Putnam 1981: 220.) 
This conceptual sense of essentialism is the type of essentialism that Putnam himself 
can be said to support, as he acknowledges to have done in his 'The Meaning of 
"Meaning"' (ibid.). Yet he concludes that neither his nor Kripke's version of essentialism 
is of any help to the materialist. Putnam puts this rather strangely though, suggesting 
that a 'metaphysical reading' of his or Kripke's essentialism is 'realist enough', but the 
realism in question is not of a materialist sort (Putnam 1981: 221). This strikes me as a 
too easy escape. How, exactly, are these versions of essentialism 'realist enough', and 
what is the type of realism in question? I do not see how any conceptualist account of 
essentialism could be realist and I doubt that we can have any kind of a middle way 
here; either we go for full-blown metaphysical realism, or we are stuck with the 
conceptual ism that the passage quoted above suggests. The motivation to go for the 
realist path should be obvious, so unless there is more to be said against essentialism of 
this sort, this hardly constitutes a refutation of metaphysical realism. The only further 
problem that Putnam mentions is that the kind of ontology that Kripke put forward 
presupposes essentialism and thus cannot be used to ground it (Putnam 1981: 220). This 
issues was o f course discussed in detail in Salmon (2005) and is quite clearly true. But a 
theory of essentialism does certainly not need to rest on Kripke's shoulders; we have 
enough independent reasons to adopt essentialism, as wi l l be made clear in the course of 
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this thesis. 
Putnam also notes that a semantic reading of the types o f essentialism described above 
causes some problems for the materialist, namely, it presupposes the notion of reference 
(ibid.). We do not have to look into the notion of reference very deeply, as the semantic 
reading is really not the way that we want to take. In fact it seems that the possible 
problems about reference are of a more serious kind to anyone who denies metaphysical 
realism. This is exactly because the metaphysical reading of Kripke-Putnam 
essentialism gives us a very straight-forward way to deal with most problems that are 
traditionally associated with reference. 
The challenge that metaphysical realists can present to Putnam and other opponents of 
metaphysical realism is to ask them to offer some kind of an explanation for the success 
of our rational activities. I f we live in a non-structured world, why does it appear to be 
structured, and, moreover, why can we manipulate it with the help of our knowledge of 
certain observed structural patterns, i.e. how can we explain, without acknowledging a 
'ready-made world', that scientific knowledge accumulates, when it is clearly based on 
the assumption that reality is structured? 
Putnam was no doubt aware of this challenge (cf. Norris 2002: 34) and he ends the 
paper under consideration now by offering a sort of an answer. The answer is 'a species 
of pragmatism' (Putnam 1981: 225). So, at this point Putnam was still selling his 
'internal realism', he also refers to Nelson Goodman here (we w i l l look at the connection 
between Putnam and Goodman as well as Michael Dummett in the next chapter). His 
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final judgement o f metaphysical realism goes as follows: 
The approach to which 1 have devoted this paper is an approach which claims that there is a 
'transcendental' reality in Kant's sense, one absolutely independent of our minds, that the regulative 
ideal of knowledge is to copy it or put our thoughts in 'correspondence' with it, but (and this its 
what makes it 'natural' metaphysics) we need no intellektuelle AnschauungXo do this: the 'scientific 
method' will do the job for us. 'Metaphysics within the bounds of science alone' might be its 
slogan. (Putnam 1981: 226.) 
Having considered the argument that Putnam puts forward in fu l l , it is time to note some 
problems with it. First of all, speaking of transcendental in Kant's sense here is asking 
for trouble (not only because of the different interpretations of Kant). Yes, we are 
talking about a mind-independent reality, but that is all that we are talking about; just 
one world and our minds as a part of it. There is nothing particularly 'transcendental' 
about this. When put like this, the 'correspondence' between our thoughts and the world 
becomes a necessity. In terms of the intellektuelle Anschauung, Putnam is right, we do 
not need an 'intuition' or something like that to uphold this correspondence. But to say 
that the 'scientific method' is sufficient is over-stretching the idea of scientific method a 
bit. At least we need a new understanding of the scientific method i f we want it to do the 
job of metaphysics, namely, we need to acknowledge the a priori part of scientific 
reasoning (which we wil l discuss in length later on). Consequently, it is our epistemic 
access to this a priori part which is in fact the intellektuelle Anschauung. Instead of 
calling this 'metaphysics within the bounds of science', it could be called 'science within 
the bounds of metaphysics', for the upshot is that all scientific disciplines are deeply 
involved with metaphysics. 
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This is an important point, and it seems that right here we could disagree with Putnam 
about the project of metaphysical realism. In a later paper he suggests that the kind of 
'internal' or pragmatic realism that he holds is 'realism with a small V " , whereas 
metaphysical realism deserves a big 'R' (Putnam 1988: 390 f f ) . This is because Putnam 
sees metaphysical realism as 'a powerful transcendental picture1, something that echoes 
the neo-Kantian line of thought that we already saw above. The problem, according to 
Putnam, is that realism with a big 'R* goes too far beyond the common sense view, it is 
absurd (ibid.). The problem that 1 see with his approach is exactly the same: it is 
completely unable to ground the common sense view, which metaphysical realism, on 
the other hand, manages to do just fine. Indeed, it seems that realism just is the 
pragmatic choice. 
Consider once again the problem of mind-independent reality: 
What I am saying, then, is that elements of what we call "language" or "mind" penetrate so deeply 
into what we call "reality" that the very project of representing ourselves as being "mappers" of 
something "language independent" is fatally compromised from the very start. Like Relativism, 
but in a different way, Realism is an impossible attempt to view the world from Nowhere. (Putnam 
1988: 392, italics his.) 
Relativism is indeed what this sounds like, but I do not see what the 'different way' 
could be. Perhaps the strongest case that we can come up with to defend metaphysical 
realism is exactly that the only alternative is relativism. While some philosophers (like 
Rorty, whom Putnam discusses in the quoted paper) might be quite happy with 
relativism, there is a good reason why it is not the predominant view. We have also seen 
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Quine's case for relativism, but both Quine and Putnam have continued to pursue 
philosophical topics as i f there would be a realist path after all. Quite often it seems to 
be the ambiguity related with reality that is independent of language and mind which 
motivates the relativist path. Presumably this is because obviously language is a 
relevant part of reality. But it is not as i f realism would try to view the world outside 
language, but rather the world which includes language, and minds, and all the entities 
that it de facto includes. This is in no way a very revolutionary view, after all, there is a 
whole science which goes 'outside language' and analyses and modifies it all the time, 
namely linguistics. 
It seems that what is at the bottom of this confusion is that Putnam takes metaphysical 
realism to say something about the 'transcendental' reality in Kant's sense. Putnam 
(1981: 226) notes that analytic philosophers have always tried to dismiss this sort o f talk 
as nonsense, quite like Carnap did. As I mentioned already in the chapter concerning 
Carnap's attack on metaphysics, this tendency is quite justified, to a certain extent. But 
this is not what contemporary analytic metaphysicians are concerned with. The talk 
about two worlds, the phenomenal and the noumenal, is thoroughly misleading and this 
is exactly where most attacks against metaphysical realism go astray. This is why I have 
been talking about 'Aristotelian metaphysics' as opposed to 'Kantian metaphysics'. At 
times Putnam talks about metaphysical realism as i f he had the Aristotelian sort in mind, 
but it is clear from a number of passages discussed above, that it is the idea of 
'transcendental' reality and our epistemic access to it that he is troubled with. 
Above I have repeatedly hinted at the metaphysical nature of science, or metaphysics as 
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a necessary basis for science. This is exactly what Putnam denies. He points out that, for 
instance, there are numerous formulations of Newtonian gravity which, although 
empirically equivalent and consistent with the relevant equations, disagree in terms of 
their metaphysical interpretation (Putnam 1981: 227). The same goes for quantum 
mechanics, where the differences in metaphysical interpretations are even more radical. 
The problem, then, is that although philosophers are eager to argue which one of these 
interpretations is the correct one, Putnam says that ' I know of not a single first-rate 
physicist who takes an interest in such speculations', which is supposed to show that the 
history of science does not support the claim that metaphysics and science are somehow 
continuous (ibid.). One only wonders which physicists Putnam knows, as this is exactly 
what most physicists are preoccupied about. The correct interpretation of quantum 
mechanics has probably been the hottest topic in theoretical physics for the last 60 years 
and, we might add, Putnam himself has contributed to this debate (although he, of 
course, is not a physicist). 1 hardly need to point out examples (I wi l l nevertheless do it 
in later chapters). Putnam is of course right to note that there might be several different 
interpretations (of quantum mechanics or something else) which are metaphysically 
equivalent, but differ in notation (or perhaps language). But this poses no serious 
problems for metaphysical realism.2 7 To be fair to Putnam, he does not direct the 
criticisms considered here towards Aristotelian metaphysics, but towards naive Kantian 
metaphysics, that is, metaphysics without fallibilism. But I am already getting ahead of 
myself here; these issues wi l l be discussed in more detail in following chapters. 
27 We will discuss metaphysically equivalent theories in chapter 13. 
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Now that we have looked at Putnam's earlier critique of metaphysical realism it is time 
to give the stage to the post-1994 Putnam and see how his views have changed. In what 
follows we wil l see that to a large extent Putnam now thinks that his earlier case against 
metaphysical realism was flawed. We wil l also take a brief look at Michael Dummett's 
and Nelson Goodman's views and their relationship with Putnam's earlier views. As we 
wi l l see, there are good reasons to think that the views of earlier Putnam, Dummett and 
Goodman are analogous in their challenge for metaphysical realism - thus the refutation 
of one would largely undermine the others. The issue, however, is not quite as simple as 
just a debate between realism and anti-realism (and not only because some philosophers 
think they are in the middle of these views), for as we saw in the last chapter, the 
characterisation o f metaphysical realism that Putnam put forward is not entirely 
satisfactory. 
In his John Dewey lectures (1994) Putnam takes an interesting and a rather surprising 
approach to the problem of realism. He starts with traditional realism and considers why 
it became a problem, concluding that what is at issue here is the epistemological 
problem of how we can be in cognitive contact with the world (Putnam 1994: 454). 
Obviously, this implies the need for some kind o f an account o f how we reach 
information with the help of our perception. The solution that Putnam considers is direct 
realism, or 'natural realism', as he calls the view that the objects of perception proper 
(i.e. not hallucinations etc.) are external things, and those external things cause us to 
have some subjective experiences (ibid.). This route is preferred because there are some 
82 
2. Metaphysical Realism: the Putnam-Dummett-Goodman Challenge 
severe problems associated with the traditional 'Cartesian' view, whether materialist or 
not (Putnam refers to both McDowell and James in this connection) and thus it seems 
that we do not have a convincing case for why we should analyse sensory experiences 
as 'intermediaries between us and the world' (ibid.). What follows is basically a 
reintroduction o f the naive problems traditionally associated with perception; dreams, 
hallucinations and so on. Something like this might sound quite uninteresting at first, 
but I do believe that Putnam has a point here and I am quite will ing to follow him with 
this. An approach like this might certainly be a good deal more fruitful than his earlier 
approach which has only relativism to offer. 
Putnam notes an analogy between the traditional, naive problem of perception and the 
world, and the modern and supposedly not quite so naive problem of language and the 
world: 
Just think: How could the question 'How does language hook on to the world?' even appear to pose 
a difficulty, unless the retort 'How can there be a problem about talking about, say, houses and 
trees when we see them all the time?' had not already been rejected in advance as question begging 
or "hopelessly naive"? The "how does language hook on to the world" issue is, at bottom, a replay 
of the old "how does perception hook on to the world" issue. (Putnam 1994: 456.) 
I think that the main line o f thought here is correct. Even though there certainly are 
some special questions about language, the main motivation for a substantial part of the 
discussion involving it is exactly the old 'how does perception hook on to the world' 
issue. At first this might not seem like a very important matter, but when we consider 
why the problem of perception and the world is not very widely discussed any more, it 
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emerges that the same reasons might undermine a lot of the discussion about the 'how 
does language hook on to the world' issue. To put it shortly, the reason for abandoning 
the problem of perception is exactly its naivety and, frankly, the obvious dead-end that 
awaits us i f we take the utterly sceptical path a la Descartes. I do not consider this result 
to be very surprising, for 1 am inclined to think that a great deal of the discussion 
concerned with the 'how does language hook on to the world' issue is quite misguided in 
a similar manner. However, what is crucial here is that Putnam tries to re-introduce the 
discussion about perception and the world and to show that we have to take the path of 
'natural realism' to overcome the problems that still haunt the discussion. I have some 
sympathy towards this kind of idea, but I am afraid that Putnam still tries to dodge the 
metaphysical implications that any view about realism necessarily brings with it. Be that 
as it may, 1 fully agree with the initial move that Putnam has made here: we need to get 
over the idea that there is something between us and the world which is somehow 
incredibly hard to overcome. It seems to me that this view can lead to nothing else but 
scepticism and relativism. 
Relativism is of course a direct implication of the view that Putnam used to hold, and 
this is certainly a positive development, but unfortunately the 'natural realism' that he 
now defends is not very sympathetic to metaphysical realism either. Putnam goes on to 
defend his form of direct realism, signs of which he sees in Wittgenstein, Husserl and 
especially Austin, by considering perhaps the most classical problem of all in regard to 
sensory experiences: dreams (Putnam 1994: 469 f f . ) . He responds to a number of other 
well-known counterexamples aimed against direct realism as well. Interesting as they 
are, we do not need to go into the details. But what is o f interest to us is how Putnam 
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now sees his earlier work and the case against metaphysical realism which he put 
forward. We wi l l also see how Putnam's earlier project is connected to Dummett and 
Goodman. 
In the Dewey lectures Putnam acknowledges his debt to Dummett in regard to the 
development o f his 'internal realism'. The problem that Putnam was preoccupied with at 
the time when he abandoned scientific realism for 'internal realism' was how reference 
is possible in the 'Cartesian cum materialist' philosophy of perception, which Putnam 
admits to have supported earlier (Putnam 1994: 460). This is, in effect, what the 
infamous model-theoretic argument amounts to (Putnam 1980).2 8 At that time, Putnam 
thought that the solution to this puzzle lies in verificationist semantics, an idea that was 
initially put forward by Dummett (1978). According to Dummett's view, the debate over 
realism comes down to questions about semantics, although he apparently thinks that 
one can, in principle, be realist about certain things and antirealist about others 
(Dummett 1991: 15-16). In any case, Dummett argues for global anti-realism, and this is 
what inspired Putnam's 'internal realism', even though he does not want to go quite as 
far as Dummett; it seems to me that Putnam wants to preserve fallibilism, as he is not 
thrilled about Dummett's idea concerning the absoluteness o f the verification or 
falsification of empirical propositions (Putnam 1994: 461-462). 
Dummett insists that bivalence is in a central position for all types of realism, which is 
understandably connected with his view that realism is a semantic thesis (Dummett 
1982: 561). This leads him to all kinds of issues into which we wi l l not go now, for 1 
find this approach very unappealing to start with, and it wi l l be made clear why. 
28 See Field (forthcoming) for discussion. 
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However, let us see how Dummett himself describes his position: 
My contention is that all these metaphysical issues [questions about truth, time etc.] turn on 
questions about the correct meaning-theory for our language. We must not try to resolve the 
metaphysical questions first, and then construct a meaning-theory in the light of the answers. We 
should investigate how our language actually functions, and how we can construct a workable 
systematic description of how it functions; the answers to those questions will then determine the 
answers to the metaphysical ones. (Dummett 1991: 338.) 
So, it is a meaning-theory that Dummett wants, and it does indeed seem that his view 
does not leave much room for metaphysical realism. Furthermore, the rejection of 
bivalence is crucial for Dummett's antirealism and he seems to be inclined to think that 
some kind of outright antirealism is the most interesting alternative, and this, in his 
terms, means rejecting any kind o f objectivist semantics altogether (Dummett 1982: 
578, 582). The view seems to be very sympathetic to the idea of conceptual relativity 
that Putnam has put forward in his writings about 'internal realism' (see for example 
Putnam 1987). It would appear that it is exactly conceptual relativity that introduces the 
biggest challenge for metaphysical realism, because it seems that conceptual relativism 
is at least implicit in most anti-realist accounts. Putnam (1983b) expresses his sympathy 
towards Dummett's account in a connection where he also suggests that vagueness is 
problematic for metaphysical realists. In the same paper Putnam notes that he himself as 
well as Dummett and Goodman generally argue for a conception of truth as idealised 
justification or rational acceptability. On the other hand, at least Dummett quite clearly 
thinks that realism requires a commitment to the conception of truth as direct 
correspondence. In fact, this seems to be Dummett's case against the accusation of 
86 
2. Metaphysical Realism: the Putnam-Dummett-Goodman Challenge 
considering realism solely as a semantic doctrine, for he thinks that a sufficient analysis 
in semantic terms provides an answer also to the epistemic questions which are 
traditionally associated with realism: 
[I]n so far as the meaning-theory takes a truth-conditional form, in so far as it equates the 
understanding of a sentence with a knowledge of the condition that must obtain for the sentence to 
be true, it has to explain in what a speaker's knowledge of that condition consists. When it is 
possible to give a non-trivial answer to the question in virtue of what a sentence of a certain form 
is true, if it is true, we have already an explanation of what a speaker must know in knowing the 
condition for a sentence of that form to be true. (Dummett 1982: 586.) 
In short, Dummett suggests that a completed meaning-theory accounts for the epistemic 
part as well. However, we should not be fooled by this sophisticated argument, for any 
answers that Dummett's account provides are surely going to be very crude. In fact, we 
do not need to look far for a dismissal of Dummett's ideas, for Putnam (1994: 494 ff . ) 
himself puts forward a strong case against Dummett. It is Dummett's strong 
verificationist account of understanding that worries Putnam - this is of course exactly 
what leads Dummett to abandon bivalence. An alternative might be some kind of a 
deflationary approach, but Putnam seems to have, finally, realised why metaphysical 
realists are so frustrated with the type of argument that Dummett has put forward: 
If we structure the debate in the way in which both Dummett and the deflationists do, then we are 
left with a forced choice between (a) either Dummettian antirealism or deflationism about truth, or 
(b) a retreat to metaphysical realism. Both Dummett's "global antirealist" and the deflationary 
advertise their accounts as rescuing us from metaphysical realism. But, surely, one of the sources 
of the continuing appeal of metaphysical realism in contemporary philosophy is a dissatisfaction 
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with the only apparent alternatives. (Putnam 1994: 498.) 
It is indeed a pleasure to see this kind of line from Putnam. A number o f more detailed 
criticisms follow. For instance, one of the major problems for both the Dummettian and 
the deflationary account is that they cannot satisfactorily account for statements about 
the past that are true in the same sense as statements about the present (Putnam 1994: 
499). The same goes for statements that may be true, although we presently lack any 
means to verify or falsify them, such as the Goldbach Conjecture (cf. Norris 2002: 29). 
This hardly even scratches the surface of the issue, but before we try to go into a little 
more detail, we have to take Goodman aboard, as advertised. 
I wi l l not try to give an exhaustive account of Goodman's views here, at this time we are 
merely interested in the connection between Putnam and Goodman (and Dummett) and 
in how Goodman constructs his case against realism. It was in his Ways ofWorldmaking 
(1978) that Goodman put forward his irrealism and for our current purpose it might be 
helpful to take a look into some responses that it produced. Goodman introduced his 
irrealism, or pluralism, at about the same time that Putnam turned from scientific 
realism to his 'internal realism' and thus it is not surprising that Putnam (1979) 
sympathises with Goodman's project. What is especially interesting to us is that Putnam 
acknowledges the connection between himself, Goodman, and Dummett: 
It seems to me that Goodman's view is closely related to a point recently made by Michael 
Dummett and by me, notably the point that the metaphysical realist notion of truth cannot play any 
role in a theory of how we understand out various versions and languages. (Putnam 1979: 119.) 
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So it is clearly 'the metaphysical realist notion of truth' which is at issue here, and 
arguably that is exactly the crucial point in each one o f these three influential critiques 
of metaphysical realism. The question is what is this particular notion of truth and why 
do Putnam, Dummett and Goodman think that it fails? Well, from what we have seen 
above, it would appear that the requirement for direct correspondence is the alleged 
problem for metaphysical realism and this kind of conception o f truth is what all three 
of them want to avoid. The alternative that Goodman suggested relies on what he calls 
'rightness' and 'validity'; this points towards the verificationist semantics that we 
discussed above and which was the basis for Putnam's 'internal realism' (Putnam 1979: 
120). As we recall, this is exactly the view that Putnam noticed in Dummett too, 
although he modified it a bit: 
I proposed to identify "being true" not with "being verified," as Dummett does, but with "being 
verified to a sufficient degree to warrant acceptance under sufficiently good epistemic 
conditions." (Putnam 1994:461.) 
Or, as Putnam put it earlier, 'truth is an idealization of warranted assertibility' (Putnam 
1979: 120). Thus, each one of these three opponents of metaphysical realism - the 
earlier Putnam, Dummett and Goodman - claim that the traditional realist conception 
of truth fails, and because of that metaphysical realism fails and we have to take another 
path. Although it is clear that Putnam is a bit uneasy about the full-blown Goodman-
style irrealism, it is quite as clear that his own earlier account merely masquerades as 
more commonsensical (cf. Norris 2002: 85-86). 
The idea of conceptual relativity is among the main premises shared by our three 
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opponents. Putnam has talked about conceptual relativity in many connections, but the 
best known example is probably the case of Carnap and the Polish logician (Putnam 
1987: 18 f f . ) , where Putnam suggests that there is no way to solve the dispute about how 
many objects there are in a certain world (consisting o f x l , x2 and x3) because the 
Polish logician believes in mereology and Carnap does not. What Putnam claims is that 
the idea of conceptual relativity is unacceptable to the metaphysical realist because there 
is no one meaning which can be fixed for the logical terms in question (ibid.). Even 
without going to the details of this example, we can easily see that something like this 
indeed has to be behind both Goodman's and Dummett's accounts as well. Putnam notes 
the connection himself in regard to Goodman by pointing out that Goodman's most 
serious arguments for irrealism depend on conceptual relativity (Putnam 1992: 183). 
A l l three of these anti-realist accounts have some important similarities, most notably 
the argument which is based on the critique of the direct correspondence theory of truth 
and on conceptual relativity; obviously these two themes are connected as well. As we 
saw above, Putnam has now changed his views on a few important points, but in the 
Dewey lectures he still thinks that metaphysical realism is unacceptable, instead he 
hopes to find a middle way between the earlier Putnam-Dummett-Goodman view and 
thorough metaphysical realism.2 9 It is from Wittgenstein that Putnam believes to have 
found such a middle way. The problem with this approach is, as Christopher Norris 
(2002: 89-90) notes, that it still 'leaves all the same problems firmly in place while 
purporting to resolve them through a commonsense appeal to our standard (communally 
warranted) ideas o f reality and truth'. 
29 I should also note that even more recently, Putnam (2004) has continued to appeal to the argument 
from conceptual relativity. Once again, we will return to the issue in chapter 13. 
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There are a number of different approaches that a proponent of metaphysical realism 
can take to address the argument from conceptual relativity and against the 
correspondence theory. There have even been attempts to counter it from within the 
semanticist framework: Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons (2002) claim that 
metaphysical realism is quite compatible with conceptual relativity and that it does not 
require a commitment to the conception of truth as direct correspondence. I am afraid 
that they might concede a bit too much to the anti-realist camp, but this approach is 
worth noting, as it shows that the battle is not automatically lost even i f we concede the 
semanticist framework. 
A better way to defend metaphysical realism is to abandon the semantic approach which 
all the anti-realist accounts that we have looked at have taken. The main arguments 
against metaphysical realism have been derived from a semantic notion of truth of 
which metaphysical realism supposedly cannot offer a plausible theory, granted the 
problems that direct correspondence has. Well, the way around this is to do exactly what 
Dummett and others tell us not to do: to start from metaphysics instead of semantics. As 
we saw, in the Dewey lectures Putnam concedes that the metaphysical realist is quite 
entitled to do so. None of the arguments provided by Dummett, earlier Putnam or 
Goodman justifies the preference for a semantic approach. However, even i f we do start 
from metaphysics, the gap between language and reality has to be closed in the end. 
That is, at some point we have to give some kind of a theory of truth. 1 believe that this 
is where we should turn to a theory of truthmaking. Of course, sometimes theories of 
truthmaking are taken as a way to explicate the correspondence theory of truth and in a 
way, they are. But what is crucial here is that a theory of truthmaking is (or can be) very 
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intimately connected with a realist ontology, and this is the starting point: from a realist 
ontology to a theory of truth. I wi l l not go into truthmaking just know though, here I 
merely wish to point the way out of this dilemma. 3 0 
Given this discussion, where are we with metaphysical realism? At least it seems that 
the general line of thought seen in earlier Putnam, Dummett and Goodman poses no 
impossible challenges for metaphysical realism. In fact, it poses only one challenge, that 
of giving an account of truth. And I think that we can indeed overcome this challenge 
and give an account of truth which is realist in nature and also at least as tenable as the 
conception of truth as idealised justification or rational acceptability. But although 
Putnam has abandoned his earlier anti-realist line, and indeed become an ally against 
Dummett and Goodman, he still insists that there is some kind of a middle way between 
thorough realism and anti-realism. His very latest comment on the matter is that while 
he previously held that the argument from conceptual relativity refutes metaphysical 
realism in all its forms and he used to be frustrated by metaphysicians who insist that he 
has not refuted their form of metaphysical realism, he now sees that this was a mistake, 
indeed, he acknowledges that metaphysical realism may be compatible with conceptual 
relativity (and in a very trivial sense, it is, as wi l l be shown in later chapters).31 What 
continues to trouble myself and, apparently, others as well (cf. Norris 2002: 89-90), is 
that Putnam still seems to be impressed by some anti-realist arguments, namely the 
Wittgensteinian ones, albeit not the Dummett-Goodman type arguments. Why this is a 
problem is precisely because there is no middle way between realism and anti-realism, 
the Wittgensteinian arguments have the same logical conclusion as the Dummett-
30 We will discuss truthmaking in sufficient detail in chapter 10. 
31 This is the view that Putnam put forward in his closing address at the 'Putnam @ 80' conference 
celebrating his 80 t h birthday at U C D in March 2007. 
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Goodman type arguments: 
In each case - so the argument runs [Wittgenstein and Dummett type arguments] - the realist 
commits a blatant logical absurdity by claiming to possess knowledge of that which exceeds the 
limits of present-best knowledge or for which there exists no decisive evidence or adequate proof-
procedure. (Norris 2002: 89.) 
However, as Norris correctly adds, arguments o f this type are intimately connected with 
the strong verificationist thesis, on the lines of Dummett, which is exactly what the 
Putnam of the Dewey lectures dismisses. The upshot is that, although Putnam wishes to 
avoid it, he is once again on the slippery slope down to anti-realism proper. 
What we are left with, then, is to somehow address the worry that the earlier Putnam-
Dummett-Goodman line of criticism raises - here it is truthmaking that seems to offer 
the most plausible solution. The challenge that the more recent Putnam has raised is, at 
least seemingly, a very modest version of the earlier one, although i f what was said 
above is correct, the implications are quite as serious. Perhaps the most promising reply 
to this challenge is to point out that the alternative theory proposed by the opponent can 
not cash out what it promises, namely the commonsense benefits of metaphysical 
realism without the ontological costs. Putnam's is not the only account that proposes to 
do something like this, for instance, Eli Hirsch, whose views we w i l l look at shortly, has 
defended a view which is realist in tone, but claims to get by without the metaphysical 
baggage. Obviously, the burden of proof here is on the opponent of metaphysical 
realism. As we w i l l see, these approaches have their own persistent problems, but my 
general reply to this line is that there is no middle way: either you endorse realism or 
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you do not. Putnam is a good example of the kind of trapeze artist that one must be to 
balance between realism and anti-realism, but it is a long fal l , and it seems that Putnam 
is on his way down. 
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3. Frank Jackson: Metaphysics as Conceptual Analysis 
It is sometimes suggested that the subject-matter of metaphysics is concepts; that 
metaphysics is conceptual analysis. One of the best known proponents of this sort of 
view is Frank Jackson; his From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual 
Analysis (1998) is devoted to the subject. It wi l l be my purpose here to show where his 
account fails. This task wi l l require looking into some quite technical matters, as 
Jackson relies heavily on so called two-dimensional modal semantics and also puts 
forward a conceptualist interpretation of modality. Thus, the nature of metaphysical 
necessity and the necessary a posteriori are among the key topics.3 2 
A favourable reading of Jackson's description of 'serious metaphysics' does not seem to 
differ very much from how a metaphysical realist might describe the nature of 
metaphysics: according to Jackson, the task o f metaphysics is to find a limited list of the 
basic ingredients o f reality with which to operate (Jackson 1998: 5). A metaphysical 
realist could agree with this, as this seems to be compatible, for instance, with the view 
that metaphysics is category-theory, i.e. categories are what determine this limited list of 
the ingredients of reality. However, Jackson goes on to argue that this is all about 
conceptual analysis, not categories. His main argument is the 'entry by entailment' 
thesis. 
Basically, 'entry by entailment' means that two stories, like physicalism and the 
psychological, can be connected so that the first, in this case the physical, tells a 
32 Our discussion of these matters will be limited here, focusing only on some problems with Jackson's 
account. A more detailed account will follow in chapter nine. 
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complete story about other one, i.e. the psychological (Jackson 1998: 9). Conceptual 
analysis enters the picture because, in effect, a story told in one vocabulary is made true 
by another one told in a more fundamental vocabulary (Jackson 1998: 28). This idea is 
followed by a common appeal to the importance of language even when discussing 
metaphysics: 
Although metaphysics is about what the world is like, the questions we ask when we do 
metaphysics are framed in a language, and thus we need to attend to what the users of the language 
mean by the words they employ to ask their questions. (Jackson 1998: 30.) 
This is still fairly uncontentious, and indeed true. However, Jackson's answer to how we 
should determine what the users of language do mean by their words can certainly be 
questioned, as he seems to think that this is done by comparing intuitions - everyone's 
intuitions - and extracting the concept of, say, K-hood from this. Now this, as Jackson 
admits (p. 32), does not sound like a particularly philosophical project. The real 
problems start to emerge when Jackson elaborates on this idea and introduces his idea o f 
'folk theory'. Jackson is convinced that what we are interested in when discussing 
examples like Putnam's Twin Earth scenario is the folk conception of things. He says 
that 'Putnam's theory is built precisely on folk intuitions' (p. 39). However, 1 think that it 
is quite clear, especially from Putnam's (1970) earlier formulation o f the matter, that as 
folk conceptions can easily fail , it is the expert's view that we, folk, should turn to. Be 
that as it may, Jackson offers enough examples of his own for us to be able to decide 
what the relevance o f analysing folk conceptions in fact is. Here is one of them, based 
on four-dimensionalism's treatment of change (1998: 43): 
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Pr. 1 Different things (temporal parts or whatever) having different properties is not change. 
(Conceptual claim illustrated in the case of temperature) 
Pr. 2 Things change. (Moorean fact) 
Cone. Four-dimensionalism is false. (Claim about the nature of our world) 
Here, according to Jackson, we see conceptual analysis being given a major role in an 
argument; he calls this an 'immodest role'. Fortunately he goes on to admit that this is 
too strong a role for conceptual analysis. It seems quite obvious that there are some deep 
metaphysical issues at hand in the example and we surely need to look deeper than the 
meanings of the concepts to solve them. Jackson only argues for the 'modest role' of 
conceptual analysis, namely, that the role of conceptual analysis is to describe the world 
in some non-fundamental terms, given a certain description of the world in more 
fundamental terms (1998: 44). Now, provided that this is all there is to the story, we 
could still accommodate it without any major conflicts. However, the link between 
realist metaphysics and the sort of role that Jackson here suggests for conceptual 
analysis is yet to be established. Just consider Jackson's example. He admits that 
conceptual analysis cannot give us the strong, metaphysical results that the argument 
seeks to establish. But no doubt there is a way to solve problems concerning change 
(and temporal parts or whatever). How? Well, by engaging in metaphysics, not 
conceptual analysis. Unfortunately, it gets worse, because Jackson later forgets his own, 
modest interpretation of conceptual analysis and goes on to draw some quite immodest 
conclusions about the necessary a posteriori. 
Before we advance, it might be a good idea to say something about the background of 
Jackson's project. The roots lie in the debate over physicalism; Jackson's earlier example 
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concerning the entry by entailment thesis hints at this. Interestingly, this topic has also 
been pursued by David Chalmers (1996), and by similar means, but towards a different 
conclusion. We do not need to go into the details, but the central idea relies on a point 
which wil l be discussed shortly: there is an a priori identity underlying each a posteriori 
identity, and it is this a priori identity that needs to hold i f there is to be any identity at 
all. So, Jackson is arguing that in the case of brain states and psychological conditions, 
which would be an a posteriori identity, there is also an underlying a priori part. 
Jackson's latest view is that this identity holds, while Chalmers argues against it. What 
is interesting to us, rather than the details of the actual debate, is that it is precisely the 
commitment to the underlying a priori part in all a posteriori identities that makes 
conceptual analysis so crucial for Jackson. However, the contentious issue is the exact 
nature of this a priori part. Jackson thinks that it is closely related with our folk 
conceptions, as noted above.33 
In a passage titled The Sense in Which Conceptual Analysis Gives A Priori Results 
(1998: 46-52), Jackson introduces his version of the now popular two-dimensional 
framework and applies it to Putnam's Twin Earth scenario. The discussion about two-
dimensionalism is far too broad to be extensively covered here, but I wi l l very briefly 
explain some basic features of the system insofar as they are relevant for our current 
discussion.34 The basic idea is that each term (or sentence) is associated with a pair of 
values - these can be called primary and secondary intensions (cf. Chalmers 1996) or A-
and C-intensions35 (cf. Jackson), or something quite different. The important feature is 
33 I will say a lot more about this exact issue in chapter nine, and in fact defend the idea of an underlying 
a priori part in a posteriori necessities. However, my understanding of the nature of this a priori 
content differs radically from Jackson's. 
34 Scott Soames1 Reference and Description (2005) is dedicated to the subject. 
35 A- and C-intensions are the functions which fix the respective A- and C-extensions of a term T in a 
world. 
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the relationship between these two. For some words, the things that a word applies to in 
a world are the same regardless of whether the world is considered as actual or as 
counterfactual. Jackson (1998: 49) mentions the word 'square' as an example of a word 
for which the A- and C-intensions (or primary and secondary intentions) are always the 
same in this manner. However, some words, such as 'water', are more problematic. Why 
is this the case? Well, the idea is that i f we consider a counterfactual world as if it was 
actual, it is the counterfactual world that fixes the reference. There are numerous ways 
to interpret this, but in Jackson's case it is plausible to think about the different contexts 
- different counterfactual worlds considered as actual - as different epistemic 
possibilities. Furthermore, there seems to be a distinct epistemic possibility that water is 
X Y Z . The upshot is that water's A-extension and C-extension differ at some worlds. 3 6 
What Jackson, in effect, argues, is that conceptual analysis enters the picture when we 
deal with A-extensions, as they involve the a priori: 'What we can know independently 
of knowing what the actual world is like can properly be called a priori. The sense in 
which conceptual analysis involves the a priori is that it concerns A-extensions at 
worlds, and so A-intensions, and accordingly concerns something that does, or does not, 
obtain independently of how things actually are.' (1998: 51). As it stands, the statement 
seems rather arbitrary, but perhaps we can make some sense of all of this in what 
follows. 
We should advance to what is perhaps the most important issue in this debate: the role 
and interpretation of modality in the argument. Jackson devotes quite a few pages to the 
discussion about metaphysical necessity and conceptual necessity, and the nature and 
36 See Jackson (1998: 49-50) for details. 
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role of these two kinds of modality is indeed a key issue here. Very briefly, Jackson 
thinks that they are one and the same, while others think that we are dealing with two 
fundamentally different kinds of modality here.37 Presumably we can make some sense 
of this by examining propositions that are necessary and a posteriori; we are especially 
interested in the so called metaphysical necessities. Conceptual necessity, however, 
should be available to us merely with the help of a priori reasoning. So, the popular 
account is that metaphysical necessities (at least usually) cannot be reached merely with 
the help of a priori reasoning and thus must belong to a different domain of modality. 
Jackson disagrees: 
I think, as against this view [the distinction between metaphysical and conceptual necessity], that it 
is a mistake to hold that the necessity possessed by 'Water = H 2 0 ' is different from that possessed 
by 'Water = water', or, indeed, '2 + 2 = 4'. Just as Quine insists that numbers and tables exist in the 
very same sense, and that the difference between numbers existing and tables existing is a 
difference between numbers and tables, I think that we should insist that water's being H 2 0 and 
water's being water are necessary in the same sense. The difference lies, not in the kind of 
necessity possessed, but rather where the labels 'a priori' and 'a posteriori' suggest it lies: in our 
epistemic access to the necessity they share. (Jackson 1998: 69-70.) 
Jackson does not leave it at this, as he offers two reasons for abandoning the distinction 
between metaphysical and conceptual necessity. The first one is what he calls 'The 
Occamist Reason': we should not multiply modality beyond necessity. But why is the 
distinction between these two kinds of necessity such a bad thing? Well, according to 
Jackson (1998: 71), it leads to a puzzle about the necessary a posteriori. What Jackson is 
puzzled about is how can someone understand a sentence that is necessarily true without 
37 Once again, I will return to these matters in chapter nine. 
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knowing that it is necessary, which seems to be the case with many metaphysical 
necessities (which are often a posteriori), and this is supposed to suggest that we would 
do better without this strange type of necessity. But while there certainly is more to say 
about these matters38, they are hardly as puzzling as Jackson suggests. As Scott Soames 
(2005: 152-153) has recently argued, Jackson is taking a very contentious view for 
granted here and this is what leads to his puzzlement. The view in question was 
originally suggested by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker and it explains 
'understanding' as a function from possible worlds to truth values. Jackson's proposed 
solution for the puzzle is to take advantage of the two-dimensional framework and 
allow that although we understand some sentences without knowing their truth-
conditions in one sense, there is always another sense in which we do know their truth-
conditions. 
Let us take a look at Jackson's example to elaborate on this. He examines the sentence 
'He has a beard' (1998: 73). Jackson thinks that he can understand this sentence without 
necessarily knowing which proposition is being expressed, i.e. without knowing who 
exactly is supposed to have the beard. This is because he knows how to get to the 
proposition from the contextual information (which is inadequate in this case). Now, 
although in one sense Jackson does not know the truth conditions, as he does not know 
which proposition is being expressed, there is another sense in which he does, because 
he knows perfectly well how to get to the proposition from the appropriate contextual 
information. Thus, given the contextual information, the proposition is within our reach. 
This is how he tries to explain the puzzle of understanding necessary a posteriori 
sentences without knowing which proposition is being expressed. 
38 See Hughes (2004: 189-192) for further discussion. 
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One way to understand what exactly puzzles Jackson about the whole issue is that he is 
concerned about the compatibility of 'folk theory' and a posteriori necessity. However, 
the problem with this approach is that Jackson's treatment of sentences is by no means 
on the lines o f any widely accepted folk theory. Just consider the previous example. 
Admittedly, we do understand what 'He has a beard' means: it expresses a property (we 
also know that this property belongs to a man). But Jackson takes the context away and 
grounds the understanding in the fact that we would know which proposition is being 
expressed i f we knew the context. Consider language without any kind o f context. I f 
you had never seen a beard, you probably would not know what the word 'beard' means. 
The problem that emerges is that we cannot imagine language without a context at all. 
No one, unless he is crazy, utters 'He has a beard' without any apparent referent. The 
reason for this is exactly that language always requires a context. What this means is 
that knowing the truth conditions of a proposition just is knowing how it depends on its 
context. What Jackson is trying to do is to separate these two and then rediscover the 
connection. Thus, i f there is a puzzle, I do not see a way out of it for Jackson. Then 
again, there only is a puzzle for those who endorse the view of understanding based on 
Lewis' and Stalnaker's suggestion. Soames comes up with a similar conclusion: 
In sum, nothing Jackson says provides any reason whatsoever to believe that there is any obvious, 
widely accepted, or even defensible view about the connection between understanding a sentence 
and knowing its truth conditions which generates a puzzle about how sentences that express 
necessary truths can be understood and yet not known, simply on that basis, to be necessary, or 
true. (Soames 2005: 158.) 
Whatever moral we want to draw from this, it should be noted that the example 
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discussed above, i.e. 'He has a beard', and our main interest, i.e. propositions such as 
'Water = H 2 0 ' , are quite different. Jackson attempts to extend his case for 'He has a 
beard' to cover propositions like 'Water = H 2 0 ' , but this should immediately strike us as 
problematic. Basically, what is being suggested here is that natural kind terms like 
'water' are indexicals. Soames (2005: 164- 170) discusses the apparent problems that 
this introduces at some length and makes it quite clear that treating these sentences in 
the same manner is very dubious. The special nature of natural kind terms should be 
apparent from the following story concerning water. 
After we found out that water is H 2 0 , we introduced the current use for the term 'water', 
which connects it with the chemical formula H 2 0 . We can indeed say that someone who 
does not grasp this story uses the word 'water' incorrectly. Understanding a natural kind 
term requires knowing that it refers to a natural kind. However, this is not to say that, 
for example, a child who does not yet know that water is H 2 0 , or does not understand it, 
could not use the term 'water' correctly, because we know that the child refers to water 
in the way that it was taught to her. Indeed, we have a good reason to say that the child 
does not know what exactly is the referent of the uttered word - the deep structure of 
water - but this does not cause problems. The deep structure of water has been H 2 0 all 
the time, but the sentence 'Water is H 2 0 ' has been meaningful only for the last 250 years 
or so. In one sense, only a few of us really know what water is about, for most rely on 
experts, chemists in this case. But this does not mean that we are unable to grasp the 
meaning of the concept.39 
39 This and other issues concerning semantics will be discussed also in chapter 12. 
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There are two issues that one could easily fail to distinguish in this story.4 0 The first is 
involved with what I called the 'deep structure' of water. The idea is that there are some 
facts, namely that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen in 2:1 relation, which caused 
and sustain the need to f ix a name for that compound, or natural kind. This is 
completely independent of the understanding or meaning of the word 'water'; but the 
other issue concerns the usage of the word 'water' and the question about how we 
determine when people understand the word and use it correctly. In terms of the second 
issue, we are interested in the facts that one must know to be able to understand and use 
the word 'water', such as the fact that it refers to a natural kind, as I suggested above. 
Soames (2005: 183) argues that Jackson confuses something like these two issues. 
Jackson is telling a story about the second issue, as his account is all about 
understanding. However, he claims that descriptive facts like 'Water covers most of the 
Earth' are necessary and sufficient for an explanation of the deep structure as well 
(Jackson 1998: 80-83). 
I mostly agree with Soames' critique of Jackson, but he fails to underline why the 
distinction made above is so important. Basically, the distinction is between 
metaphysics and semantics. This is not the main concern of this chapter, but it is worth 
noting here. Consider again the first issue: it is the fact that water has an underlying 
deep structure that makes it possible for us to pick it out as a distinct kind and refer to it. 
This is a fact concerning all natural kinds; indeed, an a priori truth. 4 1 Of course, there is 
a need to verify the connection between what we believe to be a natural kind and what 
40 I refer to Soames (2005: 182-183) here. He suggests that Jackson confuses two things, which are, in 
essence, the ones that I am about to distinguish. 
41 Admittedly it is arguable that water is not in fact a natural kind at all, but nothing here depends on the 
status of compounds, i.e. are they or are they not natural kinds. For the sake of the argument, I assume 
that they are. 
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in fact is its deep structure. This is the a posteriori part. Once it is has been verified that 
a natural kind has a certain deep structure, e.g. that water is H 2 0 , then the circle is 
closed. The a priori part was already there, and it has nothing to do with semantics, 
rather, it is grounded in ontology. In the light o f this, it seems that the a priori part is 
often underestimated and this is why the issues recognised above are easily confused. 
The conclusion that we can draw from the previous discussion is that Jackson 
introduces no compelling reasons for us to amend our view of the necessary a posteriori 
or to accept his two-dimensional interpretation. However, we have not yet examined all 
of Jackson's arguments against the distinction between metaphysical and conceptual 
necessity: 
The key point is that the right way to describe a counterfactual world sometimes depends in part 
on how the actual world is, and not solely on how the counterfactual world is in itself. The point is 
not one about the space of possible worlds in some newly recognized sense of 'possible', but 
instead one about the role of the actual world in determining the correct way to describe certain 
counterfactual possible worlds. (Jackson 1998: 77-78). 
It is not exactly clear what Jackson's point is here, as he does not really clarify his 
interpretation o f possible worlds. Presumably the idea is something like this: with the 
help of the two-dimensional framework, we can handle a posteriori necessities as 
linguistic special cases. What we learned from Kripke and Putnam and the Twin Earth 
scenario according to Jackson (1998: 77) is how to describe these peculiar sentences, 
rather than what their modal status is. However, this hardly brings any new arguments 
into the picture, for it is only the two-dimensional framework and all the baggage about 
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the interpretation of 'understanding' that corroborates Jackson's case. Moreover, Jackson 
ought to make clear what he means when he talks about possible worlds. The obvious 
way to understand two-dimensionalism is to interpret it as a way to construct and 
examine epistemic possibilities, and although Jackson does not explicitly say anything 
about this, it does seem that this is what he has in mind. What he does say about the 
subject is that the only sense of modality that we need is that of 'the weakest or most 
inclusive kind, whatever exactly that may be' (1998: 80). Now, presumably, this refers 
to something like conceptual or epistemic possibility. 
So far, nothing that Jackson has said gives us a very good reason to reduce metaphysical 
necessity to conceptual necessity, or the a priori part in a posteriori necessities to 
concepts. As Jackson acknowledges, his interpretation of Putnam's Twin Earth parable 
is too deflationary for many (1998: 79). Jackson wants to talk about concepts and word 
usage, while it is essential properties that we are interested in. This falls back to the case 
of separating the two different issues involved with the debate. Jackson is worried that 
people wi l l be seduced to think that 'Water is H 2 0 ' being a posteriori necessary is a 
separate issue from the right usage of the term 'water' (ibid.). We, of course, are worried 
that people wi l l be seduced to think exactly the opposite. It might be worthwhile to note 
that the original inventor of the Twin Earth scenario seems to share our intuitions, for 
according to Putnam (1990: 59-60): when a scientist refers to 'water', his intention (and 
intuition, 1 would add), is to refer to whatever has the 'deep structure' of water, not its 
superficial characteristics. 
At this point, we should note something about the difficulty of these issues. The picture 
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that Jackson is drawing for us is very simple: we must only deal with conceptual 
necessity. The Twin Earth story was just concerned with descriptions and thus the 
problem of a posteriori necessity is merely a linguistic phenomenon. Well, for those of 
us who do not agree with this, the problem of a posteriori necessity is quite a bit harder. 
Soames notes this difficulty and suggests that Jackson is perhaps in even more trouble 
with it, but I disagree. Thus Soames: 
[l]t is not obvious that the possibilities outlined in Putnam's Twin Earth fable, and related 
scenarios, are genuinely possible in the sense required by Jackson. They are, of course, 
epistemologically possible - we can't know a priori that a world-state doesn't obtain in which 
something other than H 2 0 - call it XYZ - has all the normal observational properties that water 
actually has [...]. But this is not enough for Jackson. Since he refuses to countenance 
epistemological possibilities that are not metaphysically possible, he is obliged to tell us why we 
should think that such world-states really are metaphysically possible. (Soames 2005: 191.) 
Soames quite correctly advances to point out that the Twin Earth story might not in fact 
be metaphysically possible, or that we at least would need more proof to justifiably hold 
that, but 1 am not convinced that this poses as big a problem for Jackson as Soames 
suggests. This is because it seems to me that Jackson is not so much refusing to 
acknowledge epistemological possibilities that are not metaphysically possible, but 
rather dismissing metaphysical possibility altogether. However, Soames (2005: 136), 
quite surprisingly, appears to think that proponents of two-dimensionalism are, in fact, 
committed to the view that metaphysical modality is the only kind of modality. Judging 
from the few explicit passages that Jackson devotes to the subject, 1 would certainly 
draw the opposite conclusion: Jackson is a full-blown conceptualist in terms of 
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modality. While Jackson and others who use the two-dimensional framework might, at 
times, seem to be saying that it is only metaphysical possibility that they are willing to 
acknowledge, we must keep in mind that they could be using the term 'metaphysical 
possibility' in a rather misleading way. As a matter of fact, i f Jackson were to genuinely 
hold that epistemological possibility is restricted to metaphysical possibility, it would 
effectively refute his project, for he would be quite unable to argue for his conception of 
the necessary a posteriori. 
In this case, it is clearly Soames who begs the question. The way he puts it is that 
Jackson ought show that the Twin Earth scenario is metaphysically possible, because 
given that he identifies metaphysical and epistemological modality, and the fact that the 
Twin Earth scenario is certainly epistemologically possible, it must also be 
metaphysically possible (Soames 2005: 191). What Soames fails to realise is that for 
Jackson metaphysical possibility just is epistemological possibility, and thus showing 
that the Twin Earth scenario is metaphysically possible would be, for him, to show that 
it is epistemologically possible, which is hardly a problem. The moral, i f any, that we 
can draw from this is that one should be quite explicit and careful about the usage and 
interpretation of metaphysical possibility and necessity. One possible way of doing this 
is to restrict the word 'metaphysical' to the contexts where modality is taken to be 
grounded in essential properties (or something else 'in the world'), in other words, to 
contexts in which we are talking about mind- and language-independent modality. 
Perhaps we should be even more careful with our use of epistemological and conceptual 
modality, as they seem to lead people to misinterpret modality altogether. I am inclined 
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to think that Jackson might actually be right about us needing only one kind of modality. 
However, this is certainly not epistemological or conceptual modality: we should opt for 
metaphysical modality instead. But I am getting ahead of myself here, for I wi l l put 
forward my own account of modality later. 
Given this discussion, it should be easy to list the major problems with Jackson's 
account. His Occamist project against two sets of possible worlds is well justified, but 
in my view he is dealing with the wrong set of possible worlds. Apparently Jackson 
likes to think that his account is very common-sense, close to folk conceptions, but he 
fails to see that these conceptions are already very heavily affected by metaphysical 
presuppositions. Jackson's endorsement of the a priori part in a posteriori necessities is 
also correct in its spirit, although no thanks to his examples that rely on two-
dimensionalism. The a priori part is certainly there, but it is independent of our language 
and thoughts. Jackson does not see (or does not want to see) the difference between 
'Water = H 2 0 ' and 'Water = water' because he interprets them as two different ways to 
describe the same thing. But in the first case we are talking about the deep-structure of 
water, and to make sense of that we must examine what makes water what it is, what is 
its essence, not just how we use the term 'water'. 
In his afterword to the discussion about metaphysical and conceptual necessity, Jackson 
tells us that it is crucial that we keep in mind whether we are talking about sentences or 
about the propositions associated with them (1998: 84). I agree with him, but it is even 
more crucial that we clarify what is meant with 'a proposition associated with a 
sentence'. Jackson - unfortunately - relies once again on the two-dimensional 
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framework. Consider the following passage: 
It is the C-intension that people most often have in mind, naturally enough, when they talk of the 
proposition expressed by a sentence, and what I am saying in this terminology is that the 
proposition expressed by 'All water is water' and the proposition expressed by 'All water is H 2 0 ' is 
one and the same, namely, the set of all worlds, so there cannot be any difference in modal or 
epistemic status. (Jackson 1998: 85.) 
This is correct, provided that we are talking about the set of all metaphysically possible 
worlds. Of course, this is not what Jackson is talking about; the error is inevitable with 
two-dimensionalism because it tends to turn our attention to epistemological possibility. 
There certainly is a difference in the epistemic status of 'A l l water is water' and 'Al l 
water is H 2 0 ' . I f people really have the C-intension in mind when talking about the 
proposition expressed by a sentence, then they are mistaken. Fortunately, this is not the 
case, as generally people tend to agree with the Kxipke-Putnam line, and this is exactly 
because we are in fact operating with metaphysical possibilities, not epistemological. 
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4. E l i Hirsch: Watered-down Metaphysics 
One thing that a proponent of metaphysics proper does not want to see is pseudo-
metaphysics done under the label of metaphysics. Very often the representatives of this 
kind of watered-down metaphysics claim that the classic problems of metaphysics are 
linguistic in nature and that we should merely examine how we use our language and 
why is it used in the way that it is in fact used. While these might be interesting 
questions, they are not the kind of questions that realist metaphysics should be primarily 
interested in. Moreover, when metaphysical problems are considered as linguistic 
problems, the results are often quite unsustainable, indeed, relativism of one sort or 
another seems to be in the end of this path. Of course, this is not very surprising, as it is 
somewhat easy to construct linguistic problems which do not seem to have any apparent 
answers - we shall see some examples of this. However, when the very same problems 
are considered as genuine metaphysical problems, they often turn out to be quite 
uninteresting, either because there is an easy solution available, or because the provided 
pre-conditions violate the a priori conditions of a coherent theory; often this points to a 
category mistake. There are a number of philosophers who we could mention in this 
connection, but here I wi l l focus on just one: Eli Hirsch. 
Hirsch is especially interesting to us because he has examined some quite traditional 
metaphysical problems, such as identity, and suggested that they should be interpreted 
as linguistic problems (or something similar). For example, in Hirsch (1982) he 
discusses persistence and identity through time. We should not be fooled by the 
seemingly metaphysical attitude that he takes towards the problem: Hirsch does 
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consider whether persistence could be grounded in continuity or sortals, but eventually 
abandons both of them as insufficient by themselves and ends up with a relativistic 
account. In his own words: 
As a relativist I hold that our identity scheme is not the only one that could in principle be 
employed in making true statements about the world. But [...] 1 am inclined toward the empirical 
speculation that our ordinary identity scheme, or at least the basic core of that scheme, is 
instinctive to human beings. My conjecture would be that, as a matter of contingent fact, each of us 
enters the world innately disposed in some manner to interpret experience in terms of our basic 
idea of persistence, in terms, that is, of the idea of persisting objects whose careers unfold along 
continuous change-minimizing paths. (Hirsch 1982: 162-163.) 
Hirsch explains these 'innate dispositions' which are supposed to guide how we interpret 
our experiences about persistence with the help of another concept: unity (ibid., ch 8). 
Our innate 'sense of unity' thus provides the ground for our conception of persistence 
and related issues. But this is clearly not how a metaphysical realist would handle the 
problem. Plausibly, from a realist point of view, the problem of persistence concerns the 
identity of the objects in the world, not how we think about them. At the very least, we 
ought to require an explanation of why we have this innate sense of unity and, 
furthermore, what is it grounded in? To clarify what is in fact going on here, we should 
take a look at some of the examples that Hirsch gives us. 
Hirsch (1982: 32-33) asks us to consider a language in which two new words are 
introduced: 'incar' and 'outcar'. These words replace the word 'car' and are defined in the 
following way. 'Incar' refers to cars inside a garage, or to any parts of a car which are 
inside a garage. 'Outcar' refers to cars outside a garage, or to any parts of a car which are 
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outside a garage. In other words, the very same car can be partly an incar and partly an 
outcar at the same time. Hirsch admits the strangeness of this example, but asks us what 
criteria of identity an example like this in fact violates (ibid.). This is supposed to be an 
argument against the sufficiency of continuity in analysing identity, as it seems that 
shrinking incars and growing outcars do not violate continuity criteria. Thus, Hirsch 
takes us one step towards the relativistic conclusion that was introduced above. But 
before we try to make sense of this, let us go a bit further with Hirsch. 
In addition to continuity, sortals are often discussed as a possible way to cope with the 
changes that objects undergo when trying to explain their persistence. Hirsch discusses 
the subject extensively, but we are more interested about the passage where he expresses 
doubts about the sufficiency of sortals, as this is, again, what leads him towards 
relativism. Hirsch argues that someone's ignorance concerning sortals would not be a 
problem when analysing situations like a car moving out of garage (Hirsch 1982: 76). 
His example is a child who is unfamiliar with the sortal 'car', but who would 
nevertheless without a doubt describe a car moving out of a garage in correct terms; 
certainly not in terms of the 'incar-outcar' language. This supposedly implies that sortals 
cannot be necessary for grounding identity-criteria. 
Suspicions should arise at this point, i f they have not earlier. However, we should still 
see where all this leads. Hirsch obviously wants to know what grounds the evident 
success of the sortal-ignorant subjects in situations like the child observing a car leaving 
the garage, or an Eskimo observing a tree (which does not undergo any change during 
the period of observation) and not identifying the tree with the tree trunk, which is also 
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one of Hirsch's examples (Hirsch 1982: 77 f f . ) . His answer relies on what he calls 'the 
basic rule': 
The basic sortal-neutral identity rule which we confidently expect to govern the Eskimo's thought 
might then be put roughly: Trace an object's career by following a spatiotemporally and 
qualitatively continuous path which minimizes changes as far as possible. (Hirsch 1982: 78-79.) 
Hirsch emphasises that his basic rule is also capable of explaining situations where 
some change does occur during the period of observation; say, a leaf might fall from the 
tree, but this obviously would not be a sufficient change to violate the rule. This 
'change-minimizing condition' is among the innate dispositions of interpretation on 
which Hirsch grounds persistence. He does refine his basic rule a bit, but we do not 
need to go into the details, the idea is clear enough. 
It is also clear that this 'change-minimizing condition' is in quite a lot o f more trouble 
than the traditional account relying on continuity and sortals. Hirsch addresses some of 
these problems, but the condition strikes me as inadequate regardless. For consider the 
change that a caterpillar undergoes when it becomes a butterfly, how does Hirsch's basic 
rule cope with situations like this? It seems obvious that a child, or an Eskimo for that 
matter, who is unfamiliar with the process in question would consider the caterpillar and 
the butterfly to be two distinct objects. Furthermore, what innate disposition could help 
them in such a situation? 
The reason why cases like the caterpillar and the butterfly as well as Hirsch's examples 
are problematic is because Hirsch is approaching them from the wrong direction. 
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Someone who is a realist about these matters should have been suspicious already when 
Hirsch's incar-outcar example was introduced, for, as he puts it, we are asked to 
consider a language, in which the word 'car' is replaced with 'incar' and 'outcar'. But the 
realist could ask: what does this imaginary and apparently wrong language tell us about 
the identity-conditions of real cars? The example might show us that the way that we 
think about cars is realistic, but that should be self-evident. Of course, Hirsch's 
argument is that the 'incar-outcar' language does not violate any criterion of identity in 
an apparent way, or at least not the continuity criteria. Continuity aside, it is clear that a 
metaphysically serious account of incars and outcars could not hold. The fact that we 
can create some arbitrary framework that relies on our observation of a car leaving a 
garage does not change what really happens: a physical body moves from a spatio-
temporal location to another. This is naturally exactly what Hirsch's basic rule states, 
albeit he adds the change-minimizing condition. However, I find it quite implausible to 
conclude from this that we have some innate disposition to interpret the movement of 
cars in the described way, rather, physical bodies of that particular kind actually behave 
in this way. So, we indeed do have an innate disposition: it is to interpret things as they 
actually are. 
Further, it seems that Hirsch has not been able to capture even the actual way of 
interpreting the spatio-temporal paths of objects quite correctly, as was noted in the case 
of the caterpillar and the butterfly. It seems to me that this is because he insists on the 
sortal-neutral account: objects like cars and butterflies are clearly instances of different 
kinds o f entities and thus they have different criteria o f identity and continuity. Nothing 
in Hirsch's story gives us means to account for this difference, because he insists on a 
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sortal-neutral account. Consequently, Hirsch's account has a very unfortunate in-built 
feature: its inability to account for tricky cases like the butterfly and the caterpillar 
produces category-mistakes. The possible appeal that his account may initially have can 
be refuted easily, for he is in fact just taking things as they actually are and concluding 
that they must be so because we have a disposition to interpret them in that way. 4 2 This 
kind of account collapses immediately i f we acknowledge that the way the world is is a 
contingent matter. Just consider what this implies: i f we had the same innate 
dispositions, but the world were totally different, our experiences would be quite messy 
indeed: all sorts o f strange things would seem to happen all the time, and science as we 
know it would not be possible. The chance of the world being similar with the innate 
dispositions that we have seems quite remote, yet here we are, witnessing breakthroughs 
in science one after another. But that is enough science fiction, the moral should be 
clear: our experiences are what they are because of how the world is, not because we are 
disposed to interpret them in a certain way. This does tell us something about our 
abilities, but it is nothing restrictive, on the contrary, for what it tells us is that we seem 
to be able to get correct information about the world, to understand the identity-
conditions of different objects as they are in the world. 
Much of what 1 have said above applies also to Hirsch's discussion about what he calls 
'the division problem', the problem of grounding the normative intuitions that we have 
about the way that our language divides up reality, as discussed in Hirsch (1993). The 
manner in which Hirsch proceeds is yet again from language to the world and thus a 
number of problems largely analogous to the ones pointed out above emerge in this 
connection as well. Nevertheless, we ought to see whether Hirsch's examples introduce 
42 If this reminds you of Kant, it should, for the basic idea is not very different. 
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any new concerns. 
Hirsch's primary examples concern so called 'strange languages', which divide up reality 
in striking, unintuitive ways. One of these strange languages is Contacti: a language 
which has a rather strange grasp of transtemporal identity, determined partly by contact 
relations of different objects (Hirsch 1993: 7 f f . ) . For example, Contacti includes words 
like 'ctable', which combines stages of what would be two different tables in ordinary 
language. The details are unimportant for our purposes, as in the light of the previous 
discussion it is quite clear where this leads: Hirsch wants to extend the relativist account 
of identity to individuation and to what he here calls the division problem. He tries to do 
this by showing that there is nothing that prevents us from accepting these strange 
languages. Hirsch's response to the first natural criticism goes as follows: 
One is tempted to say, for example: "It's obvious why Contacti is an unthinkably crazy language. 
It's simply because there are no such things as cdogs, ctables, and so on." But the assumption that 
there are no such things does not explain in any obvious way why it would be unreasonable or 
impossible to speak a language containing sentences with the specified truth-conditions of 
Contacti. (Hirsch 1993: 174.) 
Hirsch thus concludes that ontology cannot provide an easy solution to the division 
problem. He does, however, consider a more sophisticated solution, which he calls the 
'impossibility claim' and which roughly suggests that strange languages are necessarily 
inadmissible at the level of thought. Nevertheless, Hirsch is not satisfied with this 
solution and seems to be forced to go for the relativist solution, although reluctantly (p. 
201). 
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Fortunately, we do not have to follow him in this, for it seems that Hirsch's 
understanding of ontology does not overlap with the full-blown realist ontology with 
which we are working with here. Hirsch has been kind enough to clarify why he 
considers ontology to be irrelevant for the division problem. First of all he makes a 
distinction between soft and hard ontology; problems of soft ontology being, i f not 
equivalent with, then at least disposed to be verbal. These problems satisfy what Hirsch 
calls 'the equivalence condition', which, in short, says that for every controversial 
sentence within a dispute there are two sentences which are not controversial and one 
disputant believes that the first of these sentences is equivalent with the controversial 
sentence, and the other disputant believes that the second sentence is equivalent with the 
controversial sentence. Hirsch also adds another condition which states that each 
disputant's position must be consistent with what he would conclude after further 
observation. Furthermore, there are the problems of hard ontology, which do not 
necessarily satisfy the equivalence condition, a sentence like this would be for example: 
'There are (such things as) numbers'. (Hirsch 1993: 180-185.) 
The distinction between soft and hard ontology seems questionable, or at least Hirsch 
puts it in a very strange way. Presumably, what he is suggesting is that some ontological 
problems are just based on linguistic misunderstandings (and the division problem 
might be one of those). He does note that his view should not be taken to imply that the 
existence of individuals depends on what language people speak, or something like that 
(p. 190). This might sound familiar, and Hirsch indeed acknowledges that there is some 
overlap with his views and Carnap's and Putnam's views (p. 191). 
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So, it seems that Hirsch is inclined to accept that there are genuine ontological 
problems, which might be the ones that he calls problems of hard ontology, but granting 
this would appear to make it difficult to motivate the approach that he takes towards 
questions about identity and indeed the division problem. For his case, then, would 
seem to be that very often or at least in the mentioned cases ontological discussions are 
just arbitrary linguistic debates. However, he admits that we have strong intuitions about 
these things and in the case of identity even suggests that these intuitions are based on 
some innate dispositions. But why the mystification? Is it really so hard to admit that we 
might actually be successful in our rational activities; that we are inclined to interpret 
(and divide) the reality in certain ways because that is the way the reality is? Certainly, 
Hirsch is right about the fact that sometimes people use their words differently and this 
might indeed produce some unnecessary debates which are based on misunderstandings 
- call these debates soft i f you wi l l - but surely we can eventually spot such 
unintelligible discussions and clarify what we are actually talking about. What a 
surrealist world this would otherwise be! Thus, I conclude that Hirsch's case for 
relativism is a strikingly unconvincing one, even more so because he does not seem to 
be quite convinced by it himself. Furthermore, Hirsch's approach to the discussed 
problems seems to make them a lot more problematic than they actually are. For even 
though the answers might not be obvious even from the point of view of realist 
metaphysics, it is clear that we at least have some means to approach the solution; this is 
the only way to explain the success of our rational activities unless Hirsch's idea of 
innate dispositions is accepted. And, as we saw, there really is not much motivation for 
that.4 3 
43 The two books discussed in this chapter are by no means Hirsch's only contributions to the this debate 
(see especially Hirsch 2002, 2005), and we will return to the topic in chapter 13, where the idea of 
some metaphysical debates being merely linguistic will be thoroughly examined. 
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5. Metaphysics and Natural Science 
This chapter as well as the next two focus on the relationship between metaphysics and 
natural or empirical science. In this chapter I wi l l defend the view that natural science is 
fundamentally dependent on metaphysics, chapter six concentrates on the details of this 
relationship, and in chapter seven I wi l l examine whether it is a two-way relationship, 
i.e. does natural science have implications for metaphysics. 
Metaphysics and natural or empirical science are generally considered to be at the 
opposite ends of our methods of inquiry. The obvious reason for this is that the term 
'metaphysics' is usually associated with armchair philosophy, i.e. pure a priori 
reasoning, whereas natural science and empirical research are considered to be 
thoroughly in the realm of a posteriori knowledge, based on experiments. I wi l l argue 
that this sharp distinction between metaphysics and natural science is groundless and 
misleading. This is partly because the view that metaphysics deals only in terms of a 
priori knowledge and that natural science deals only in terms of a posteriori knowledge 
is simply wrong, as we wi l l see. However, the distinction between a priori and a 
posteriori knowledge as such is also problematic, as the fact that these two methods of 
inquiry are in a constant bootstrapping relationship has not been acknowledged.44 But 
the idea that metaphysics and natural science could be continuous is of course not 
totally alien; as we have seen, the idea is familiar from Aristotle, and some of it survives 
in contemporary naturalistic accounts (e.g. David Armstrong's). The manner in which 1 
wi l l lay out this continuity is quite different, although, as should be clear by now, 
44 The relationship between the a priori and the a posteriori will be examined in chapter eight, but I will 
introduce the general idea in this chapter. 
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Aristotelian in spirit. In this chapter the claim wi l l be motivated by observing some 
examples from the history of science and from ongoing scientific debates - quantum 
mechanics in particular. 
As is well known, metaphysics and natural science have certainly not always been quite 
as distinct as they might seem to be today. Consider for example Democritus, who is 
best known for his atomic theory. Not only was his theory a piece of remarkable 
philosophy, but his basic idea of an indivisible basis for all physical bodies, an atom, has 
survived even in modern physics. Of course, now we know that the particles that we call 
atoms do have an internal structure, but this does not mean that there could not be some 
more fundamental indivisible particles; these are what modern physics now takes quarks 
and leptons to be. In addition, Democritus' theory also contained a form of the principle 
of conservation o f energy, as he considered atoms and motion to be eternal. Democritus 
is of course only one example, almost all the philosophers of his time could be said to 
have been scientists of some sort, and some of them performed experiments as well. 
Take Archimedes or Pythagoras, who were certainly scientists in modern terms, but also 
philosophers in their time. Perhaps all ancient philosopher-scientists were not very 
much involved with metaphysics, but the ideas of those who were no doubt influenced 
others as well. The best example is perhaps Aristotle, who is probably the ultimate 
philosopher-scientist. 
A l l of Aristotle's scientific theses were not very accurate though - Galileo's challenge to 
Aristotelian physics is probably the best known example o f this. Galileo's famous idea 
was of course that the velocity at which physical bodies fall does not depend on their 
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weight, contrary to what Aristotle thought. Galileo's law of fall states that the distance 
travelled by a falling body is directly proportional to the square of the time that it takes 
for the body to fall . He verified this result by empirical experiments, but at that point he 
already believed in the law. The basis had no doubt been mathematical, drawing on 
Archimedes, whose follower Galileo considered himself to be. Here we are interested in 
Galileo's method of reaching scientific hypotheses. For instance, his theory concerning 
acceleration was quite hard to verify empirically at the time. Galileo did eventually 
manage to show that falling bodies accelerate uniformly, but it was not due to his 
experiments that the original hypothesis was reached. So, what I am here suggesting is, 
quite simply, that Galileo did not just randomly test how physical bodies behave when 
they fall, instead he engaged in a priori reasoning and tried to figure out how they could 
possibly behave, constructed a mathematical formula for this, and then went on to test i f 
his hypothesis corresponded with the reality, as it did. 
What then, does this have to do with metaphysics? Well, it seems to me that what 
Galileo did was not very far from what Aristotle did. It might be that Aristotle failed to 
test his ideas about motion, as Galileo showed them to be incorrect (by empirical means 
as well), but the mistake was obviously made already in the a priori part o f Aristotle's 
reasoning, for Galileo pointed out that there was something inconsistent in Aristotle's 
account. This inconsistency was revealed by Galileo's famous thought experiment in 
which a large and a small stone become connected in the middle of their fal l : by 
Aristotle's reasoning, the composite stone should speed up, but he also thought that 
when a faster object joins a slower one, the faster wi l l slow down, thus it follows that 
the composite stone should slow down as well as accelerate. 
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Aristotle and even Galileo did not have much empirical, a posteriori knowledge to build 
on and perhaps these examples are not fully comparable to the current situation because 
of that. But this is what Galileo struggled to change and the situation was already 
getting significantly better when Newton was active. Newton was in fact able to use 
Galileo's verified empirical results (but recall that these were a priori results before they 
were verified) when he came up with the hypothesis that the moon's motion in orbit 
could be understood by using the principles that Galileo introduced when considering 
projectiles, i.e. the parabolic path that a projectile forms when it falls. Newton had a 
thought experiment of a cannon placed on a high mountain: when the cannon ball is 
fired at a sufficient speed (imagine the mountain being so high that the air resistance can 
be ignored), we have to start considering the curvature of the earth to determine where it 
wi l l fal l , ; / it w i l l fall at all. This thought experiment represents how the gravitational 
force o f the earth could be able to hold the projectile in an earth orbit and Newton 
realised that this might be how the movements of the moon can be explained. What is 
interesting to us is the methodology of this kind of reasoning: Newton took Galileo's 
empirical results regarding projectiles and engaged in some a priori reasoning, with the 
help of which he constructed a possible explanation for certain natural phenomena. The 
mathematical applications of this are familiar enough, but note that all of the above was 
introduced before anything had actually been empirically verified. 
What we have described here is in fact the method of scientific progress: we introduce 
hypotheses, we then test these hypotheses empirically and establish verified a posteriori 
results. Given these established results, we can again consider different possible 
explanations. This bootstrapping relationship is necessary for scientific progress. For 
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now, it is sufficient to think about this procedure simply as the method by which 
scientific knowledge accumulates. Ultimately my claim is that this is also exactly how 
metaphysics is done, indeed, it could be said that this is metaphysics. But to defend this 
claim, we wil l need a thorough account of the a priori, for the purpose is to demonstrate 
that scientific hypotheses (and thought experiments) are based on a priori reasoning. I 
w i l l introduce the idea here very briefly, but a more detailed account wi l l follow in 
chapter eight. The major challenge is to explain why, i f they are based on a priori 
reasoning, do scientific hypothesis very often turn out not to hold? 
Consider the gravitational theory and the three laws of motion introduced by Newton. 
Now we know, thanks to Einstein, that Newton's gravitational theory breaks down when 
very strong gravitational fields are in effect and similarly Newton's three laws of motion 
break down when velocities approach the speed of the light. Still, Newton's original 
ideas are evidently very nearly correct. What has happened here? The explanation is that 
a priori reasoning does not always produce propositions which are true in the actual 
world. So, strictly speaking, Newton's theory turned out not to be actual and now it 
would seem that Einstein's is. This is because a priori reasoning deals with possibilities. 
It is still possible that the world is structured like Newton suggested, but it turned out 
that the actual story is more complicated. Despite this, there is no need to say that 
Newton's theory was entirely wrong, as it quite adequately describes the world, save the 
special cases mentioned above. 
It might be that Einstein's theory is, yet again, just another non-actual possibility which 
happens to correspond with the actual reality rather well, and indeed this seems to be 
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what quantum mechanics suggests. In either case, it is quite unlikely that we would 
abandon Einstein completely, even i f it were to be clear that Einstein's theory fails in 
some contexts. Theories need not be discarded when we realise, as in Newton's case, 
that they apply only to limited cases. This is because the a priori reasoning behind these 
theories might still partly correspond with actuality, although not sufficiently for a 
complete description. The upshot of this is that rarely, i f ever, can a theory be complete. 
It can certainly be a part of a complete description, but the complete description itself is 
in a constant state of revision, as it consists of a number of theories which are, o f course, 
themselves revisable. This is indeed why we need philosophers and scientists to keep 
thinking about radically different possible explanations and interpretations which might 
lead to more accurate results and thus help us to approach a complete description of the 
world, even i f can never reach it. 
There have been scientific debates which illustrate both the dangers and potential of 
scientific thought experiments particularly well. What is remarkable about these debates 
is that they do not necessarily even aim to verify or falsify hypotheses by empirical 
means. Such was Einstein's and Niels Bohr's debate about the interpretation of quantum 
theory. The schism was over the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, which 
Einstein accused of inconsistency. It is impossible to go into the details of the debate 
here, but essentially Einstein tried to show that the incompleteness of the Copenhagen 
interpretation is groundless.45 The 'incompleteness' in this case refers to the idea that we 
can only demonstrate either the particle-like or wave-like properties of quantum 
particles at a time t, but not both simultaneously. Rather than engaging in empirical 
experiments, Einstein put forward a thought experiment which was supposed to show 
45 The details of this debate can be found, for example, from Baggott 2004: 120 ff. 
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that, in principle, it is quite possible to demonstrate both the particle- and wave-like 
properties o f quantum particles simultaneously. This led to an extensive exchange 
between Einstein and Bohr, in which they developed several arguments relying purely 
on thought experiments. After some revisions of what is now known as the Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen, or the EPR experiment, Einstein thought that he had successfully 
established that the Copenhagen interpretation's incompleteness caused a logical 
paradox when applied to this very experiment.46 However, this time he was apparently 
wrong, as later on experiments concerning inequality by John Bell presented results 
which were in favour of the Copenhagen interpretation. Nevertheless, the debate is far 
from over, for the Copenhagen interpretation leaves a significant part of the story open -
in fact, it is fair to say that it is not an interpretation at all. Indeed, important work 
concerning these matters is being done purely on a hypothetical basis, i.e. by 
considering different possible interpretations which are all perfectly compatible with 
established empirical results (cf. Whitaker 2006). 
Interestingly, it is exactly quantum mechanics that has once again made the connection 
between natural science and metaphysics apparent in a way that would have been hard 
to imagine some hundred years ago. For one thing, it has made physics uncertain. 
Indeed, it has made physics a discipline which has to consider some wild possibilities 
based on nothing else than a priori reasoning. Of course, my understanding is that a 
priori reasoning has been a crucial part of natural science all along, but during the 200 
46 The E P R thought experiment attempts to explain away the so called 'spooky action at a distance' 
phenomenon, that is, quantum entanglement: measuring, say, the spin of an electron in a quantum 
system which consists of two electrons travelling to different directions apparently has an immediate 
effect on the other electron in the system, although the two electrons are seemingly independent of 
each other and can indeed be miles apart; hence 'spooky action at a distance'. Einstein, Podolsky and 
Rosen explained the phenomenon by introducing so called 'hidden variables': there must be something 
more to reality than the standard quantum theory suggests which accounts for the strange results. 
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year period before quantum theory was discovered, physicists and other scientists 
tended to have a sense of security which they have now lost. When Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle was introduced, leading physicists were suddenly debating over 
what we really mean when we talk about quantum particles such as electrons which, 
although still measurable, are affected by the measuring devices so that we necessarily 
lose some information in the process. In fact, as John Bell's experiments verified, there 
is something very spooky going on here indeed, for the reality of the physical properties 
of photons which the experiment concern seem not to be even established before a 
measurement is made. It is not hard to see that this shakes the very grounds of a 
discipline such as physics which is traditionally considered to be purely experimental, 
its task being simply the observation of the phenomena of the physical world. I f the 
reality of some of these phenomena is only established after the experiment, it makes 
the traditional conception of physics simply impossible. However, it seems to me that 
this has only revealed the true nature of natural science: it is inevitably tied to 
metaphysics. This is evident when physicists try to explain these strange results, as 
suggestions such as the string theory seem to be almost completely beyond the scope of 
empirical research. 
A l l this makes the suggested pattern of acquiring scientific knowledge apparent in an 
undeniable way. Here is yet another example: many of the particles which are now 
considered elementary were predicted by a priori means long before their existence 
could be empirically verified, one of them was the quark with the peculiar name 'charm'. 
It is revealing that the people who predicted the quark charm and other elementary 
particles were awarded the Nobel prize (1979) before the existence of these particles 
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was empirically verified (Baggott 2004: 54). Perhaps even we philosophers have some 
hope of being awarded this distinguished prize, as apparently it may be awarded for 
outstanding a priori reasoning! Be that as it may, it is clear that right now, natural 
science is more in need of metaphysics than perhaps ever before, as sometimes 
metaphysical a priori reasoning is all we have. 
In the light o f these examples, we can make a couple of important conclusions about the 
relationship between metaphysics and natural science. Firstly, the involvement of 
metaphysics in natural science is associated with the progress o f science, with the 
method of reaching new theories, not so much with basic research which tends to form 
the empirical part, i.e. the a posteriori basis and verification of the a priori results. 
Secondly, the interpretation and meaning of scientific theories is also a question for 
metaphysics. This has been quite apparent since the introduction o f quantum theory. 
A possible objection to this picture might be suggested by those who would be content 
just with describing the world and limiting interpretation to a consistent mathematical 
scheme which perhaps describes the limits of what is measurable.47 But i f we were 
content with this, it would, so it seems to me, mean the end of progress in science. For 
did we not just see that considering different possibilities is crucial for scientific 
progress? It thus seems that an intellectually honest scientist, not to mention a 
philosopher, should boldly dwell on considerations o f this sort and 'stretch' the limits of 
what is possible, to see i f there are alternative interpretations to be found. This also 
means that there is a genuine need for cooperation between philosophers and scientists. 
I f the picture of the involvement of a priori reasoning in coming up with different 
47 This is how Heisenberg supposedly saw his principle of uncertainty (cf. Baggott 2004: 38). 
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possible scientific interpretations is correct, then natural science and metaphysics seem 
to have an important methodological connection. Accordingly, it would perhaps be 
useful i f philosophers were aware of what is happening in natural science, especially on 
the cutting edge of the theoretical branch, as that is where most of the work in a priori 
reasoning is done. On the other hand, it would be wise for the theoretical scientists to 
consult philosophers every once in a while, as they are certainly most experienced in the 
kind of reasoning that the theoretical scientists need. 
A number of further issues require our attention. In the next chapter we wi l l look at the 
process of coming up with different possible scientific interpretations in more detail -
thought experiments seem to play an important role here. I wi l l discuss some recent 
literature both in favour and against the view sketched here. In the following chapter I 
wi l l suggest that the relationship between metaphysics and natural science works both 
ways, i.e. science has implications for metaphysics. Furthermore, the exact role of a 
priori reasoning in this picture has to be settled.48 We wi l l see that some fundamental 
changes in our conception of the a priori are needed. Nevertheless, 1 hope to have 
already established that progress in natural science requires reasoning that appears 
distinctively philosophical. In what follows I aim to demonstrate just how crucial this is. 
48 Chapter eight is concerned with the nature of the a priori. 
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6. The Methodology of Thought Experiments 
Thought experiments are perhaps the most obvious example of shared ground between 
natural science and philosophy. In the previous chapter I suggested that scientific 
thought experiments, and in fact not just thought experiments but also hypotheses and 
theory-forming in general, rely on a priori reasoning, which points towards a continuity 
with metaphysical reasoning - the traditional domain of the a priori. However, this 
certainly needs further grounding and even i f my view is correct, there is still the 
question of the exact methodology of thought experiments, i.e. how does a priori 
reasoning work in this connection. My account is that the a priori deals with 
possibilities, in other words, thought experiments, which rely on a priori reasoning, are 
inquiries into the different possible states of affairs which are compatible with a given 
set of pre-conditions. This is, of course, just the start, as the introduction of a modal 
operator leads us to another discussion.49 I wi l l try to give an accurate description of 
what I believe is going on here, but I should start by putting forward a stronger case for 
the continuity between scientific and philosophical thought experiments. 
The view that scientific and philosophical thought experiments are indeed similar is 
rather popular, at least among philosophers. There are some serious objections though 
and I shall consider one of them, put forward by David Atkinson. Atkinson's (2003) 
main point is that thought experiments which do not lead to real, empirical experiments, 
are not as valuable as the ones that do. While this does not directly question the view 
that I have put forward, its implications are rather problematic, for Atkinson would 
seem to suggest that philosophical thought experiments are of less value, as they hardly 
49 The analysis of modality in this picture will be postponed until chapter nine. 
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ever lead to empirical experiments. This is in fact what Atkinson suggests in another 
connection with Jeanne Peijnenburg (Atkinson and Peijnenburg 2003). What makes 
Atkinson's approach interesting is that he does not consider only philosophical thought 
experiments to be poor ones, but also a number of scientific thought experiments, such 
as Galileo's thought experiment about falling bodies in response to Aristotle's view 
(Atkinson 2003). The fault in Galileo's thought experiment is that, according to 
Atkinson, there is nothing inconsistent in Aristotle's original idea, contrary to what 
Galileo claimed: Aristotle's idea that the time that it takes for a body to fall is inversely 
proportional to its weight does hold, when the body is falling in a fluid, such as water. 
So, Atkinson suggests that Galileo perhaps misread Aristotle and, moreover, presented 
his thought experiment of the imagined inconsistency as a polemical device. 
1 wish to take no stand on this matter here, but it should certainly be acknowledged that 
even i f Aristotle's reasoning was consistent, his account o f motion is nevertheless 
unsatisfactory. Furthermore, this hardly tells us anything about the actual process by 
which Galileo reached his conclusion about falling bodies, which is correct, albeit in a 
restricted framework (as is Newtonian mechanics). Thus, even though Galileo's thought 
experiment, as we know it, might not quite do what Galileo thought it did, namely point 
out a clear inconsistency in Aristotle's original idea, it nevertheless is an accurate 
description of an idealised situation, of a possibility. It is revealing that the same is true 
about Newtonian mechanics, which breaks down in special cases. Consequently, I find 
it quite puzzling that Atkinson grounds his case by pointing out certain special 
circumstances in which Galileo's theory does not hold, and concludes that his thought 
experiment must be a bad one. Certainly, it could have been a better one, but i f it 
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successfully describes at least some states of affairs in the world and i f it even remotely 
illustrates the process of reasoning that Galileo went through when forming his theory, it 
is indeed a fine thought experiment. 
The discussion above gives us some idea of how to deal with thought experiments. I 
think that it is a mistake to judge their value merely in terms of what kind of empirical 
experiments they might lead to. Atkinson clearly thinks that there is not much more to 
thought experiments than that, and this is why he thinks that the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) thought experiment, which we discussed in the previous chapter, was a 
good one; not because its conclusion was correct (because it was not), but because it 
later led to a real experiment by John Bell, which in fact corroborated the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum theory, contrary to the purpose o f the EPR thought 
experiment. In a similar fashion, Atkinson (2003) claims that the string theory is an 
example o f a bad thought experiment: it seems that we can never have access to the 
energy required to test it empirically, hence it wi l l not lead to empirical experiments. To 
understand Atkinson's motives, we need to look at the two indicators, which, according 
to him and Jeanne Peijnenburg (Peijnenburg and Atkinson 2003), reveal when a thought 
experiment is a bad one. 
The two indicators are contradictory conclusions and conclusions which beg the 
question. As an example of the first one, Peijnenburg and Atkinson mention the 
Doppelgdnger thought experiment which produced a heated debate in the philosophy of 
mind; the question being of course whether your physical duplicate can be mentally 
identical to you. The Doppelgdnger thought experiment is supposed to offer an example 
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of a conclusion which begs the question as well, for Peijnenburg and Atkinson claim 
that the contradictory conclusions are caused by question-begging premises: the thought 
experiment is meant to explain our intuitions about the mental and the physical, but 
these intuitions are also the cause of the contradictory conclusions. 
While I am not entirely sure that the Doppelgdnger thought experiment really does 
serve its purpose, I am quite positive that the criterion of good and bad thought 
experiments introduced here is not satisfactory. The problem seems to be this: 
Peijnenburg and Atkinson take thought experiments simply as pragmatic tools towards 
empirical experiments. However, it is clear that this is not how they are used and it 
certainly gives us a wrong idea about the methodology behind them. Take for example 
the EPR thought experiment, which, apparently, did not correspond with reality, 
although it produced a real experiment (although quite a bit after the actual thought 
experiment was introduced). It seems thus that the EPR thought experiment was good 
only because of the contingent fact that John Bell happened to find a way to test it 
empirically (after David Bohm did some additional a priori work with it). And this is 
even though it obviously falls into the category of bad thought experiments by the 
criteria just provided: the EPR thought experiment did produce contradictory 
conclusions and certainly begged the question given Peijnenburg's and Atkinson's 
understanding of question-begging. 
Certainly, there are thought experiments which are bad ones because they clearly beg 
the question. Some of the thought experiments familiar from philosophy of mind no 
doubt fall into this group. However, I would be inclined to say that in fact these are not 
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thought experiments at all, because they violate one rather simple requirement that I 
would consider necessary for thought experiments. This requirement is that thought 
experiments must be closed in terms of their pre-conditions: the initial set of empirical 
pre-conditions has to be sufficient for the scope of the thought experiment (i.e. nothing 
that might be relevant for the thought experiment may be ruled out), on pain of begging 
the question. This is perhaps also the closest thing to a definition of a thought 
experiment that we can have. It is often the case with thought experiments in philosophy 
of mind that the empirical grounds are shaky at best. For one thing, the popular thought 
experiments about zombies (see Chalmers 1996) fail to take into account whether it is 
even physically possible to have an exact duplicate o f a person walking around, but 
perhaps with different phenomenological properties. In other words, the information on 
which thought experiments like this rely on is insufficient and thus they fail to satisfy 
the requirement of closed pre-conditions, which is crucial for successful thought 
experiments. 
Let us go back to the problems in Peijnenburg's and Atkinson's view. They define the 
value of thought experiments in terms of the empirical experiments that follow from 
them. But how are we supposed to know when we can decide on the value of a thought 
experiment, i f there can be empirical experiments that follow from it much later, as in 
the case of the EPR thought experiment? How do we know that something like this wi l l 
not happen with string theory, or indeed any thought experiment that might initially 
seem 'bad'? This is a concern that Daniel Cohnitz (2006) has also put forward in his 
comment on Peijnenburg's and Atkinson's paper. It is also somewhat suspicious that 
Peijnenburg and Atkinson refuse to define what a thought experiment is: 
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Since we are preoccupied with the difference between good and bad, we do not feel the need to 
state exactly what thought experiments are; after all one can distinguish good from bad theories, or 
thoughts, or experiments without being able to define what exactly theories, thoughts or 
experiments are. (Peijnenburg and Atkinson 2003.) 
Well, at least it seems that my claim for the continuity between scientific and 
philosophical thought experiments cannot be questioned by Peijnenburg and Atkinson. 
Nevertheless, we need to look for a more satisfactory criterion of judging when thought 
experiments actually are bad and when they are good. In my view, this is indeed very 
closely connected to what thought experiments are. I suggested above that a minimal 
condition for a successful thought experiment is that the pre-conditions of the thought 
experiment are closed. I have also pointed out that I consider thought experiments to be 
based on a priori reasoning and this, together with the set of closed pre-conditions, is 
exactly what gives us a criterion to judge the value of the thought experiment: as long as 
the a priori work associated with the thought experiment is logically consistent and 
coherent in regard to the closed pre-conditions, the thought experiment is a good one. 
What needs to be emphasised, however, is that even i f this criterion is fulfil led, it does 
not mean that the thought experiment corresponds with actual reality, i.e. thought 
experiments by themselves are not a reliable guide to how things are in the actual world. 
To put this in terms of an example, recall the EPR thought experiment again, which, 
although logically consistent, turned out not to correspond with actual reality after Bell's 
experiments. 
Naturally, thought experiments which do not correspond with the actual world might not 
be very interesting, at least not for experimental scientists, but as long as the state o f 
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affairs described in them is coherent and does not conflict with the established a 
posteriori framework, we cannot really claim that the thought experiment is a bad one. 
Indeed, the whole point of the thought experiment is to come up with a possible 
scenario. Whether this scenario is true has to be settled by other means. So, many 
thought experiments turn out not to be true, where truth is considered in terms of the 
actual world, but i f they are consistent, they nevertheless describe possible states of 
affairs. What's more, even i f we have a thought experiment which does correspond with 
actuality, it often means just that it corresponds with a certain restricted framework of 
actuality. In the light of Atkinson's discussion, this seems to be the case with Galileo, 
but it is also the case with Newton's mechanics and a great number of other thought 
experiments and theories. The explanation for this is simple: only a theory of everything 
could sufficiently take into account all the local variations in the world. However, most 
of the time it is quite clear what the area of applicability is, as in the case of Newton's 
versus Einstein's mechanics. Incidentally, one of Atkinson's (2003) examples of a bad 
thought experiment, the string theory, is something like a theory of everything. I wi l l not 
try to settle whether string theory is in fact logically consistent and coherent with what 
we already know, but provided that it is, it seems that it is a good thought experiment in 
terms of my criteria. 
We now have a rough idea about the methodology of though experiments, but a number 
of details remain to be settled. Firstly, I wi l l not be giving a description about the 
psychological processes associated with thought experiments. While it is an interesting 
topic and certainly worth pursuing, I believe that it is partly a question of psychology 
and partly of philosophy of mind, both of them beyond the scope of the discussion at 
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hand.50 But we can certainly say something here. It seems that we do have the ability to 
reach information about how the world might be. However, this information does not 
always correspond with how the world actually is, although it certainly sometimes does. 
We have also seen that even the thought experiments which turned out not to correspond 
with actual reality can be logically consistent and coherent in regard to the established 
framework of a posteriori information. What, then, explains the fact that sometimes we 
successfully reach information about the actual state of affairs, but sometimes, even 
when the methodology of reasoning is exactly the same and all preconditions have been 
taken into account, we come into a conclusion that does not correspond with actuality? 
Well, the reason for this appears to be simply that there are several possible ways that 
the world might be, all of which are logically consistent and coherent in regard to what 
we already know. However, this is no cause for despair, as we also know that one of 
these possible ways that the world might be must be actual. 
What delimits the range of thought experiments (at least useful ones) is logical 
consistency-cwwj-the established a posteriori framework. It is important to note here that 
the established a posteriori framework does not consist just of empirical information, it 
consists o f everything we know, including the a priori results that have been verified 
earlier.51 Thus, we already have some important information which radically delimits the 
vast range of possibilities at hand - these are the preconditions of feasible thought 
experiments. So, this limited albeit still quite broad range of possible states of affairs is 
the area where thought experiments, and a priori reasoning, operate. I f a thought 
50 I advise to consult Roy Sorensen (1992: ch. 4) for an overview of possible accounts in this regard. 
51 Be it noted that the fallibility of empirical research is hardly a problem here, as empirical science is a 
self-correcting discipline and the a posteriori framework can be revised accordingly. However, this 
does mean that sometimes a priori results which violate the established a posteriori framework are in 
fact correct, indeed, this is usually what points out the need for revision in the first place. 
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experiment suggests something that falls outside this area, then it is indeed an example 
of a bad thought experiment, as it is either logically inconsistent or fails to take the 
established pre-conditions into account. 
How, then, do we acquire information about the possible states o f affairs? I have already 
suggested that this is done with the help of a priori reasoning, but what does this exactly 
mean? It is not an unusual suggestion that this has something to do with conceivability. 
The relationship between possibility and conceivability can of course be either, neither, 
or both of the following: 'what is possible, is conceivable' and 'what is conceivable, is 
possible'. The second of these is the one of interest to us, but I do not wish to endorse it. 
We can immediately see that something which violates the conditions that I have just 
put forward might very well be conceivable, as it is easy to conceive of something that 
is not coherent in terms of the established a posteriori framework. There are certainly a 
number of other problems associated with conceivability, but I w i l l not try to give an 
exhaustive account here.52 Let it just be said that i f conceivability is interpreted as 
something that can be imagined, it is certainly far too loose for our purposes. I am 
inclined to agree with Sorensen, who suggests that the connection between 
conceivability and possibility is only a statistical overlap (Sorensen 1992: 41). 
I f conceivability is out of the question, what are our options? An appeal to 
conceptualism of some sort might be tried, and often is. This is of course the approach 
that Frank Jackson (1998) takes; we already considered his views in chapter three. 
Jackson's account seems to be that only philosophical thought experiments, such as 
Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiments, could be dealt with in terms of a 
52 For it is the task of chapter nine. 
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conceptualist framework (Jackson 1998: 78-79). The question is: what does he think 
about scientific thought experiments? Well, Jackson describes Galileo's thought 
experiment concerning falling bodies and draws the following conclusion: 
We should not be too surprised at thought experiments revealing facts about the empirical world. 
Detective stories make us familiar with the idea that reconstructing 'in our minds' what would have 
been involved in the butler doing it may reveal that he could not have done it. This is surely very 
different from the Twin Earth thought experiments. They do not lead us to revise our views about 
what Earth is like, or indeed what Twin Earth is fundamentally like. (Jackson 1998: 78-79.) 
I w i l l not discuss the Twin Earth thought experiments here. Instead, I wish to ask how is 
it possible that Jackson considers scientific thought experiments to be any less 
problematic than philosophical ones. It is obvious, from what he is saying, that there is 
some kind o f a modality at work here, and apparently we reach it with the help of a 
priori reasoning, 'in our minds', as it were. But why should we not be surprised about 
this, does it not raise the very same question that we have been concerned with? I take it 
that Jackson is not applying the conceptualist scheme to scientific thought experiments, 
as this would certainly require a more extensive account than he has given us. 
Moreover, Jackson himself has put forward a number of thought experiments, the 
classification of which is somewhat problematic. The best known of these is the 
example of Mary, the colour scientist who is confined to a black-and-white-room and 
learns everything about colour from books (Jackson 1986). The question is, does Mary 
learn anything new when she actually sees a new colour, say, red? The argument is 
supposed to show that physicalism is false, but we are here only interested in how to 
classify it. 
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According to Peijnenburg and Atkinson (2003), the case of Mary is an example o f a bad 
thought experiment, comparable to the Twin Earth thought experiments. However, 
according to Jackson's criteria, it would seem that it is closer to a scientific thought 
experiment, as supposedly it shows that physicalism is false, and thus tells us something 
about the empirical world - an indicator of a scientific thought experiment in Jackson's 
terms. What makes the situation even more complicated is that Sorensen considers the 
Mary thought experiment to be a counterexample to the view that thought experiments 
are appeals to ordinary language, which seems to be more or less what would follow 
from Jackson's conceptualist interpretation o f the Twin Earth thought experiments 
(Sorensen 1992: 94). 
We should pause for a while and see what is going on here. Obviously, something is not 
right. It seems to me that the cause of these inconsistent accounts is the attempt to 
separate scientific and philosophical thought experiments, or the attempt to explain 
some of them away as appeals to ordinary language, as Jackson tries to do with the Twin 
Earth thought experiments, or simply to dismiss some thought experiments as bad, as 
Atkinson does with both the Twin Earth thought experiments and Jackson's Mary 
thought experiment. But as I have been emphasizing all along, the methodology behind 
all o f these thought experiments is the same. They all make modal commitments, they 
are all based on a priori reasoning." What remains to be done, is to see what in fact 
grounds these modal commitments. 
In my view, the most plausible explanation is that the modal commitments are grounded 
53 The claim that thought experiments are based on a priori reasoning is perhaps contentious. I will 
motivate this claim in chapter eight, but see also Sorensen (1992: 14-15) for discussion. 
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in the way the world is. In other words, there has to be something in the world which 
governs our modally loaded thought experiments. When I earlier emphasised that the 
established a posteriori framework does not only include purely empirical information, I 
meant just this: we already have some information about how the world can potentially 
be like; the framework is certainly not modally innocent. I w i l l elaborate this in due 
course, but I hope that enough has been said to establish that thought experiments are 
relevant both for science and philosophy, and that their methodology is similar in both 
cases. 
So, what I have suggested is that by engaging in a priori reasoning we delimit the scope 
of the possible with the help of the established a posteriori framework. The details of 
this process wi l l be discussed in later chapters, but it would appear that we have good 
reasons to think that both philosophical and scientific thought experiments express 
synthetic a priori propositions: as we saw, the conceptualist line that Jackson has 
suggested is unsatisfactory, but so is Atkinson's line which attempts to reduce the value 
of thought experiments to empirical testability. Insofar as thought experiments do 
provide new information, it must be 'independent of experience'. This is relative though: 
we always have a certain established a posteriori framework, which naturally works as 
our starting point. Once new results are established, they w i l l be integrated into the very 
same framework. This process is repeated over and over again; it suggests that a 
posteriori and a priori knowledge are in a constant bootstrapping relationship* 
Finally, it is rather meaningless to argue whether thought experiments which fall within 
the criteria I have presented are philosophical or scientific. Empirical testability clearly 
54 The details of this relationship will be discussed in chapter eight. 
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does not help in determining this, as there are thought experiments which have been 
tested empirically in both disciplines, as well as thought experiments which have not 
been, or perhaps even cannot be tested empirically. Thought experiments rely on our a 
priori capabilities in order to determine how the world might be; what is distinct about 
this process is the modal content of the scenario, which wi l l be analysed in detail later. 
In conclusion, it could be said that all thought experiments are philosophical, as 
generally a method of inquiry that applies a priori reasoning is surely a philosophical 
one. 
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7. The Relevance of Science to Metaphysics 
In the previous chapters I have argued that natural science is closely tied to metaphysics 
and that scientific thought experiments employ our a priori capabilities - a kind of 
inquiry that generally characterises metaphysics. The question at hand now is whether 
this is a two-way relationship, i.e. what, i f any, is the relevance of science to philosophy 
and especially metaphysics? It should be clear that the conception of metaphysics that I 
have been defending does indeed have something to do with science, for I have 
abandoned the view that metaphysics is just armchair philosophy and nothing more. 
Moreover, 1 believe that the two are connected in much the same way that a priori and a 
posteriori knowledge are connected: in a manner of a bootstrapping relationship, an 
idea which very briefly I introduced in the previous chapter. However, it is worthwhile 
to consider how, exactly, science affects philosophical theories, and just how important 
this connection is. 
It might seem that a view which connects philosophy and science in the way that I have 
suggested resembles what some philosophers call naturalism. While I find that much of 
the discussion about naturalism defines it in a way that has nothing to do with the view 
that I have been defending, it nevertheless seems that on some level the name might not 
be so misleading. At the very least, Aristotle is sometimes considered to be one of the 
first naturalists and in this sense naturalism does indeed come very close to how I would 
like to characterise my view. However, Quine is often considered to be one of the 
modern adherents of naturalism, but I think that his critical form of naturalism, which is, 
at least in principle, very hostile towards metaphysics, could rather be called 
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scienticism, as it occasionally is. Furthermore, David Armstrong has been defending a 
rather different version of naturalism, but his views are again much closer to the type of 
naturalism that I might support. Judging from these radically different ways to use the 
term 'naturalism', I believe that it is best to abstain from its use in this connection. 
Nevertheless, i f someone wants to describe the type of view that I am defending as 
naturalistic, it would be important to emphasise that nothing about it implies that 
science could do the work of philosophy, only that there is an important connection 
between the two. 
To get into a little more detail about what exactly is going on between natural science 
and philosophy - in that particular order - we need to distinguish a rather obvious 
general effect from science to philosophy, which is indirect, and more specialised cases, 
which are perhaps relevant just in terms of one single theory, but quite directly. The 
general effect that science necessarily has to the whole of philosophy, including 
metaphysics, is of course the a posteriori framework that established scientific results 
create. This is usually such an obvious restriction that it goes without saying. Although 
every once in a while this framework itself goes through such a radical change that it 
immediately affects philosophy in a clear and important way. History is ful l of examples 
like this: the change from geocentric to heliocentric understanding of our solar system, 
finding out that Euclidean geometry breaks down at a certain level, the relativity of 
space and time, and last but not least, results concerning the miraculous world of 
quantum mechanics. A l l of these radical changes to the established scientific framework 
caused immediate response in the work of philosophers. But now, when we have 
learned to live with these changes (although it is at least arguable that we have not, and 
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perhaps never wi l l quite learn to live with the odd results of quantum mechanics), the 
effect that they have is mostly in the background, an obvious precondition. To 
appreciate just how far these preconditions reach, consider Thales and other ancient 
philosophers who were trying to figure out what is the basic element of the world. 
According to Thales, the basic element, arche, was water. No sane modern philosopher 
would suggest anything like this. Why? Because it conflicts with the established 
scientific framework: water is a compound and it has a number of internal, more 
fundamental constituents; as, of course, do atoms. 
The general effect of the established scientific framework is massive and cannot be 
denied, but the direct, specialised effects that natural science sometimes has on 
philosophical theories are perhaps more illustrative. Again, historical cases are 
numerous, but modern examples might serve our purpose better. Some of the most 
obvious examples are of course from such areas as philosophy of physics, philosophy of 
biology and philosophy of chemistry, but it could be argued that within these areas of 
philosophy, the effect from philosophy to science is more important than the effect from 
science to philosophy, as they mostly focus on the methodology, ethics and 
interpretation o f the associated scientific theories. Obviously these areas of philosophy 
are in direct connection with natural sciences, but as the purpose of the research is to 
map the philosophical aspects of these specific sciences in the first place, more general 
philosophical ramifications wi l l be very limited. 
The kind of link that we are looking for might thus be clearer in some other areas of 
philosophy, such as the philosophy of mind. This is indeed an area of philosophy which 
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is strongly influenced by the latest results in psychology and neuroscience. Note, 
however, that this tendency is very recent, starting seriously perhaps from Patricia 
Churchland (1986). The functionalism put forward by Putnam that was predominant 
earlier did not effectively take advantage of the latest results in the related sciences. 
Also, although prominent philosophers working in the area, such as David Chalmers, 
are no doubt quite familiar with the associated scientific background, their arguments 
rarely take fu l l advantage of this background. For instance, Chalmers is primarily 
interested in arguments concerning the so called explanatory gap between consciousness 
and brain processes (cf. Chalmers 1996), not so much with the many arguments from, 
say, neuroscience.55 So, although science certainly has an important effect on the 
philosophy of mind, even this effect is perhaps not quite as evident as one might hope. 
Be that as it may, there is no doubt a certain limit to the help that science can offer to the 
problems in the philosophy of mind, as we are certainly nowhere near a completed 
neuroscience.56 
Could it be then that it is metaphysics which provides the most interesting cases of the 
effects from science to philosophy? This might seem unlikely as, quite generally, 
metaphysics is regarded as the area of philosophy which is perhaps the furthest away 
from science. And of course we must acknowledge that not many metaphysicians 
extensively discuss the scientific background of their metaphysical theories, not directly 
anyway. Still, it is clear that some metaphysicians, for example David Armstrong, think 
that there is a very clear way in which metaphysics is connected with science. This is 
apparent, for example, in the view that Armstrong (1978, 1989) takes in regard to 
55 See Bickle et al. (2006) for an extensive discussion about neuroscience's influence on the philosophy 
of mind. 
56 And, arguably, even a completed neuroscience would not settle the issue. 
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universals; a view which he calls 'scientific realism'. The idea is that it is largely, i f not 
entirely, the work o f science to determine what the actual universals are, what kind of 
properties things actually have, and in what kind of relations they stand to each other. 
This is a very Aristotelian view and it is undeniably a view which emphasises the 
important connection between science and metaphysics. Note that one important 
implication o f this view is that these matters - the true properties and relations in the 
world - are subject to the falsifiability and revisability of science. This suggests that the 
true relations could only be fixed by a finalised science; although in fact we of course 
have to rely on 'the best science'. The effect of science understood in this way is also a 
very direct one: the properties and relations that we - or physicists - observe in the 
world directly tell us something about the ontological structure o f the world. But, let it 
be noted again, this connection between science and metaphysics does not undermine 
metaphysics in any way, for it is the job of metaphysics to make sense of these results. 
And quite a job it wi l l be, as during the last 100 years the results have been increasingly 
disturbing. 
The question that emerges is how, exactly, science is supposed to give us hints about the 
ontological structure of the world? Well, it seems almost as i f scientists are working on 
different sub-branches of metaphysics: trying to determine what kinds of properties 
certain entities have, and what sorts of relations hold between these entities. Consider 
quantum mechanics. What are we supposed to conclude from the information that, when 
we make a measurement on a correlated pair of photons, it seems that they are able to 
exchange information at thousands or millions of times the speed of light, as John Bell's 
inequality theorem suggests (Baggott 2004: 153 ff.)? Frankly, how are people without 
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extensive training in theoretical physics supposed make any sense of quantum 
mechanics, which nevertheless seems to be 'the best science'? I believe that the situation 
is not quite as worrying as it might perhaps seem, although it would indeed appear that 
it is very crucial that philosophers have at least a minimal understanding of what goes 
on in 'the best science'. Still, given the pace at which the established scientific 
framework is expanding, it is quite impossible for anyone to be aware of all that is 
going on. But this is just where cooperation comes into the picture: we should rely on 
the help of our colleagues in the empirical disciplines. Currently, the amount of such 
cooperation is negligible, but it seems obvious that i f a project such as David 
Armstrong's is to be pursued, cooperation between philosophers and scientists is 
unavoidable. The move which Armstrong makes, and which I think we should make, 
should not be considered as an end of discussion, but rather as the start of it. 
Now, let us take a genuine example from quantum mechanics and try to see how it 
could really be used when we engage in metaphysical reasoning. We know for a fact 
that there is something strange going on between the correlated pair of photons 
mentioned above. This strangeness is apparent when we would like to make two 
measurements on the photons, as when we make a measurement on the first photon, we 
somehow manage to disturb both of the photons, even i f they are miles away from each 
other (Baggott 2004: 170).57 This result suggests that there is some kind of a peculiar 
relationship between the two photons, yet to be explained. I think that any 
57 The measurement disturbs the photon because the measuring device interacts with it, as demonstrated 
by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. This is why we have two correlated photons in the first place: 
we hope to be able to make two measurements on the first one by making the second measurement on 
the second photon, which we have not disturbed yet. Thus we could make a second measurement on 
the first photon, as if we had not disturbed it. But, alas, somehow the information of the first 
measurement seems to reach the second photon, although there are no feasible ways for that 
information to reach it in time. 
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metaphysician should be thrilled about results like this. For it seems to me that the 
results in quantum mechanics have not only broken down classical mechanics, but also 
a great deal of classical metaphysics. This is because there is a direct relationship 
between these two as well. Thus, quantum mechanics might require that we revise our 
metaphysical theories. We need to ask: what kind of relation could be responsible for 
the strange, instantaneous action that takes place between the two photons? This is of 
course, again, largely, i f not completely, an empirical matter, and it might be hard to say 
much about the relation before we have more empirical information, but surely any 
metaphysical account has to take into consideration that there seems to be some strange 
relation in the world that does not fit into the classical view. In other words, this adds to 
the prerequisites that philosophers have to take into account. Just how one does this is a 
matter of the details of the theory in question.58 
It might be argued that, interesting as they are, results in quantum mechanics do not 
necessarily require any revisions in our metaphysical theories. It could be said that they 
are merely a part of the empirical framework which defines the actual relations and 
properties in the world and demand no changes in our metaphysical framework. 
Something like this is true of the empirical results which in fact do fit in the 
metaphysical framework: the finding that water is H 2 0 , or even that it is X Y Z , does not 
require a change in our metaphysical framework because we have a clear conception of 
how it fits into the ontological structure of the world. O f course, it is debatable what this 
ontological structure actually is, but the point here is that whatever our theory about it 
58 Admittedly, although issues in quantum mechanics are anything but settled, and it might yet turn out 
that there is realist interpretation of these strange results (cf. Einstein, David Bohm), one compatible 
with classical mechanics and thus not of drastic consequences to metaphysics either. Be that as it may, 
we should keep a very close eye on these results. 
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is, it has to be able to accommodate the fact that water molecules have a certain internal 
structure and the atoms which water molecules consist o f have certain relations with 
each other. The upshot of this is that no matter what the details of your metaphysical 
theory are, it is certainly one of its prerequisites that it is compatible with these 
empirical results. Because of this, your theory is naturally compatible with all the 
empirical results that fit into the similar framework (given that you are aware of these 
results). However, for an ancient philosopher like Thales, the results about water would 
have been utterly incredible and his conception that water is the arche would have 
needed some serious revision indeed. Now, what makes the case of quantum mechanics 
so striking is that it is to us as the finding that water is H2O would have been to Thales. 
The results in quantum mechanics do not f i t in the established framework; the relations 
and properties introduced by it are completely different from the ones that are in effect 
in the case of water. Of course, in fact, water molecules have a quantum structure as 
well, so now we also need to explain how that structure can produce the properties and 
relations that we observe at the macro-level. 
Perhaps it seems rather hopeless to somehow take into account all these strange results. 
But in fact the situation is not very much different from the ones that I described earlier: 
the change from geocentric to heliocentric understanding of our solar system, finding 
out that Euclidean geometry breaks down at a certain level, and the relativity of space 
and time. A l l o f these distinctly empirical results must have seemed incredible, and 
equally impossible to take into account in philosophical theories which were designed 
under such a misguided conception of what the reality is like. But we have nevertheless 
managed to accommodate all these results to our theories. Thus, it seems to me that 
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what we have here is nothing more than a continuing relationship between philosophy 
and natural science, a two-way relationship. Radical empirical results wi l l always 
require considerable revisions to our metaphysical theories, just as they always have, 
but there are no reasons to think that we could not cope with this. 
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In the last three chapters I examined the relationship between metaphysics and science. 
It should now be obvious that I believe a priori reasoning to have a central role in 
characterising this relationship. I have already mentioned some of the most important 
aspects of my understanding of the a priori in passing, but in this chapter it is the main 
focus. It wi l l not come as a surprise that the conception of the a priori that I am about to 
put forward is not quite conventional. In fact, the novel definition of the a priori that I 
wi l l offer is one of the key features of my argument for the necessity of metaphysics. 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to describe the role of the a priori in regard to 
metaphysics, but it wi l l become apparent that it has an undeniable role in all of our 
rational activities. 5 9 
Characterisations of the a priori usually start with the idea that a proposition is 
knowable a priori i f it is knowable independently o f experience. However, to what 
degree can anything be known independently of experience? What is the relationship 
between established a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge? And further, are 
there any synthetic a priori truths, or, more neutrally, non-analytic a priori truths? I 
suppose that the most popular view today is that all a priori truths are analytic and that a 
priori reasoning is some sort of conceptual analysis.60 But the alternative view, namely 
that some and indeed the most interesting kind of a priori truths are not analytic, is not 
unheard of. It does certainly seem that i f there are non-analytic a priori truths, they are 
the most interesting sort. Here I am interested in the a priori exactly in this sense. I wil l 
59 This chapter is largely based on my (2008). 
60 Recall our discussion of Frank Jackson's views in chapter three. 
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suggest that the (non-analytic) a priori, rather than being strictly independent of 
experience, is always one step beyond experience. To be able to reach this step, we must 
have an a posteriori framework to take us just below that next step. Furthermore, once 
the a priori step has been firmly verified, by a posteriori methods, it becomes a part of 
the established a posteriori framework. What I mean is that the a priori is in a constant 
bootstrapping relationship with the a posteriori, as I have indicated in previous chapters. 
But despite this intimate connection with the a posteriori, a priori reasoning is a distinct, 
crucial method of inquiry which is not reducible to the empirical. 
Apart from the analytic/synthetic distinction, it needs to be settled where the a priori 
stands in terms of the necessary/contingent distinction. I w i l l argue that the defining 
characteristic of the a priori is in fact its relationship with modality. To start with, we 
must acknowledge Kripke's critique: 'a priori' is not synonymous with 'necessary', and 
not all necessary truths are a priori. Given Kripke's compelling examples, there should 
be very little controversy over this matter.61 Nevertheless, I certainly wish to maintain 
the link between the a priori and modality; the qualification that is needed concerns the 
strength of this connection, namely, apriority only implies possibility. In what follows it 
wi l l be shown that it is precisely the connection with modality that helps us to answer 
some of the hardest questions about the a priori. For example, the question about the 
status of the a priori in regard to the analytic/synthetic distinction reduces to a question 
about the nature of the involved modality. I f the modality in question is conceptual, it 
would appear that there is little room for non-analytic a priori truths, but i f a priori 
knowledge concerns metaphysical modality, it seems clear that there have to be 
61 Although in the course of this chapter I will point out good reasons to re-evaluate the situation 
altogether. 
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(something like) synthetic a priori truths. I wi l l argue that the latter is true, although I do 
not find the analytic/synthetic distinction very informative in the first place. Finally, I 
wi l l combine the two points introduced above - the bootstrapping relationship between 
a posteriori and a priori knowledge, and the connection between the a priori and 
metaphysical modality - and demonstrate that the upshot of these views is a coherent 
and plausible characterisation of the a priori. 
Before I advance to defend my claims in detail, it w i l l be necessary to make some 
clarifications. Firstly, the positive characterisation of ' a priori knowledge' suggested here 
states that a logically valid a priori proposition6 2 always holds in at least one possible 
world. It is a separate issue whether it holds in the actual world, and this generally has 
to be determined by a posteriori means (given that we are dealing with non-analytic a 
priori truths). The question that remains is how we define 'a priori knowledge'; do any 
logically valid a priori propositions qualify, or only the ones that are true in the actual 
world? For the time being, let us assume the latter - we w i l l return to the matter later. 
Secondly, I hold that a priori reasoning is fallible, but also that a priori knowledge, 
understood as above, is fallible. By 'a priori reasoning' 1 mean the rational activity that 
human beings engage in when trying to reach a priori knowledge. The Cartesian 
conception of the a priori maintains a strong link between apriority and necessity, which 
naturally implies that consistent a priori reasoning provides access to necessary truths. 
Presumably this still leaves space for the fallibility of a priori reasoning, but not for the 
fallibility of a priori knowledge. Kripke's ideas on the matter are usually considered to 
62 An 'a priori proposition' being any proposition that was reached by a priori means. The validity of the 
proposition simply means that the reasoning process that led to it is consistent and does not violate the 
laws of logic, i.e. that human error is ruled out and we have no reasons to suspect its feasibility. 
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have severed the link between apriority and modality completely, but these results do 
not imply that there is no connection between the a priori and modality, they only imply 
that a priori reasoning is not a direct guide to necessity. There might be a temptation for 
a deflationary account o f the a priori given the usual interpretation of Kripke's results, 
but we can certainly put forward a more explanatory view i f these results are understood 
correctly.63 We have a middle way between abandoning the a priori altogether (cf. Quine 
1951, but also MacBride 6 4) and giving a characterisation of it which does not grasp the 
traditional sense at all. However, I cannot sympathise with the recent accounts o f the 
nature of the a priori 6 5 , for although they do make some important amendments, they 
tend to be guilty of the same fault that the classic debate between rationalism and 
empiricism is, i.e. the illusion that a priori and a posteriori knowledge are wholly 
separable. 
Many modern accounts of the a priori, such as Laurence BonJour's (1998), do correctly 
acknowledge that a priori reasoning is fallible. There are three things to note here. 
1. Human beings are fallible creatures and their rational capabilities are subject 
to errors. 
2. Even when a valid a priori proposition is reached, it might not hold in the 
actual world. 
3. The status of a priori propositions in the actual world is generally determined 
by a posteriori means, which are, of course, fallible. 
63 Friedman's (2000) account, for instance, is a good attempt at this. 
64 MacBride, F., 'Ontological Categories: A priori or A posteriori?1, delivered at the Conference On 
Methodological Issues In Contemporary Metaphysics, 6-7 January 2006, Nottingham. 
65 E.g. BonJour (1998), Peacocke (2000 &2004), Bealer (2000), Field (2000); I will not analyse these 
accounts in detail, but it will become apparent where my views differ from most recent suggestions. 
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The first two points concern the fallibility o f a priori reasoning - how it might fail to 
produce a priori knowledge - whereas the third one suggests, given that a priori 
knowledge is considered to require the truth of a valid a priori proposition in the actual 
world, that a priori knowledge as well is fallible. This is a direct consequence of the 
fallibility of our (empirical) means to verify the truth of any given a priori proposition in 
the actual world. Accordingly, a priori reasoning can never reach absolute certainty.66 
What about the supposed empirical indefeasibility o f a priori propositions (cf. Field 
2000)? Well, in the terms that I have been using, an a priori proposition that is true in 
the actual world, that is, a logically valid and consistent a priori proposition that counts 
as a priori knowledge could still be subject to falsification later. Now, it must be noted 
here that, given a fallibilistic picture to start with, 'truth' is not an absolute notion: the 
truth of an a priori proposition - unless it is necessary, in which case we wi l l deal with it 
later - w i l l always be verified by empirical means. Obviously we might have gotten the 
empirical story wrong and i f this is the case then it would seem that the proposition is 
not, and never was, true in the actual world. It will still be true in the actual world that 
the proposition is true in some possible world, just not in this one, but this is another 
matter. So, it seems that due to the fallible nature of empirical information itself, there is 
always a possibility that further empirical information might falsify a priori propositions 
that were previously believed to be true. This implies that i f we insist that 'a priori 
knowledge' refers to those a priori propositions which are true in the actual world, then 
a priori knowledge is indeed fallible. I must say that this result does not please me. This 
66 For the time being, I will leave the case of necessary (non-analytic) a priori truths aside, but they will 
be discussed briefly later on. However, analytic a priori propositions are not my concern here, even 
though my account could easily be extended to them: classic examples of analytic a priori truths, such 
as 'All bachelors are unmarried', are grounded in logical modality, which, as I will argue in the next 
chapter, reduces to metaphysical modality. But these are trivial and relatively uninteresting examples 
of a priori truths. 
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is why I wi l l suggest a different definition of 'a priori knowledge'. This definition must 
be very broad, because otherwise we could never determine when we have reached a 
priori knowledge. Thus, my suggestion is that any logically valid and consistent a priori 
proposition constitutes 'a priori knowledge', whether or not it is true in the actual world. 
When defined like this, a priori knowledge, albeit a very broad notion, is empirically 
indefeasible and we can avoid the problematic cases where the status of an a priori 
proposition in the actual world seems to change. 
So, a crucial feature of my characterisation of the a priori is the distinction between a 
priori propositions that hold in the actual world and a priori propositions that grasp 
merely a non-actual possibility. This distinction is of utmost importance i f a plausible 
characterisation o f a priori knowledge is to be established. Without it, we would have no 
means to deal with cases where an a priori proposition that was believed to be actual is 
later falsified by further empirical information. The problem is that i f we define 
apriority simply in terms of the actual world, then either the original proposition has lost 
its a priori status, or it was not a priori to start with. Perhaps the best known example of 
this is the case of Euclidean geometry, which, according to Kant, is a priori and 
necessary. Empirical results in favour of the general theory of relativity seem to have 
falsified Euclidean geometry, but it surely cannot be that the a priori status of Euclidean 
geometry has changed.67 Either it was always a piece of a priori knowledge and still is 
or it never was. The consensus seems to be that it was not a priori in the first place, or, 
at least, Euclid's controversial fifth postulate68 is not and never was a priori. The 
67 In fact, this point is controversial, as non-Euclidean geometries due to the work of e.g. Lobachevsky 
were arguably reached by a priori means. Regardless of these details, the question of which geometry 
is the actual one remained, and this is sufficient for my purposes. 
68 The fifth postulate states that if two lines intersect a third so that the sum of the interior angles on one 
side is less than two right angles, then the two straight lines, if extended indefinitely, must intersect on 
the side on which the sum of the angles is less than two right angles. 
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problem that we are faced with, however, is that possibly empirical information that 
falsifies any o f Euclid's first four postulates could emerge as well, and again we would 
have to say that they were not a priori to start wi th . 6 9 This causes two serious 
complications: a priori knowledge appears to be empirically defeasible, and it seems 
that we can never know for certain whether we have a genuine piece of a priori 
knowledge at hand. 
A plausible way to deal with these problems is to adopt the distinction between a priori 
propositions that hold in the actual world and merely possible a priori propositions (i.e. 
the ones that do not hold in the actual world), which I suggested above. We ought to 
keep in mind though that because of the fallible nature of our verification methods, the 
status of a priori propositions in regard to the actual world may be subject to revision in 
the future. Nevertheless, we can agree that once the validity o f an a priori proposition is 
established, that is, i f the proposition is logically valid and consistent, its a priori status 
wi l l never change. So, what happened in the case of Euclidean geometry is that further 
empirical information pointed out that it does not entirely correspond with the actual 
world. However, this does not change the a priori status of Euclidean geometry.70 So, i f 
my definition of 'a priori knowledge' is accepted, then Euclidean geometry is still very 
much in the realm of a priori knowledge. This is a small price to pay for a coherent 
conception of a priori knowledge. 
Now that the basis o f my account has been established, we can advance to examine the 
first claim: a posteriori and a priori knowledge are in a constant bootstrapping 
69 Or, perhaps more plausibly, geometry altogether is not a priori, but the point stands. 
70 For a more detailed discussion of Euclid's postulates with at least partly similar sentiments, see 
BonJour (1998: Appendix). 
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relationship. A dramatic example of this relationship is gravitational theory. We have 
good records o f how knowledge about gravitation has cumulated in this process.71 Let 
us start from Aristotle, who reasoned that the speed of falling bodies is directly 
proportional to their weight, and thus, heavier bodies should accelerate faster. This 
appears to be an a priori proposition, but, as Galileo famously argued, two falling bodies 
of different weights that become connected in the middle of their fall create a paradox 
for Aristotle's reasoning. This is an example of the fallibility of a priori reasoning due to 
human error, for no doubt Aristotle believed that he was presenting an a priori 
proposition. Galileo, however, fared better. Having identified the faults in Aristotle's 
reasoning, Galileo came up with an a priori proposition of his own, later formulated as a 
general law for acceleration. Of course, Galileo not only formulated this a priori 
proposition, but also tried to determine whether it holds in the actual world, as it 
appeared to do. 
For Newton, the level of established a posteriori results was Galileo's theory - a theory 
which used to be only an unverified a priori proposition, but was verified by a posteriori 
means. Newton tried to reason how these results could explain the movements of 
heavenly bodies. His familiar formula states that the gravitational force is proportional 
to the product of the point masses involved and inversely proportional to the square of 
the distance between the point masses. This a priori proposition as well seemed to 
correspond nicely with actuality, as Newton observed in the case of the Moon and the 
Earth. So, again we have an a posteriori verification for an a priori proposition. Of 
course, Newton's theory launched numerous attempts to deduce new a priori results 
71 There is some overlap with what was said in chapter five in what follows, but now we have the full 
range of tools to deal with this story. 
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about our solar system, and many were successfully established. Among them was the 
predicted existence of Neptune, which was subsequently found because we knew where 
to look. However, to get back to the main line of a priori and a posteriori bootstrapping 
concerning gravitation, we need to advance to Einstein. 
Eventually, it became clear that Newton's theory is unable to explain all the movements 
of the planets. Namely, the orbit of Mercury did not quite seem to follow Newtonian 
predictions. A posteriori knowledge thus pointed out the insufficiency of an a priori 
proposition - this is an example of the second sort of fallibility concerning a priori 
reasoning: Newton's a priori proposition, although valid, did not correspond with the 
actual world. So we needed a better one, and Einstein gave us general relativity. With 
the help of general relativity we were able to explain the orbit of Mercury, among quite 
a few other things. Empirical experiments concerning the bending of light (by the sun's 
gravity) soon corroborated Einstein's theory and its superiority over Newton's theory 
was obvious. We do not need to stop here, for combining general relativity and quantum 
mechanics has turned out to be very problematic. So, the current situation is that yet 
again we are looking for an a priori proposition which would explain quantum gravity. 
There are several suggestions in the air, such as the string theory, but at present we have 
no means to determine whether the a priori propositions of string theory hold in the 
actual world or are merely non-actual possibilities. 
This is of course a very simplified description of the bootstrapping relationship; for 
instance, we are not really talking about individual a priori propositions but, rather, 
about a network of them. A l l that I am trying to establish here is that knowledge 
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accumulates in a manner of bootstrapping. I f you have doubts about whether the 
reasoning involved in these scientific examples is really a priori, bear with me for a 
while, as I wi l l elaborate on this. In the meanwhile, 1 w i l l illustrate the process with 
another example: a game of chess. 
Someone with good knowledge of different openings can play several moves in a chess 
game with only his experience of these famous openings as a guide. He can simply 
counter every move by the corresponding move in the opening library, which is based 
on previous chess games. But when the opponent makes an unexpected move, or when 
enough moves have been played and the opening library is of no help, even the best 
chess player has to start thinking about his next move. One must consider different 
possible move combinations as deep as possible and decide on the best one, analogously 
to the case of different possible scientific explanations concerning gravitation. Of 
course, a new 'a posteriori basis' for these considerations is established with each played 
move, and the cycle starts again. So, each chess move played is an example of the 
bootstrapping relationship between a posteriori and a priori knowledge. But do not be 
misled by this example. Even though a chess game mimics the bootstrapping 
relationship very nicely, it is clearly not a genuine example - naturally the whole idea of 
the game must be derived from some mathematical truths which would perhaps qualify 
as a priori knowledge, but these are not the concern of the player.72 Indeed, this is an 
artificial example and I only use it to illustrate the phenomenon of bootstrapping. I wil l 
return to the example briefly later on. 
72 If we did want a genuine chess-related example of a priori reasoning, we should perhaps look at the 
invention of chess. However, very little is known of it. 
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Perhaps the conception of the a priori suggested here does not seem very interesting, for 
it is beginning to look as i f almost all reasoning is a priori reasoning. The upshot o f my 
account is indeed that most scientific and certainly all philosophical reasoning fall in the 
scope of the a priori, but there are several reasons why this is nevertheless a very 
interesting understanding of the a priori. Some of these reasons wi l l become apparent 
later, but we can observe a few already. 
Firstly, the manner in which a priori reasoning seems to be tangled with the ever-
changing a posteriori framework is a crucial insight concerning the scientific method. 
The process is not simply one of coming up with hypotheses and verifying them, as i f 
the a posteriori framework was a sturdy staircase and every hypothesis is a new step on 
top of the others. The staircase is not immutable: any previous step might turn out to be 
rotten. Furthermore, we do not have a single direction that the next step can take - in 
fact, there are whole parallel staircases with altogether different groundings, and our 
next step could overlap with any of them. This ever-changing staircase is supposed to 
illustrate the uncertainty concerning the verification of our a priori propositions; the 
history o f science is fu l l of examples. The problem is that we can never know with 
certainty that the staircase we are building is the actual one, that is, our a priori 
propositions might have led us astray about what is actual. What is interesting is how 
we might learn to better evaluate these a priori propositions. This is not necessarily a 
purely empirical matter, for part of the question is which combinations of different a 
priori propositions are compatible - it is the task of ontology to examine this. But I am 
already getting ahead of myself. Before we can discuss these matters in detail, 
something must be said of another interesting consequence of this conception of the a 
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The staircase might still serve as a useful metaphor. What is interesting is the first step, 
or, even further, the ground below the staircase. I f my understanding of the 
bootstrapping relationship between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is correct, there 
is a pressing question about where all this starts. It would appear that the staircase can 
only be grounded in a priori principles, as each step seems to first require an a priori 
proposition, which is then checked against experience. Well, there may be some a priori 
principles, such as the law of non-contradiction73, which could serve as such 
fundamental principles. I f there are principles like this, it would seem that they must be 
necessary - a common ground for all possible staircases. I f this is the case, these 
principles are obviously of utmost importance for us, as they would tell us something 
about the necessary constraints on reality, not only about the actual world. 
But before we get too enthusiastic, a word of caution is in order. It seems that we have 
no reliable method of testing whether we have indeed reached a fundamental a priori 
proposition or merely one of the very first steps on our staircase. Clearly, verifying the 
principle by empirical means only helps in terms of the actual world. This also implies 
that no matter how irrefutable something like the law of non-contradiction seems, we 
cannot simply postulate its necessity and infer that it must hold in the actual world as 
well - even the law of non-contradiction is subject to verification, or falsification as the 
case may be. Having said that, I think that we have a fairly reliable case for the validity 
of the law of non-contradiction in the actual world, and to my mind it is also our best 
73 Or the law of minimal contradiction, i.e. not every statement is both true and false (cf. Putnam 1978). 
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candidate for a metaphysically necessary principle. 7 4 Consequently, as groundbreaking 
as necessary a priori truths would be, it is always quite risky to claim that we have 
found one. 
So, when we engage in a priori reasoning, we take small steps on our staircase towards 
what could possibly follow from the already established steps. In philosophy, these steps 
tend to be considerably bigger than in other disciplines (and potentially more erroneous 
because of that). However, a priori reasoning is what philosophers are educated to do 
and they, i f anyone, should go for the largest steps. The question that we are left with is 
what these different possibilities are grounded in. To answer this and other related 
questions, we need to examine my second point: the connection between the a priori and 
modality. 
In the previous examples we saw that a priori reasoning appears to be concerned with 
possibilities. Consider the chess game again: each of the trillions and trillions of move 
combinations represents a different possibility, a different path that the game could take. 
It is by considering different possibilities that we try to determine the path that leads to 
victory. A chess game, though, is hardly a challenge for our rational capabilities when 
compared to a priori reasoning concerning reality. It is a closed system with strict rules 
and no exceptions. Compared to the number of different possible paths that reality 
might take, a chess game seems very simple. In a chess game, our reasoning relies on 
the rules of the system; how else could we determine the possible routes that the game 
might take. The question that emerges is: are there analogous 'rules' in reality, that is, 
constraints for the different possible routes that reality might take? 
74 I will discuss the status of the law of non-contradiction in chapter 11. 
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It would appear that there indeed must be some constraints like this, as otherwise we 
would be unable to reach any results whatsoever concerning reality. However, even i f 
there are some constraints that restrict the possible organisations of the world, the 
situation is a lot more complicated than the chess game, not only because the space of 
possibilities is so much bigger but also because we do not know, exactly, what the 
constraints are. Recall the distinction between actual and non-actual a priori 
propositions. I suggested that even i f an a priori proposition is logically valid and 
consistent it still might not hold in the actual world. This would never happen in a chess 
game. I f a move in a chess game is valid, it just means that all the rules of the game 
have been followed. It might not be a good move, but ontologically its status is identical 
with all the other valid moves. In contrast to the chess game, an a priori proposition 
about reality can easily fail to follow all the constraints, because we lack sufficient 
knowledge about them. The only criterion for the validity of an a priori proposition is 
that it is logically valid and consistent, i.e. it does not violate the laws of logic and any 
human errors in the reasoning process are ruled out. Also, as we hope to reach a priori 
results which are actual and not only possible, the proposition should also be consistent 
with established a posteriori results. So, we can deem an a priori proposition valid i f it 
was reached by reliable methods - by logically valid and consistent reasoning.75 I f there 
are no empirical considerations that contradict the proposition, then it is also potentially 
actual. 
As we saw in the story concerning gravitation, Galileo, Newton and Einstein all put 
forward propositions which were valid in the sense described above. However, so far, 
every time it has turned out that the governing conditions o f reality are a lot more 
75 Possibly also with the help of, say, a computer, as Kripke (1980: 35) has suggested. 
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complicated than we previously believed, as empirical information that conflicts 
suggested propositions has emerged. Generally, we could say that science is an attempt 
to come up with the best approximation that fits these conditions. Metaphysics, on the 
other hand, examines these conditions. They consist of things like relations between 
different kinds o f entities, identity and existence conditions and other conditions based 
on the fundamental structure of reality. Of course, the conditions themselves are 
examined with the help of a priori reasoning. For the most part, such as in scientific 
contexts, they are presupposed, which is to say that scientists do not contemplate how 
the conditions work. The identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus was settled by observing 
the sky, not by contemplating the identity conditions between heavenly bodies. 
Nevertheless, a set o f identity conditions was presupposed. 
The role of modality in this process is now starting to emerge. It is the tool that we use 
to postulate different scenarios of how the governing conditions of reality might work. 
Consider an example that I mentioned before: the discovery of Neptune.7 6 The discovery 
of Neptune is usually credited to Le Verrier, a French mathematician who predicted its 
location from calculations concerning the perturbations in Uranus' orbit. These 
calculations were of course based on Newton's work on the gravitational force. Quite 
simply, the perturbations in Uranus' orbit had to be caused by a massive body 
somewhere nearby. From Newton's formula for the gravitational force, we get the 
distance between two massive bodies, Uranus and Neptune, so we can roughly 
determine where Neptune must be. Here, it is Newton's theory of the gravitational force 
which is the most important part of the process of finding Neptune. His theory of 
gravitation is a scenario about how the governing conditions of reality might work in 
76 The example has also been mentioned by Kripke (1980: 79n) and discussed by Hughes (2004: 95-96). 
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regard to massive bodies. It successfully explains some of the factors that affect the 
relations between two massive bodies; only some, because it turned out that the scenario 
fails in more general contexts, where the gravitational potential increases. This is where 
we need to switch to Einstein's scenario. 
The modal basis of any given scenario about how the governing conditions of reality 
might work must be based on the different possible states of affairs that could explain 
empirical observations. In our example, Le Verrier took advantage of Newton's general 
theory of how massive bodies interact via gravitation and derived the most plausible 
case o f what could explain the perturbations in Uranus' orbit. This was another massive 
body, Neptune, situated appropriately. It is important to see that the idea is not just to 
identify a priori propositions with contingent scenarios concerning the possible states of 
affairs. The possibility of these scenarios is of a more fundamental sort - just any 
scenario wi l l not do. According to the account at hand, the modality in question is 
grounded in the governing conditions of reality. In this case, the relevant conditions 
would concern the relations between massive heavenly bodies: the essences of the 
entities of this particular kind. This implies that we are working with metaphysical 
modality.7 7 This is why I have stressed that the modal basis o f a priori propositions is so 
important, for i f the modality here were epistemic or conceptual, it would reduce a 
priori propositions to statements which have no bearing on the actual governing 
conditions of reality. This cannot be, as a priori propositions clearly do have a bearing 
on these conditions. 
77 My sympathies are with Kit Fine's (1994, see also Lowe 1998) account of metaphysical modality - a 
more detailed discussion has to be postponed until the next chapter. 
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A possible objection to this picture can be anticipated. One thing that Kripke has 
managed to convince most people about is that 'a priori' is an epistemic notion and 
'necessity' is a metaphysical notion. Consequently, the connection between a priori 
knowledge and modality has been deemed to fail . Here 1 have tried to re-establish that 
connection in terms of possibility. I also think that Kripke's case only amounts to the 
conclusion that a priori truths are not always necessary or necessary truths a priori, 
which 1 of course happily admit. Ultimately, the upshot of my view is that epistemic and 
metaphysical issues are fundamentally connected, and it is precisely modality that 
upholds this connection. However, my opponent might insist that the examples 
concerning scientific hypotheses that we have considered are just that: examples o f 
scientific hypotheses, not of a priori reasoning. Moreover, a devoted empiricist could 
argue that possibility has little to do with all this; scientific hypotheses are just well-
advised guesses, which are then verified or falsified empirically. There is nothing more 
to the picture, just guesses and empirical research. 
However, there is more to the empirical story than meets the eye. Consider an example 
that I already mentioned in passing: the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus. I 
suggested that their identity was settled by observing the sky, by empirical means. I also 
said that a set o f identity conditions was presupposed. What I mean is that it could not 
have been discovered that Hesperus is Phosphorus i f we did not have some criterion of 
identity for the sortal 'planet'. For example, it must have been known that two planets 
cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Before we were able to settle whether 
Hesperus and Phosphorus are actually identical, we had to know that it is possible that 
they are identical. 7 8 Above I have argued that we need a priori reasoning to determine 
78 See Lowe (1998) for an extensive explanation of why possibility precedes actuality, I will also 
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what is possible. And why cannot a priori reasoning be just guesswork? Well, because 
what is possible is determined by the identity and existence conditions of the involved 
entities. The 'guess' has to be based on something, and it can only be based on the 
natures of the involved entities. Thus, this is not merely to equate a priori propositions 
with contingent propositions, far from it. Otherwise a priori reasoning would indeed be 
indistinguishable from guesswork. 
So, before we can settle the actuality of anything, we must already have determined its 
metaphysical possibility. Metaphysical possibility, I take it, reduces to the essences of 
the entities concerned, as I wil l argue in the next chapter. The problem with the 
empiricist's objection is that empirical research is committed to this very picture. 
Without the a priori delimitation of what is possible, we could never reach knowledge 
about what is actual. A priori reasoning delimits the space of metaphysical possibilities, 
and only after the initial delimitation has been done can we proceed to test individual a 
priori propositions by empirical means. This cycle emerges repeatedly, as progress from 
established empirical results to new information again requires a delimitation of 
different metaphysically possible states of affairs which are compatible with the current 
results. Here we have a method by which knowledge slowly but surely accumulates, 
even though we can never reach absolute certainty. 
I am now in a position to define the a priori with a single phrase: the a priori concerns 
different metaphysically possible configurations of the governing conditions of reality. 
Already in the beginning of this chapter I suggested that we should define a priori 
knowledge in the broad sense, that is, all knowledge concerning the different 
elaborate the idea in the next chapter. 
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metaphysically possible configurations of the reality is a priori knowledge, even though 
only one of these configurations is actual. However, given the difficulty of the task of 
determining which configuration is the actual one, we are better off with a broad 
definition of a priori knowledge; otherwise we would have very little use for the notion. 
A priori knowledge in this sense is accessible to all rational human beings, and, as 
demonstrated above, it is in a constant bootstrapping relationship with a posteriori 
knowledge. The aim of metaphysics (and science, I might add) is to establish the actual 
governing conditions of reality, but this process is fundamentally fallible. Nevertheless, 
we have good means to falsify a priori propositions which do not hold in the actual 
world, so we can at least narrow the space of metaphysical possibilities, thus slowly but 
surely gaining more knowledge about what might be actual, even i f the space of 
metaphysical possibilities does approach infinity. 
The exact route from a priori reasoning to knowledge about possible configurations of 
the governing conditions of reality has not been extensively examined yet. It has been 
shown that metaphysical modality plays an important part in this and it could be said 
that talk of a priori reasoning just refers to our ability to grasp these metaphysically 
possible states of affairs, which I take to be grounded in essences. Given this 
understanding of metaphysical modality, the process is relatively straight-forward: the 
relations and identity and existence conditions of the objects of our inquiry impose 
constraints on the possible configurations that reality may take, and the space of 
possibilities consisting of these configurations is accessible to our a priori capabilities. 
Modality, then, is what upholds the connection between a priori reasoning and the 
structure of reality. Further clarifications concerning this relationship wi l l be made in 
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The upshot of this characterisation of the a priori is that we can, after all, salvage 
something of the classic understanding of a priori knowledge. Knowledge acquired with 
the help of a priori reasoning might not be necessarily true, but it never fails to be 
possible, insofar as human error is excluded. There may be nothing particularly glorious 
about a priori knowledge, indeed, as I have argued, much of scientific reasoning falls 
within its scope, but there is no doubt about its value for philosophy and science, as it is 
the basis of the scientific method and all philosophical reasoning. 
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In this chapter I wi l l sketch a theory about the nature of modality and our epistemic 
access to modality. My main concern wi l l be to settle what modality is grounded in -
this wi l l be examined by analysing the distinction between conceptual or epistemic 
modality 7 9 and metaphysical or genuine modality. I wi l l argue that we are not dealing 
with two distinct kinds of modality here; in fact, conceptual modality is at best a 
subspecies of metaphysical modality. Thus, the modal space is exhausted by 
metaphysical modality. Our epistemic access to modality is best illustrated by a 
thorough examination of the necessary a posteriori. It wi l l be shown that there is quite a 
lot that has to be unpacked in a posteriori necessities, most importantly, we need to 
acknowledge that there is an a priori part in a posteriori necessities. As a by-product, my 
inquiry into the necessary a posteriori wi l l produce a detailed analysis of our epistemic 
access to modality. Here, as I suggested above, a priori reasoning is our guide. 
Our inquiry begins with the distinction between conceptual and metaphysical modality. 
The majority view is, following Kripke (1980), that the distinction is genuine and that 
there are some things which are conceivable, i.e. conceptually or epistemically possible, 
but metaphysically impossible. To avoid launching into Kripke exegesis, I wi l l abstain 
from analysing Kripke's own position, instead I wi l l refer to the established 
interpretation.80 According to this interpretation, conceivability is a useful, but fallible 
guide to metaphysical possibility. A posteriori knowledge then delimits the space of 
79 Often these two are taken to refer to the same type of modality, and I am taking that approach here 
because I will argue that they indeed do amount to the same thing in terms of modality, that is, they 
are not distinct kinds of modality at all. These issues will be clarified in due course. 
80 Proponents of this general line of thought that is usually referred to as 'Kripkean' are many, and recent 
accounts include Hughes (2004) and Soames (2005). 
172 
9. Modality and Metaphysics 
conceptual possibilities so that we can sieve out the genuine, metaphysical possibilities. 
The alternative view states, in essence, that the distinction between conceptual and 
metaphysical modality fails and in fact we are only dealing with one type of modality -
the conceptual type. Generally this is combined with a suggestion about how to reduce 
metaphysical modality to conceptual modality.8 1 Clearly, there is also a third option 
available, namely, that the distinction between conceptual and metaphysical modality 
fails because metaphysical modality is the only type of modality. This is the view that I 
wi l l be defending.8 2 The upshot of this view is that all other types of modality are either 
reducible to metaphysical modality, or alternatively they are not modality proper at all 
None of the listed views is any good without an independent account of the nature of 
modality. In fact, it is the nature of modality that settles which one of the views is 
correct. First of all we must examine what conceptual and metaphysical modality 
amount to, that is, what could these types of modality be grounded in. The case of 
conceptual modality seems quite straight-forward. Presumably, it is grounded in 
concepts and our epistemic access to it is via conceivability. But a clarification is 
needed, for above I talked about epistemic modality as i f it was synonymous with 
conceptual modality, yet it seems that there is a way to distinguish them. One of 
Kripke's passages about the nature of epistemic possibility goes as follows: 
If I say, 'Gold might turn out not to be an element,' I speak correctly; 'might' here is epistemic and 
expresses the fact that the evidence does not justify a priori (Cartesian) certainty that gold is an 
81 This is, roughly, the view that Chalmers (1996) and Jackson (1998), among others, have been 
defending, although Jackson is perhaps the only one who commits to it explicitly and Chalmers in fact 
talks in terms of two modal spaces. However, we will see that the logical consequences of his views 
are similar to Jackson's. 
82 At least Fine (2002) has also defended this view, arguing that other types of modality can be reduced 
to metaphysical modality, albeit with the exception of natural and normative modality. 
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element. I am also strictly correct when 1 say that the elementhood of gold was discovered a 
posteriori. If I say, 'Gold might have turned out not to be an element,' 1 seem to mean this 
metaphysically and my statement is subject to the correction noted in the text. (Kripke 1980: 
I43n.) 
Here the 'might' is epistemic because it does not need to be true in any (metaphysically) 
possible world that gold is not an element. Given that the sentence 'Gold is an element' 
is (necessarily a posteriori) true, it is not (metaphysically) possible that Gold might have 
turned out not to be an element. To generalise: for a proposition to be epistemically 
possible, it does not need to be metaphysically possible, and on the other hand, i f both 
terms in a true identity sentence are rigid designators, then the identity-relation in 
question has to be metaphysically necessary. So, the sentence 'Gold might have turned 
out not to be an element' seems to make a metaphysical claim, when it should only be 
making an epistemic claim, as in the case 'Gold might turn out not to be an element'. 
This is the kind of correction that Kripke refers to in the quoted footnote. Now, on the 
other hand, it does not appear to be conceivable, at least not any more, that gold is not 
an element, given the a posteriori knowledge that we have about its elementhood. 
So, what is at issue here is our understanding of conceivability. Some would like to say 
that it is always conceivable that things might have been otherwise, while others would 
insist that conceivability is restricted by the current a posteriori framework. Kripke does 
not give an explicit account of these matters and there does not seem to be any general 
convention about the relationship between conceptual and epistemic modality. The 
major issue, in any case, is whether we should f ix conceivability in terms of how the 
world might be before we have any a posteriori knowledge, or how the world might be 
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given the a posteriori framework. 8 3 One way to read this distinction between the 
concepts of epistemic and conceptual possibility is to apply the 'a priori' version to 
epistemic possibility and the 'a posteriori' version to conceptual possibility. This is by no 
means the only way, but it would seem to be consistent with Chalmers (2002a: 
156-159). The problem, however, is that 'conceptual' and 'epistemic' are often used 
interchangeably. To simplify matters, I wi l l here only consider the stronger 
interpretation of conceivability and I wi l l continue to use the words 'conceptual' and 
'epistemic' interchangeably - this should cause no serious problems, as the stronger 
interpretation is the one that seems to be taken for granted in the relevant connections 
(cf. Jackson 1998).84 
It seems that the stronger version of conceivability has to be grounded in something that 
is purely a priori, or, more accurately, everything that is not ruled out by a priori 
reasoning is conceptually possible. Chalmers (2002a: 158) further separates this kind of 
negative definition from a positive one - the latter requires that we can coherently 
imagine a situation (as i f it was actual) that would verify the possibility in question. 
Defined as such, conceptual modality would only seem to apply to sentences like 
'Hesperus is Hesperus' or 'A l l bachelors are unmarried', that is, truths that can be 
discovered merely with the help of conceptual reflection. 8 5 Metaphysical modality, on 
the other hand, is usually considered to concern more substantial matters - one way to 
put this is that metaphysical necessity is broad logical necessity, that is, truth in all 
83 Yablo (1993) suggests a number of different subscripts for different sorts of conceivability. Chalmers 
(2002a) thinks that there might be up to eight types of conceivability; it is his distinction between 
primary and secondary conceivability that reflects the issue at hand. See also Hughes (2004: 86 ff.). 
84 There is in fact another reason to adopt this usage, as it helps to avoid confusion when we talk about 
metaphysical modality, which is often a posteriori. 
85 This interpretation can perhaps be challenged, but I will postpone further analysis until I have 
established the basis of my account. 
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logically possible worlds. 8 6 This is to separate it from strict and narrow logical necessity, 
the first concerning only laws of logic and the latter concerning laws of logic plus the 
definitions of concepts. Broad logical necessity, or metaphysical necessity as we wi l l 
call it, concerns the identity and existence conditions of entities, thus making it the type 
of modality most plausibly associated with a posteriori necessities. 
These initial definitions, however, leave a lot to be specified and can be rather 
misleading. Nevertheless, we need to have something to work on and this is roughly the 
picture that Kripke's work on a posteriori necessity and modal epistemology is usually 
considered to have inspired. We should now examine the view that challenges the move 
from a posteriori necessity to metaphysical modality and which is, at least implicitly, 
committed to a wholly conceptualist view of modality. This type o f view is commonly 
defended by an appeal to the framework of two-dimensional modal semantics.87 
Very roughly, the idea of two-dimensional semantics is that where traditionally modality 
is seen as 'considering something to be possible counterfactually', there is another way 
to think about it, namely to 'consider something to be possible actually' (cf. Chalmers 
2006a, 2006b). These different ways to think about modality are supposed to reflect 
metaphysical and conceptual or epistemic modality, respectively. This gives the two-
dimensionalist a tool to talk about metaphysical necessities as i f they were not true in 
the actual world, e.g. the epistemic possibility that Hesperus is not Phosphorus is not 
ruled out by a priori reasoning and thus there is a perfectly clear sense in which 
86 Cf. Plantinga (1974), Forbes (1985), Lowe (1998), Fine (2002), and others. 
87 Different versions of two-dimensional semantics have been put forward by Kaplan (1978, 1989), 
Stalnaker (1978), Evans (1979), Davies and Humberstone (1981), Chalmers (1996) and Jackson 
(1998). Here I will focus only on the last two, often dubbed 'epistemic two-dimensionalism'. 
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Hesperus is possibly not Phosphorus. This is not in conflict with the Kripkean idea of 
metaphysical necessity, or so Chalmers (2006b) argues. 
What is relevant for our purposes is how the two-dimensional picture could account for 
metaphysical necessity. Chalmers endorses the idea that there are two distinct ways to 
understand modalities, which he relates to what he calls the primary and the secondary 
intension, and here it is the secondary intension that is supposed to correspond with the 
traditional understanding. But let us take a closer look at these secondary intensions and 
what they amount to. Chalmers (2002b: ch. 7) argues that what is relevant for the 
Fregean view of language are the epistemic intensions, i.e. the primary intensions, and 
thus epistemic modality; whereas Kripke's case involves secondary intensions and thus 
metaphysical modality. Two-dimensional semantics is supposed to be able to 
accommodate both of these cases. Unfortunately, because Chalmers takes the case of 
secondary intensions to correspond with the classic Kripkean story, he does not say a 
great deal about them. It seems, however, that the difference between primary and 
secondary intensions lies in their epistemic status; here is how Chalmers puts it in terms 
of primary and secondary conceivability (which correspond with primary and secondary 
intensions, respectively): 
Unlike primary conceivabiliry, secondary conceivability is often a posteriori. It is not secondarily 
conceivable that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, but one could not know that a priori. To know this, 
one needs the empirical information that Hesperus is actually Phosphorus. This aposteriority is 
grounded in the fact that the application of our words to subjunctive counterfactual situations often 
depends on their reference in the actual world, and the latter cannot usually be known a priori. 
(Chalmers 2002a: 159.) 
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The story that is starting to emerge here goes as follows. Conceptual or epistemic 
possibility is purely a priori and (primary) conceivability is a guide to it - everything 
that is not ruled out by a priori reasoning is possible in this sense. Metaphysical 
possibility, however, is restricted by a posteriori information. According to Chalmers, 
when we talk about Hesperus and Phosphorus counterfactually, the application of our 
words depends on their reference in the actual world, which is plausibly in the realm of 
a posteriori knowledge. This is a fairly simple picture, as the only difference between 
conceptual or epistemic modality and metaphysical modality is indeed that they have a 
different epistemic status. However, our initial, supposedly Kripkean picture about the 
difference between these types of modality seemed considerably more substantial. 
Indeed, it appears that there is an argument available here for the likes of Frank Jackson, 
who would rather see Kripkean metaphysical modality be reduced to conceptual 
modality altogether. Here is how it goes: the sentence 'Hesperus is Hesperus' is clearly 
purely a priori and necessary, it reflects the primary intension of 'Hesperus'. The 
supposed metaphysical necessity, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', requires a posteriori 
information, but is there anything else that separates it from sentences like 'Hesperus is 
Hesperus'? According to Jackson (1998: 69-70), this difference in epistemic status is all 
that there is to it. Moreover, there is nothing else than the empirical discovery that 
Hesperus is in fact Phosphorus that differentiates these sentences. I f this is the case, it 
would seem that the type of modality that is in effect in the case of 'Hesperus is 
Hesperus' is quite sufficient for the case of'Hesperus is Phosphorus' as well. There is a 
difference between these cases, but 'The difference lies, not in the kind of necessity 
possessed, but rather where the labels "a priori" and "a posteriori" suggest it lies: in our 
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epistemic access to the necessity they share' (Jackson 1998: 69-70). 
It is somewhat surprising that Jackson is the only two-dimensionalist who has explicitly 
put forward an argument like this, for it seems that the two-dimensional framework can 
only accommodate this sort of view. 8 8 The distinction between primary and secondary 
intensions appears to be grounded in their epistemic status, indeed, this much is quite 
explicit in everything that Chalmers says. The way I see it, then, is that two-
dimensionalists are, at least implicitly, committed to a thoroughly conceptualist view of 
modality. Whether this picture can accommodate the Kripkean story is another question 
and depends on what we consider the Kripkean story to be, but this is irrelevant for the 
issue at hand. What we are interested in is the nature of modality, and now it is time to 
see whether the conceptualist view can stand its ground. 
It was suggested earlier that metaphysical modality is somehow more substantial than 
conceptual modality, but according to Jackson the difference between metaphysical and 
conceptual modality can be explained away as a difference in their epistemic status. 
There are several ways for the friend of metaphysical modality to challenge this view. 
For one thing, we can challenge Jackson's (1998: 70-86) route to this conclusion: he 
offers two reasons to abandon the distinction between metaphysical and conceptual 
modality, one is Occamist, appealing to ontological parsimony, the other one is based on 
the two-dimensional framework. The first reason is hardly conclusive, as Jackson's 
point is that we do not need metaphysical modality to explain the necessary a posteriori. 
Even i f this is true, it does not mean that there could not be other explanatory roles that 
88 Note, again, that I am here focusing on the epistemic view of two-dimensionalism (which both 
Jackson and Chalmers have adopted), however, it is plausible that other versions are equally 
problematic. 
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we need metaphysical modality for. However, this is somewhat irrelevant to start with, 
as the need for distinguishing between conceptual and metaphysical modality 
presumably lies in the fact that there are modally loaded sentences which have their 
modal status in virtue o f fundamentally different things: conceptual modalities in virtue 
of the concepts involved and metaphysical modalities in virtue of some metaphysical 
truths. For instance, in the case of'Hesperus is Phosphorus', the necessity is grounded in 
the identity conditions of heavenly bodies. Jackson's second reason, the appeal to two-
dimensionalism, can also be easily challenged; in fact, it was already pointed out above 
that the two-dimensionalist framework assumes a thoroughly conceptualist account of 
modality, as it cannot accommodate metaphysical modality. This hardly constitutes an 
argument against the distinction between conceptual and metaphysical modality, rather, 
it begs the question. 
Perhaps Jackson could still insist that what motivated the distinction between 
conceptual and metaphysical modality in the first place was the Kripkean necessary a 
posteriori and that he has offered an alternative way to account for a posteriori 
necessities, which does not require metaphysical modality. A l l we have is conceptual 
modality plus empirical discovery. But this is a crude simplification. Consider what the 
empirical discovery amounts to. 8 9 In the case of'Hesperus is Phosphorus', the identity in 
question was established with the help of empirical observations, but this did not 
happen overnight. Rather, there was a series of empirical observations and gradually it 
became apparent that the orbits of Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical. However, we 
need something more to be able to judge that Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical, 
namely, we need the background assumption that two heavenly bodies can not both 
89 Recall the discussion from the previous chapter. 
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share their orbits and not be identical. This background assumption seems quite self-
evident, but its importance should not be underestimated. Furthermore, it is not 
empirical in nature, it is a priori. This implies that there is more to the story of a 
posteriori necessity than Jackson suggests, namely, the empirical part is not purely a 
posteriori. The a priori part in a posteriori necessities has been noted a number of times, 
but for some reason its importance (and nature) has been neglected. There are good 
reasons, though, to think that Kripke himself was aware of its importance when he 
wrote about the necessary a posteriori (cf. Salmon 2005: 193-196). 
Is there any way for the conceptualist to explain the a priori part in the empirical 
discoveries associated with a posteriori necessities? For the friend of metaphysical 
modality, the most plausible route is the essentialist one: metaphysical modality is 
grounded in essences and the a priori part in a posteriori necessities reflects the identity 
conditions of the entities at hand. Heavenly bodies such as the planet Venus are material 
beings and two such entities cannot exist in the same place at the same time (cf. Fine 
1994, Lowe 1998). The conceptualist might argue that all this is built into the concepts, 
that is, Hesperus and Phosphorus are names for a heavenly body and by conceptual 
analysis alone we can determine that i f they exist in the same place at the same time, 
then they must be identical. But how could this be a feature of the concepts? It is of 
course true that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', as we use the concepts now, refer to the 
planet Venus, but they could as well refer to 'lights in the sky', which would imply none 
of the requirements associated with material, heavenly bodies. Thus, we must 
distinguish between the concepts and any ancillary assumptions that might be associated 
with them. The crucial part here is the empirical discovery and the a priori framework 
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that precedes it. Plausibly, when we f ix the reference of a concept, all this is in the 
background, but the only sense in which it is 'built into' the concepts is that we have 
already done the a priori and empirical work needed to determine the essential features 
of heavenly bodies. This process is quite independent o f the reference-fixing of proper 
names. Nathan Salmon reads Kripke exactly like this: 
Kxipke's view of the matter seems to be this: We know a priori that if a biological kind (e.g., a 
species) k is subsumed under a higher-level biological kind (e.g., a genus, class, kingdom, etc.) k', 
then it is necessary that k is subsumed under k'. We also know by the direct reference theory of the 
designation of natural kind terms that such terms as 'cat', 'tiger', 'mammal1, and 'animal' are rigid 
designators of natural kinds. Putting these two together, we know a priori, by "philosophical 
analysis," that if all cats are animals, then it is necessary that all cats are animals, and if all tigers 
are mammals, then it is necessary that all tigers are mammals, etc. Science discovers empirically 
that cats are in fact animals, and that tigers are in fact mammals. Combining these scientific 
discoveries with what we know a priori by philosophical analysis, we infer that it is necessary, 
even though a posteriori, that cats are animals and that tigers are mammals. Given what we know 
by philosophical analysis - the theory of direct reference plus the a priori essentialist fact that 
every biological kind k is such that it could not fail to be subsumed under any of the higher level 
biological kinds k' that in fact subsume it - any empirical discovery that cats are in fact animals, or 
that tigers are in fact mammals, is indirectly but automatically an empirical discovery that is is 
necessary that cats are animals, or that tigers are mammals. (Salmon 2005: 195.) 
What a posteriori necessities are grounded in is thus the a priori essentialist framework 
in the background. The empirical discovery is a rather unimportant part of the whole 
process (in terms of modality), as the nature of metaphysical modality is not exhausted 
by the aposteriority that this empirical discovery induces, in fact, it just verifies the a 
priori hypothesis. The example that Salmon deals with concerns the essential 
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dependence between higher- and lower-level kinds, but similar descriptions can be 
given for all metaphysical necessities, as was sketched above in the case of Hesperus 
and Phosphorus. An interesting question is whether we can do this in the case of more 
substantial identity sentences, such as 'Water is H 2 0 ' , or 'Mental states are brain states'. 
I f 'Water is H2O' is in fact a metaphysical necessity, we must show it in terms of the 
identity conditions that this identity is grounded in. The identity between water and H 2 0 
is based on the natural laws that govern water molecules and only i f these laws are 
metaphysically necessary would it be possible to show that water being H 2 0 is in fact a 
metaphysical necessity. Obviously it all comes down to the a priori part, which, in the 
case of water and H 2 0 , concerns the organisation of hydrogen and oxygen atoms and 
their tendency to form H20-molecules. However, mere reflection on chemistry is 
insufficient to ground the metaphysical necessity of the laws governing this 
organisation, instead, a thorough analysis o f the nature of these natural laws is needed 
(cf. Lowe 2007). 
So, the real lesson about the necessary a posteriori concerns the a priori framework on 
the background and it seems that the conceptualist has no means to reduce this 
framework to concepts. Where does this leave him? Well, given the picture of 
metaphysical modality that we now have, it appears that the conceptualist's project can 
be turned around: conceptual modality can be reduced to metaphysical modality. This is 
the line that Fine (1994, 2002) takes.90 However, there is a further problem here, 
namely, what are we to say about claims that are metaphysically impossible, yet 
90 As Fine puts it, each class of objects can be thought of as having its own sort of modality, based on the 
essence of that particular kind, but it seems to me that the modal input in each case is the same, it just 
concerns different kinds of entities. 
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conceptually possible - claims like 'Hesperus is not Phosphorus'?91 The conceptualist 
can easily accommodate claims like this, but on the face of it they might seem to pose a 
problem for the view that metaphysical modality is the only kind of modality. The 
easiest way to deal with this would seem to be to adopt the view that we indeed do have 
two modal spaces at hand. But there is a problem that prevails, for we should somehow 
be able to determine how strong an alignment there is between conceptual and 
metaphysical possibility. This reflects the question about our epistemic access to 
modality, i.e. to what extent is conceivability a guide to metaphysical possibility. 
The two-dimensional framework does not help in answering this question: we saw that 
it cannot accommodate metaphysical modality. However, a thorough conceptualist 
would not even ask this question, instead, he would presumably suggest that 
conceivability is an infallible guide to conceptual possibility - after all, this is supposed 
to be an a priori matter. The upshot of all this is that those who wish to uphold the 
distinction between metaphysical and conceptual modality are unable to determine the 
exact boundary between them, and those who abandon metaphysical modality 
altogether are committed to infallibilism about our epistemic access to modality. But 
there is a more natural way to deal with this problem. 
The solution that I have in mind focuses on the nature o f modality understood as being 
grounded in the essences of the entities it concerns. In a somewhat trivial sense, this 
implies that we have as many kinds of modality as we have different kinds of entities: 
physical modality which concerns all material objects, biological modality which 
91 Cf. Sturgeon (forthcoming), who places these claims in what he calls the Kripke Zone and presents a 
case against the view that a priori reasoning is an infallible guide to possibility. I have some sympathy 
towards his account, but mine will be slightly different. 
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concerns living organism and indeed conceptual modality which concerns concepts. But 
the modality in each o f these cases is grounded in the same features of reality, namely in 
the identity and existence conditions of the entities in question. Clearly, then, there is 
only one kind of modality in effect. So, given this picture, how should we deal with 
sentences like 'Hesperus is Hesperus' or 'A l l bachelors are unmarried', that is, classic 
cases of conceptual necessity? 
Well, the answer depends on what kind of propositions we take these examples to 
express. One option would be to take sentences like 'Hesperus is Hesperus' to express 
the self-identity of material objects of a certain kind, in which case the modality in 
question would be grounded in the identity conditions of these material objects. But this 
would mean that there is nothing conceptual about the necessity of 'Hesperus is 
Hesperus', as the proposition would not concern the essences of concepts, but rather the 
essences of heavenly bodies. Plausibly, when sentences like these are discussed as 
examples of conceptual modality, it is more likely that they are taken to be necessary in 
terms of the essences of concepts. According to this approach, a conceptual necessity 
would presumably be a proposition which is true in virtue of the nature of all concepts 
(cf. Fine 1994: 8). Thus, the proposition expressed by 'Hesperus is Hesperus' is exactly 
the same as the proposition expressed by 'abc is abc'. Clearly, this analysis wi l l not do in 
the case of 'A l l bachelors are unmarried', as all concepts wi l l not produce the same 
outcome. As Kit Fine (1994: 8-11) has convincingly argued, here we would rather opt 
for a solution that respects the meanings of the terms, i.e. the meaning of a concept is an 
essential feature of it. In the latter case, then, modality seems to reduce all the way to 
the meaning's essence. 
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This rather hasty treatment does not to do justice to the complexity of these matters, but 
serves as a brief reconstruction of where Fine's account takes us. What is crucial here is 
that the modality in 'Hesperus is Hesperus' and 'A l l bachelors are unmarried' seems to 
amount to different things. In the first case the meaning of the concepts does not enter 
the picture, so in effect we are talking about strict logical necessity: the proposition 
expressed amounts to nothing more than 'A = A', i.e. the law of identity. The second 
case, however, would appear to be a case of narrow logical necessity, i.e. true in virtue 
of the laws of logic and the definitions of the concepts involved. 
What about sentences like 'Hesperus is not Phosphorus', that is, conceptual or epistemic 
possibilities that are not metaphysically possible? Apparently we have strong intuitions 
that in some sense it might have turned out that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, and i f this 
is not a metaphysical possibility, then surely it must be an epistemic or conceptual 
possibility. But consider the example 'Cats are animals', or any other example 
concerning natural kinds. As Kripke puts it, we 'know a priori that, i f they [sentences 
like 'Cats are animals'] are true at all, they are necessarily true' (Kripke 1980: 138). 
Now, presumably, i f we know this a priori, then there should be no sense in which we 
could conceive the opposite (because it is ruled out by a priori reasoning and is thus 
even conceptually impossible). However, our a priori capabilities are not infallible and 
in ordinary language we often say things like 'Cats might turn out to be demons' (Kripke 
1980: 122). But when we consider the possibility with philosophical scrutiny, we should 
see that i f we take the thought-experiment to its logical end, we would not actually think 
that cats are demons, but instead that something, namely demons, have taken the form 
of cats. So Kripke continues: 
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We could have discovered that the actual cats that we have are demons. Once we have discovered, 
however, that they are not, it is part of their very nature that, when we describe a counterfactual 
world in which there were such demons around, we must say that the demons would not be cats. It 
would be a world containing demons masquerading as cats. Although we could say cats might turn 
out to be demons, of a certain species, given that cats are in fact animals, any cat-like being which 
is not an animal, in the actual world or in a counterfactual one, is not a cat. The same holds even 
for animals with the appearance of cats but reptilic internal structure. Were such to exist, they 
would not be cats, but 'fool's cats'. (Kripke 1980: 126.) 
What has happened here is that when we say that cats might turn out to be demons, we 
are talking about this possibility as i f it was a metaphysical possibility, indeed, this is 
really the only way that we can come up with such scenarios. However, as Kripke 
pointed out, we should be able to rule out scenarios like this by a priori means. But 
because we were able to conceive of the scenario to start with, we seem to have some 
kind of a problem: we must explain the phenomenon somehow. A plausible way to do 
this seems to be to say that these scenarios are conceptually or epistemically possible, 
although metaphysically impossible. But, I put it to anyone who goes for this solution, 
how could this be the case i f we know a priori that i f cats are animals, then they are 
necessarily animals? In other words, what is our epistemic access to the conceptual 
possibility that cats might turn out to be demons, i f it is already ruled out a priori that 
cats could fail to be animals? The importance of the often neglected a priori part in a 
posteriori necessities should be apparent now, as it rules out the supposed epistemic 
access to conceptual modality. 
I anticipate a fair objection: even i f it is ruled out a priori that i f cats are animals then 
they are necessarily animals, it is not ruled out a priori that cats are not animals - we 
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need empirical work for that. Or take the case of Hesperus and Phosphorus again: it 
seems that, a priori, we have little to say about the identity or non-identity of Hesperus 
and Phosphorus. A priori, the sentences 'Hesperus is Hesperus' and 'Hesperus is 
Phosphorus' look quite different, even though we now know that the words 'Hesperus' 
and 'Phosphorus' refer to the same entity. In any case, before we acquire at least some a 
posteriori information, we do not even know which proposition is expressed by the 
sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. Same naturally goes for 'Hesperus is not 
Phosphorus'. It would not do to insist that 'Hesperus is not Phosphorus' is possible at this 
stage - surely we are going to need at least the definitions of the concepts 'Hesperus' 
and 'Phosphorus' to say anything about the modalities involved. Yet, given that they 
both refer to the planet Venus, the proposition expressed by 'Hesperus is not 
Phosphorus1 is clearly false. Thus, only the first case could possibly accommodate the 
possibility o f 'Hesperus is not Phosphorus'. But at that stage the only modality that we 
can have is strict logical modality, as in 'Hesperus is Hesperus1. Of course, the word 
'Phosphorus' could have referred to something else than the planet Venus, say, the planet 
Mars, in which case the sentence 'Hesperus is not Phosphorus' would be true, but the 
modality in effect here concerns the original reference-fixing of the word, and this is 
surely not what conceptual modality was supposed to amount to. 
What this line of thought is supposed challenge is the route from 'in some sense it seems 
that Hesperus might not be Phosphorus' to the conceptual possibility of'Hesperus is not 
Phosphorus'. I suppose that one could insist that in the very hollow sense that we saw 
above, 'Hesperus is not Phosphorus' is possible, that is, it is possible that it expresses a 
true proposition, for nothing in its logical form contradicts this. But this is a very 
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uninteresting observation and it certainly lacks the strength that many would like to 
associate with the possibility of 'Hesperus is not Phosphorus'. Once we introduce the 
definitions o f the concepts involved, however, we see that the proposition is clearly 
false. 
One last attempt might be to insist that, in a perfectly clear sense, it might have turned 
out that Hesperus is Venus and Phosphorus is some other heavenly body. But this is just 
to make the mistake that has been repeatedly noted, namely to talk about a metaphysical 
impossibility as i f it was metaphysically possible. Of course it could not have turned out 
that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, that is to say that it could have turned out that Venus is 
not identical with itself! Similarly, it wi l l not do to insist that Hesperus might still turn 
out not to be identical with Phosphorus. For even i f we have got the empirical story 
horrifically wrong and Phosphorus is, say, a further planet in our solar system, this 
would only underline the fallibility of our empirical methods. The whole 'Hesperus and 
Phosphorus' talk would have to be amended (as would quite a few other things); perhaps 
we would redefine the word 'Phosphorus' so that it would not refer to the planet Venus. 
A l l this is, I suppose, conceivable, but none of it concerns modality: as we have seen, 
the modal input in 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is based on the a priori part, which holds no 
matter how we might have to amend our empirical story. According to the current story, 
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' both refer to the planet Venus and that is all that matters. 
The upshot of all this, once again, is that the difference between sentences like 
'Hesperus is Phosphorus' and 'Hesperus is Hesperus' is indeed much deeper than just a 
difference in their epistemic status. They differ in regard to their a priori part: the a 
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priori part in them is true in virtue of different things. As I have argued in length above, 
the a priori part in 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' concerns the identity conditions of heavenly 
bodies. The truth of the proposition 'Hesperus is Hesperus', however, can be determined 
strictly in virtue of the laws of logic. This should be the starting point for any solution to 
Frege's Puzzle, but more importantly for our concerns, any differences in the modal 
status of these sentences has to be settled at this level. As our examination implies, the 
only difference in their modal status is that they are necessary in virtue of different 
things. Nevertheless, they are both necessary in virtue o f the essences of these things, 
thus, the modality in question is reducible to the metaphysical sort. 
What I still must do is to explain what, in fact, causes these unfortunate misconceptions 
about conceptual modalities. The answer is simple enough: both our a priori and our 
empirical capabilities are fallible. Yes, we should be able to rule out a priori the 
possibility that cats might turn out to be demons, given that they are in fact cats, but 
sometimes we are overwhelmed by our imagination and we fail to do this. So, rather 
than conceptual possibilities, cases like these are pseudo-possibilities produced by our 
failure to grasp the genuine, metaphysical possibility determined by the identity 
conditions of natural kinds. Conceptual modality, then, amounts merely to cases like 
'A l l bachelors are unmarried', which can be neatly reduced to metaphysical modality. 
The details of our epistemic access to metaphysical modality are yet to be specified, but 
the structure is implicit in what has already been said both in this and the previous 
chapter. 
Conceivability clearly cannot serve as a guide to metaphysical modality, so what is our 
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epistemic access to metaphysical modality based on? Well, i f what I have said above is 
correct, it seems that metaphysical modality has a distinctive feature which should be 
accessible to us via a priori reasoning. This feature is of course the a priori part that we 
examined whilst discussing a posteriori necessities. The a priori part, as we saw, is 
grounded in the essence of the entity that the modality concerns, i.e. its identity and 
existence conditions. As these conditions seem to be within the grasp of our a priori 
capabilities, the link to modality is already established. The Finean understanding of 
metaphysical modality, namely that 'we should view metaphysical necessity as a special 
case of essence' (1994: 8) enables us to explain modality strictly in terms of the identity 
and existence conditions of the entities involved. In effect, then, the question about our 
epistemic access to modality reduces to the question of our epistemic access to 
essences.92 
We have some very strong reasons to think that a priori reasoning is a good, although 
fallible guide to essences. Indeed, it seems that i f we can have any substantial a priori 
knowledge at all, it wi l l have something to do with essences. As we saw in the case of 
Hesperus and Phosphorus, sometimes the crucial information is something as simple as 
the constraints that govern the identity conditions of material bodies, namely that two 
material bodies cannot exist in the same place at the same time. There is, of course, 
quite a bit more to the essence of the planet Venus, but the story about the necessity of 
'Hesperus is Phosphorus' can be settled with as little knowledge about the essence of 
Venus as this. In the case of 'Cats are animals', on the other hand, we need a priori 
knowledge about the connection between the higher-level kind 'animal' and the lower-
92 See Correia (2006) for some specifications to Fine's account, namely the distinction between general 
and individual essences. I acknowledge this distinction, but will not discuss it here. 
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level kind 'cat', namely that all instances of the lower-level kind must also be instances 
of the higher-level kind. These are relatively simple cases and it might seem that the a 
priori input does not amount to much, but this is not the case. In the previous chapter I 
discussed a number of more substantial cases, such as the discovery of Neptune. 
There is one further concern: the account of the a priori which I put forward in the 
previous chapter might seem to leave room for some doubt concerning the necessity of 
sentences like 'Cats are animals'. It seems that, after all, there is one sense in which cats 
might turn out be demons: we might have gotten the empirical story wrong (cf. the case 
of Hesperus and Phosphorus). This, however, has no consequences for the a priori part, 
for even i f the empirical story fails, it is still true that //cats are animals, then they are 
necessarily animals. In fact, as our treatment of the case suggests, i f cats turned out to 
be demons, then, apparently, cats would not exist in the actual world, so we could still 
correctly say that 'A l l cats are animals' is a metaphysical necessity. Here we are 
interested in the essential connection between the higher-level and lower-level kinds; 
this is a feature of the categorical structure of reality - demons masquerading as cats 
would presumably reflect the very same structure. In this case the particular kind of 
demon that masquerades as cats would be a lower-level kind whereas 'demons' would 
take the place of'animals' as a higher-level kind. The case would then just be that in the 
actual world there are no cats that could fail to be animals, but only demons 
masquerading as cats. 
In a similar fashion, Newton's gravitational theory, strictly speaking, does not hold in 
the actual world, but the a priori validity of the hypothesis still holds, as I demonstrated 
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in the previous chapter in the case of Euclidean geometry. This does not necessarily 
imply that Newton got the story about the identity conditions o f material bodies wrong, 
rather, he failed to list all the relevant conditions. In fact, it was quite a good effort, 
which is of course why we still use Newton's theory in all but the most extreme 
situations. Einstein and others managed to add something to this story about the 
interaction of material bodies. And it seems that there might still be a lot more to it 
when quantum gravity enters the picture. One thing is certain though: we have grasped 
more and more of the essential features that govern the interaction of material bodies; 
we can only hope that someday we wi l l be able to complete the story. Given the success 
of science, it seems that a priori reasoning combined with the scientific method is a 
fairly reliable guide to real essences. Even i f the whole story about a particular 
governing feature of reality, say, gravitation, remains elusive, we can at least come up 
with fairly accurate approximations. 
To sum up: 1 have argued for a strictly essentialist understanding o f modality -
understanding that sees modality as a feature brought about by the identity and 
existence conditions of different kinds of entities. Our epistemic access to modality, 
according to this view, is based on a priori reasoning - a reliable guide to metaphysical 
possibility and a fallible, but reasonable guide to real essences. 1 have also argued that 
conceptual modality is a considerably hollower phenomenon than is usually suggested, 
and that it is ful ly reducible to metaphysical modality. With conceptual modality goes 
the framework of two-dimensional modal semantics, which, it seems, cannot 
accommodate metaphysical modality understood in the way suggested here. As we saw, 
the necessary a posteriori is a key issue here. I f I am right, a central feature of a 
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posteriori necessities has been neglected, although this feature seems to be central 
already in Kripke's characterisation of the issue. This feature is of course the a priori 
part in a posteriori necessities - it seems to be unanalysable in any but essentialist terms, 
which might be the reason why it has been so widely neglected. The upshot of all this is 
that we can indeed be ontologically parsimonious about modality, as Jackson suggests, 
but the modal space that we are dealing with is metaphysical, not conceptual; indeed, 
we could even say that modality is just a supervenient feature of the governing 
conditions of reality. 
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10. Truth and Metaphysics 
Truth is a particularly difficult topic, especially so for a proponent of metaphysical 
realism. The 'easy' way to deal with truth, direct correspondence, has been largely 
undermined, mostly by philosophers who are not very sympathetic to metaphysical 
realism, but are rather inclined to go for some sort of relativism, like Hilary Putnam. In 
chapters one and two I addressed a number of Putnam's objections, but a positive 
account of truth is needed i f we hope to address the relativist's objections conclusively. 
So, it seems that direct correspondence wi l l not do, but a more sophisticated method of 
dealing with the problem of truth from the realist point of view is the theory of 
truthmaking. The most notable defender of truthmaking is probably David Armstrong 
(1997, 2004), whose theory wi l l receive some attention in what follows. However, 
Armstrong's theory of truthmaking is very closely tied to his ontology, that of states of 
affairs, and it has some important implications for his conception of truthmaking. The 
most obvious of these implications is that, according to Armstrong, truthmakers are, in 
general, facts. Of course, as Armstrong (2004: 4) happily admits, the idea of 
truthmaking can be separated from the question of what truthmakers in fact are. In this 
chapter I wi l l build on this idea: we wi l l see that the idea of truthmaking is plausible and 
independent from a specific ontology. Consequently, all that needs to be established is 
that truthmaking is a well-motivated way to account for truth, and that it can be 
combined with a realist ontology. 
Indeed, truthmaking does seem to be a very plausible idea: the idea of there being 
something in the world that guarantees the truth of true propositions fits our intuitions 
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very nicely - at least the intuitions of those of us who still crave after some sort of a 
correspondence theory of truth. Not surprisingly, truthmaking is often considered to be a 
more sophisticated version of the correspondence theory of truth. But recently (e. g. 
Beebee & Dodd 2005) there has been a lot of hostility towards truthmaking understood 
like this; many would like to see it as a more general framework, not strictly as a vessel 
for the correspondence theory of truth. This broader conception of truthmaking fits in 
nicely with my agenda: as I wil l argue, this is all the better for truthmaking, and further, 
this is all the better for those of us who do wish to cash out our realist intuitions about 
truth with the help of truthmaking, for it only strengthens the case against the main 
opponents of a realist conception o f truth. 
In addition to Armstrong, accounts of truthmaking which are intimately connected with 
certain, although rather different metaphysical backgrounds have been put forward for 
example by E. J. Lowe (2006) and David Lewis (2001, 2003), but our main focus here 
is how truthmaking could best be combined with a realist conception of metaphysics 
without making too many commitments in terms of the exact metaphysical framework. 
But some recent accounts suggest that truthmaking is not a specifically realist theory at 
all. For instance, Pihlstrom (2005) has suggested that the idea of truthmaking could also 
be combined with pragmatism, which, at least in some of its forms, is quite hostile 
towards metaphysical realism. The compatibility between pragmatism and truthmaking 
has also been noted by Chris Daly, and he suggests further that it is compatible with 
idealism as well (2005: 95). What I hope to establish, however, is that truthmaking can 
indeed provide a systematic method of dealing with truth in a rigorously realist way. 
Not only would this help in answering questions about truth as such, but it would 
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certainly help metaphysical realists to counter the usual objections from the relativists.93 
Before we go into the details of truthmaking theory, a few words about truth itself are in 
order. I am sympathetic towards the view that Lowe (2006: 177) takes on truth, namely 
that truth should be conceived on the lines of alethic monism. The idea of one and 
indivisible truth, as alethic monism suggests, might sound rather mystical, but the 
important feature is merely that alethic monism upholds the principle of non-
contradiction (Lowe: 188 ff. , see also the next chapter). In a perfectly clear sense truth is 
many and quite scattered, but there are nevertheless some governing features, such as 
the principle of non-contradiction, which are universal for truth. Truth is one and 
indivisible in just this sense: it must follow a very clear pattern, because for every 
proposition it holds that that proposition is either true or false. 
I would hope that most philosophers are quite happy with what has just been said, but of 
course part of this is already familiar from Dummett (1991). 9 4 He would presumably 
insist that bivalence, which the principle of non-contradiction is usually considered to 
assume, is some kind o f vice and we should find ways to get around it. Well, I wi l l not 
try to do that here. However, truthmaking might offer us some help in this regard, for i f 
we are able to show that the idea of truthmaking is plausible before we need to make 
any serious metaphysical commitments, it wi l l turn out that bivalence is not so much a 
premise here, but rather a necessary implication. 
Moving on to truthmaking itself, there are a couple of things that, I believe, can be said 
without much controversy. One of these is that whatever we take the actual truthmakers 
93 As well as pragmatists, anti-realists and such; I am here calling all the philosophers who are hostile 
towards metaphysical realism relativists, as this seems to be the logical consequence of their views. 
94 Recall the discussion from chapter two. 
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to be, and, I suppose, even regardless of the nature of the relation between propositions 
and reality (here taken to be a truthmaking relation yet to be more accurately specified), 
we can in any case say that the (possible) correspondence between a proposition and 
reality, i.e. between propositions and truthmakers, is not, in general, a one-one 
correspondence.95 This is the view that Armstrong (2004: 16) takes and, in essence, 
seems to be what Lowe (2006: 182) would go for as well. The reason for opting for a 
many-many relation is simple enough: a single truthmaker can quite clearly be a 
truthmaker for several truthbearers and correspondingly there might be several 
truthmakers which serve as a sufficient truthmaker for a given proposition. Perhaps it 
could be argued that there is always some minimal truthmaker for each truth, but as 
Armstrong points out, many truths do also have several minimal truthmakers, such as 
the proposition <there exists an .v such that* is a human being>% (Armstrong 2004: 21). 
Another thing that ought to be fairly uncontroversial is that truthmaking is some kind of 
asymmetrical relation between propositions and something in the world. This something 
in the world could be facts or states of affairs, as in Armstrong's case, or something 
quite different, depending on your account of truthmakers. The exact nature of the 
truthmaking relation is not as uncontroversial though: one possibility is that it is an 
entailment relation between the existence of truthmaker and the truth of the proposition, 
but it has also been argued that we are dealing with a grounding relation here (cf. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005). There is also the question of whether truthmaking is an 
internal or an external relation. Armstrong favours the first alternative, and it does at 
least initially seem more plausible that truthmaking is an internal relation, but the 
95 I should perhaps add that 'propositions' is merely a placeholder here. 
96 Where the angled brackets denote a proposition, following Horwich (1998). 
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opposite has been suggested as well (cf. David 2005). 
Rather than discuss any of these specific problems in detail, I wi l l now turn to the issue 
of motivating truthmaking in the first place, which is harder than many who have 
actually put forward theories of truthmaking seem to think. It has been suggested by 
Daly (2005) that there is one issue about which the advocates of different truthmaker 
theories always agree upon: that truthmaking does some explanatory work. This is of 
course a rather natural source of motivation and might indeed be why truthmaker 
theorists tend to skip the details when explaining their motivation. Clearly, this comes 
down to the nature of the truthmaking relation, for whatever explanatory work the 
truthmaker principle might do, it must surely have something to do with the relationship 
between propositions and truthmakers. So, what kind of motivation could we have? 
According to Daly (2005: 102), there are three options. The first one is what he calls the 
'Canadian mountie' theory of truthmakers, the idea of which is to argue from examples 
and to show that we can, in fact, always find a truthmaker for any given truth. Daly 
accuses this theory of being ad hoc, in that it assumes the truthmaker principle without 
giving any justification for it. Presumably the point is that we need more than a working 
theory of truthmaking to motivate the idea in the first place, and I do agree with this. 
The second strategy suggests that truthmaker theory could help in finding explanations 
of further ontological problems, such as the theory of universals. Daly (2005: 98-102) 
argues against Rodriguez-Pereyra's suggestion, namely that truthmakers could explain 
universals by entailing that it is true that there are some properties which are shared by 
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several distinct particulars. There are other alternatives as well though, one of them 
being Josh Parsons' (2005) rather plausible idea that truthmaking could be used to 
motivate arguments concerning propositions about the past and the future and thus 
might provide some explanatory power in discussing theories about time, such as 
presentism. However, while I am not averse to granting the possibility that truthmaking 
could help in settling other ontological problems, I do not believe that this by itself is a 
sufficient condition for adopting the truthmaker principle. And neither, of course, does 
Daly. 
The third strategy that Daly (2005: 94-98) considers, namely inference to the best 
explanation, is perhaps the most common. According to this strategy, truthmaking 
explains our pro-realism intuitions and captures the core idea of the correspondence 
theory of truth. Daly considers Armstrong's and Bigelow's theories in this connection. 
As 1 noted above, I as well hope that truthmaking could offer a way to characterise a 
realist theory of truth and help to dismiss any relativist views. But we have to be careful 
here, for even i f truthmaking does offer a way to characterise a realist theory of truth, it 
does not mean that it would explain why realism is any better than other alternatives. 
And indeed, it seems that the truthmaker principle is not necessarily connected with any 
realist premises, given that it might be compatible with pragmatism and idealism as 
well. Daly argues also that the same applies to the correspondence relation, formulated 
in the following way (CI): 
(CI) <p> is true if and only if things are as <p> says they are. (Daly 2005: 96-97.) 
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The idea is that (CI) is compatible with all other theories of truth as well, not only 
(something like) the correspondence theory of truth. Armstrong (2004: ch. 4) claims that 
the truthmaker principle could say something more than (CI) says by combining the 
correspondence relation with the truthmaking principle and his states of affairs 
ontology, but Daly is not convinced: 
My point here is that the coherence theory and the pragmatic theory are each compatible with the 
admission of states of affairs. Furthermore, each of these theories is compatible with the admission 
of states of affairs standing in a correspondence relation to truths. (Daly 2005: 97.) 
So, Daly's case against the third strategy is based on the claim that the truthmaker 
principle does not restrict our choices in terms of ontology in any way and thus fails to 
provide us the explanation that Armstrong and Bigelow suggest. This is indeed plausible 
and I would not endorse the strong connection between truthmaking and realism 
without doubt, or take Armstrong's understanding of the correspondence relation for 
granted. But it seems trivial that the truthmaker principle could be combined with 
different ontologies once we acknowledge that the idea o f truthmaking is quite distinct 
from the varying answers concerning the actual truthmakers and truthbearers. And (CI) 
is certainly neutral in this regard. However, as I have already noted, Armstrong (2004: 
4) has no quarrel with this idea. Consequently I am not at all sure whether too many 
philosophers actually hold the view that Daly criticises. 
I think that Armstrong and other advocates of realist truthmaking theories would prefer 
a somewhat weakened condition when it comes to the truthmaker principle, namely that 
the truthmaker principle is the best way to characterise the correspondence relation 
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understood in a rigorously realist sense. When put like this, the details of our ontology 
are still open, as long as it is a realist ontology, but the motivation for truthmaking is 
still clear: it is the best way to formulate the realist understanding of the correspondence 
relation. This hints to a fourth strategy of motivating truthmaking in addition to the 
three suggested by Daly, and in fact I think that the fourth strategy is closer to how most 
truthmaker theorists would like to motivate their theories. 
The strategy for motivating truthmaking that I wi l l now put forward rests on a very 
simple point: realism can stand on its on. In other words, we do not need truthmaking to 
uphold realism. Compared to Daly's third strategy, this changes the direction of 
explanation. Indeed, it could be said that the fourth strategy does not so much try to 
provide an explanation, but a justification for truthmaking, although in another sense it 
can be thought to provide an explanation as well, as we wi l l shortly see. In any case, 
what is important is that because realism can stand on its own, we can motivate 
truthmaking with realism, and not the other way around. Admittedly, this does leave us 
with the not so small task of showing how, exactly, realism stands on its own, but I think 
that we have good reasons to think so, as I have demonstrated in earlier chapters. Let me 
summarise some of the main points again, very briefly. 
The usual way to argue for (metaphysical) realism is to point out our natural intuitions 
towards it, somehow address the typical objections and perhaps put forward a detailed 
ontology. I would add an argument from natural science to this list; that is, it seems to 
me that realism is the only tenable choice for explaining the success of science, as 1 
have argued in detail in chapters four and five. But in this context, it is the usual 
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objections against realism that are at issue. By these I mean foremost the relativist 
objections put forward by Putnam (e.g. 1987: ch. 1), Dummett (1991) and Goodman 
(1988), among many others.97 The common aspect of these objections is the critique of 
the correspondence theory of truth, to which realism is supposedly committed. So, one 
would think, these objections drive the proponents of realism towards something else, 
namely truthmaking; be it as it might that truthmaking is just a more sophisticated 
version of the correspondence theory. This, however, is not as important as it might 
seem. It could explain why the majority of truthmaking theories are realist in nature, but 
it is certainly not enough to defend truthmaking against someone who does not share the 
realist intuitions to start with. Perhaps the only thing that we can say to some opponents 
of realism is that realism is simply better than any of the relativist alternatives because it 
has so much more explanatory power, and truthmaking only extends that power. This 
would leave us with the following argument. Given that realism has the greatest initial 
appeal and that truthmaking seems only to increase that appeal, it is rather 
straightforward to choose the way to go: realism plus truthmaking is the best theory 
available. I wish it was that easy. So does Armstrong: 
I do not have any direct argument (for truthmaker necessitarianism). My hope is that philosophers 
of realist inclinations will be immediately attracted to the idea that a truth, any truth, should 
depend for its truth for something 'outside' it, in virtue of which it is true. (Armstrong 2004: 7.) 
At this point, I am sure that Daly and others would point out that the only thing that 
hold this house of cards together are exactly the realist intuitions in the background. 
Well, that is more or less true. But we needed to see that to put forward a better 
97 See chapter two. 
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argument. And it still rests on the point that realism can stand on its own. What we must 
do now is to solve the following problem, mentioned by Beebee & Dodd: 
Suppose that some formulation of truthmaker theory does indeed succeed in capturing realist 
intuitions. The question arises, how can truthmaker theory now legitimately be put to use in an 
argument for realism (about a particular domain) and against anti-realism? If truthmaker theory 
itself enshrines a commitment to realism, then presumably the appropriate anti-realist reaction to 
such an argument is simply to deny whatever truthmaker principle is being used as a premise in 
that argument. If a given truthmaker principle is to pull its weight in arguments against anti-
realism, then we had better have reasons, independently of our commitment to realism, for 
believing that the principle is true. We wonder whether such reasons are to be had. (Beebee & 
Dodd 2005: 16.) 
So, the task that Beebee and Dodd have given us is to put forward a truthmaker theory 
that, unlike other suggestions, would be able to capture our realist intuitions. But even i f 
we would succeed in that, we would have to show that there are reasons, independently 
of our realist intuitions, to believe that this truthmaker principle is true. Perhaps this can 
be done, but I wi l l not attempt it here. I have conceded above that (at least most) 
truthmaker theories fail to cash out the realist intuitions without leaving room for other 
interpretations. And, perhaps, the ones that might just be able to do this are not quite as 
useful or plausible.9 8 Yet, does this matter? After all, every one o f these suggestions is 
certainly compatible with realism as well. Thus, even though truthmaking might be an 
ontologically neutral way of talking about truth, and indeed because of that, we can 
combine it with a realist ontology. And i f we can do that, we have a very efficient 
argument against the Putnam-Dummett-Goodman line of thought. This is because their 
98 However, if this route is taken, my money would be on Lowe's (2006) suggestion. 
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objection is, in essence, that you can not combine a realist ontology with a plausible 
theory of truth. Well, it seems that you can. The only thing left to do is to show that the 
truthmaker principle is in fact plausible. 
How should we go on about showing that this weakened version of truthmaking is 
plausible? Well, our task is considerably easier than it would be i f we tried to come up 
with a truthmaker theory which captures our realist intuitions and only our realist 
intuitions. Now we need only to come up with a principle which is plausible, useful and 
compatible with realism. I f it proves to be compatible with pragmatism or idealism as 
well, then so much better for truthmaking, as this only contributes to its applicability 
and plausibility. Of course, when understood like this, truthmaking gives us very little 
motivation to go for realism, contrary to what many proponents of truthmaking might 
hope. But I am not looking for a motivation for realism in truthmaking, I am looking for 
a way to combine realist intuitions with a plausible theory of truth. What would a 
plausible truthmaker principle look like then? The usual formulation goes roughly like 
this: 
(TM) Necessarily, if <p> is true, then there exists at least one entity a such that <a exists> entails 
« p > is true>. (Beebee & Dodd 2005: 2.) 
The nature o f the truthmaking relation, here suggested to be an entailment relation, is 
perhaps the most controversial part of (TM). Other problems occur when certain truths, 
such as necessary truths or negative truths are considered. There have been numerous 
attempts to deal with these problems, but the details of each solution depend, often 
heavily, on the details of the ontology that one tries to combine with truthmaking. A 
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somewhat neutral way to address the problems involved with entailment is to replace 
entailment with (metaphysical) necessitation: in every possible world where the 
truthmaker for a certain proposition exists, that proposition is true." 
I listed some key features of the truthmaker principle earlier and at least some of them 
would also seem to hold in regard to the general principle that we are now looking for. 
So, we can for example without much risk of controversy hold that truthmaking is an 
asymmetrical many-many relation. As Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005: 20-21) suggests, we 
seem to have the intuition that truth is asymmetrical, and the truthmaking principle 
corresponds with this intuition perfectly. The way that Rodriguez-Pereyra puts it is that 
truth is grounded: the truth of a proposition depends on what reality is like, and the 
relationship between truth and reality is of course asymmetrical, as reality does not 
depend on the truth of the proposition. He also points out that this by itself does not 
commit us to realism, for an idealist could just add that reality or the world and the 
entities in it are not mind-independent (ibid.). 
The truthmakers are here taken to be entities of some kind, but it is certainly a matter of 
debate what kind of entities they might be. I think that answering this question wil l 
bring forward the first serious ontological commitments. For a realist, there are several 
alternatives, such as Armstrong's facts, or, i f your ontology allows them, tropes, as 
suggested in Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984). There is not much that I can say about 
the nature of the truthmakers, given that I am not defending any particular theory, but 
rather the general appeal of the truthmaker principle. However, it seems to me that the 
apparent complexity of truth would suggest that truthmakers must be spread out in 
99 This is the line that both Lowe (2006: 185) and Armstrong (1997: 115) take. 
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several different categories rather than just one - that of facts for example. This line of 
thought has also been noted by Beebee & Dodd (2005: 9) and it is exactly what Lowe 
(2006: 182 ff . ) argues for as well. 
What we have here is of course still quite a sketchy account, but much more cannot be 
said without making further ontological commitments. Nevertheless, I think that we 
have good reasons to think that the idea of truthmaking on a general level is a plausible 
one. It also seems clear that this idea can be combined with realism in a coherent 
manner. What should be noted however is that truthmaking is not, or does not have to 
be, an explanation for our realist intuitions. Perhaps it does increase the appeal of 
realism, for the explanatory power of the complete theory (realism plus truthmaking) is 
certainly greater with truthmaking than without it. But as 1 pointed out above, we have a 
strong case for realism before truthmaking even enters the picture. Look at it like this: i f 
the relativist's strongest case against realism is realism's inability to deal with truth, as it 
seems to be according to the Putnam-Dummett-Goodman line of thought, then adopting 
the truthmaker principle is no doubt the best possible response to this objection. In the 
light of this, the possible applicability of the truthmaker principle to the relativist's 
ontology merely corroborates the realist's case, as then we have some common ground 
in regard to this particular issue. How can we decide between these ontologies then? 
Well, I think that in virtually every other regard, realism is no doubt the winner. 
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11. Logic and Metaphysics 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine what logic is grounded in, its metaphysical 
status. In other words, in virtue of what are logical truths true? The relevant candidates 
for the grounds of logic include language, grammar and reality. I wi l l defend the view 
that logic is, ultimately, grounded in reality. In what follows I wi l l repeatedly refer to the 
relationship between logic and metaphysics, which is one of my central concerns. In 
fact, what I attempt to establish is that logical principles, such as and especially the law 
of non-contradiction (henceforth LNC), are metaphysical principles rather than logical 
principles. What this means, exactly, wi l l be clarified in due course. I wi l l proceed as 
follows. First it wi l l be examined whether some kind o f a consensus can be reached 
about what a discussion about the status of logic should involve. It w i l l be suggested 
that i f we can agree on certain fundamental logical principles, then we can settle the 
debate by examining what these fundamental principles are grounded in. The law of 
non-contradiction seems to be the best candidate for such a principle, and the 
metaphysical status of LNC in particular wi l l receive attention. It wi l l be argued that 
LNC is the best candidate for the most fundamental principle of our reasoning. But to 
establish this, it is also necessary to address the challenge from dialetheism, due to 
Graham Priest and others. 
The relationship between logic and metaphysics must be one of the following. Firstly, 
we can hold that logic and metaphysics are wholly separate. In this case there would be 
no direct exchange between them, although presumably we could still argue about 
which one is a more fundamental discipline. Secondly, we can hold that logic has 
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implications for metaphysics, or even that metaphysical questions are reducible to 
questions of which logic to adopt (cf. Dummett 1991). And thirdly, we can hold that 
logic has some kind of a metaphysical basis which implies that your logic does, or 
should, reflect your metaphysics. My sympathies lie with the third option, but we 
should briefly consider where the other routes might take us. Even i f there indeed is a 
connection between logic and metaphysics, it seems that there is no straight-forward 
way to determine the exact nature of this connection. It is very likely that we have a 
number of different compatible metaphysical and logical systems rather than a simple 
one-one relation. The upshot of this is that at the very least, we should settle the 
question of how much common ground there is between the different possible 
approaches. For instance, can we agree upon some fundamental laws of logic or logical 
principles which are common for all the different approaches? I f we could, then settling 
the nature of this particular principle should serve as a reliable guide towards the 
metaphysical status of logic. 
A strong candidate for a principle like this is LNC, but mainly because of the work of 
Graham Priest (1998, 2006), even this has become controversial. In the light of these 
problems, the first option becomes increasingly attractive: maybe there is no connection 
between logic and metaphysics: perhaps the debate over different kinds of logics has no 
bearing whatsoever on metaphysics and metaphysics has nothing to do with logic. 
Indeed, the lack o f interest that many logicians and metaphysicians show in examining 
the connection between the disciplines further motivates this move. But we should be 
alarmed by this, for on what, i f not metaphysics, is logic based? Language and grammar 
are the usual candidates, but then the further question about the nature of language and 
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grammar needs to be addressed.100 It seems then that we are faced with some very 
fundamental problems before the discussion can even get started. I wi l l try to make my 
way through these issues. 
There is plenty of literature about the status of logic in terms of the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction, the revisability of logic and related issues (e.g. Field 1996, 2000, 2005; 
Boghossian 2000, Shapiro 2000, Bueno and Colyvan 2004, Resnik 2004). This 
discussion is of less relevance to us than it might initially seem, partly because even the 
notion o f 'a priori' is often seriously misconceived, as we recall from chapter eight. 
Additionally, it is not the epistemic status of logic that is our main interest here. What 
we need to examine is the metaphysical status of logical principles, albeit naturally the 
question o f their a priori status and revisability is o f some importance as well. 
My view is that logic is indeed an a priori discipline, but it is important to remember 
that the apriority of logic does not rule out the possibility of it being revisable.101 Others 
(Field 1996, Boghossian 2000, Shapiro 2000, Resnik 2004) have argued against the 
revisability of logic on the grounds that we would always need to have at least some 
core principles which are indefeasible, on pain of infinite regress. The idea is perhaps 
appealing, and may work well against the Quinean idea of the web of belief of which 
logic is one revisable part (cf. Shapiro 2000). Apriority, nevertheless, is compatible with 
revisability. A detailed discussion of these issues is not necessary here, I merely wish to 
point out that the debate over the apriority of logic in terms of its revisability is clouded 
with conceptual issues.102 
lOOWe will return to this issue in the next chapter. 
101 As should be clear given what was established in chapter eight. 
102See Bueno and Colyvan (2004) for an account against apriorism in logic - the debate is exactly over 
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Of course, there is a genuine problem about whether logic is empirically revisable. Field 
(2000), among others has argued for the empirical indefeasibility o f a priori knowledge, 
including logic, but there are opposite views in the air (cf. Bueno and Colyvan 2004). 
For one thing, quantum mechanics has been suggested to provide empirical information 
that challenges some of our most basic logical principles, even the law of non-
contradiction (ibid., see also Putnam 1978). Indeed, I do not see why it could not be 
possible for empirical information that is inconsistent with some of our logical 
principles to emerge. Quantum mechanics hardly constitutes a sufficient case against 
LNC though - 1 wi l l elaborate on this later. 
Before we can advance further, it must be settled what the appropriate formulation of 
LNC is. For my purposes, the typical formulation 'not both P and not-P', is 
unsatisfactory. In fact, it could be said that this formulation presupposes that the 
principle is a logical one. We would be better o f f with one o f Aristotle's many ways to 
formulate LNC, such as 'the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not 
belong to the same subject in the same respect' (Aristotle 1984b: 1005b 19-20). When 
put like this, the principle appears considerably deeper, as it clearly states a restriction 
that concerns things rather than, say, sentences. 
At its simplest, the metaphysical interpretation of LNC amounts to this: the entities of 
mind-independent reality are plausibly governed by some sort of principles (as 
otherwise there would be no order in our experience o f them), that is, there are some 
constraints as to what kind of properties a certain kind of entity can and can not have 
and further, some of these properties are mutually exclusive. For instance, a particle can 
revisability. 
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not have both a positive and a negative charge at the same time, or an object can not be 
both green and red all over at the same time. It seems that reality just is such that it 
conforms to the principle of non-contradiction. The different formulations of the 
principle are merely attempts to express this orderliness in a simple manner. Note that 
semantic paradoxes such as the Liar do not threaten LNC as a metaphysical principle. 
That is, any arbitrariness or vagueness over language has no bearing on LNC 
understood as a metaphysical principle. A counterexample to the metaphysical version 
of LNC could only be a true contradiction in the world. 
To get into the bottom of what LNC understood as a metaphysical principle amounts to, 
consider the previous example in more detail: a particle can not have both a positive and 
a negative charge at the same time. The labels 'positive' and 'negative' are admittedly 
arbitrary, especially when we are trying to define a fundamental metaphysical principle, 
but perhaps we can clarify this. We know that, for instance, electrons and protons have 
an electric charge of the same size, but with the opposite polarities: electrons have a 
'negative' charge and protons a 'positive' charge. Now, when we say that a particle can 
not have both of these charges at the same time, we can think of this as a restriction in 
terms of the implications that an electric charge has. The most important of these 
implications is that like charges repel and unlike charges attract. Setting aside for the 
moment what electric charges actually are, it seems that to produce the effects that they 
evidently do, there must be two mutually exclusive types of them, i.e. the negative and 
the positive charge. This is because the most important causal powers associated with 
electric charges emerge due to the fact that like charges repel and opposite charges 
attract - a feature that requires polarity. I f we think of the electric charge as a property 
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of an entity, say an electron, it is a fully exhaustive property, for the charge can be of 
exactly one type and this exhausts any further qualifications. Of course, this is not to say 
that the charge could not change (both in strength and polarity), just that at any given 
time it must be of exactly one type. A l l of this, you might think, is obvious; it is obvious 
because we are used to things that conform to LNC. What is not obvious is why they do 
so. 
The metaphysical reading of the law of non-contradiction suggests an answer to the 
question why our observations conform to the principle: because LNC is a valid 
metaphysical principle concerning the world. So, let us trace the route from our 
observations of the world to the mind-independent reality which supposedly conforms 
to LNC. Basically, you can insert any kind of metaphysically realist ontology here, it 
makes little difference for my purposes. What we need to agree about is that whatever 
the organisation of the entities in the world is, it does not violate LNC. 1 wi l l try to be as 
neutral as possible in what follows, but feel free to translate what I say into your 
preferred ontology. 
Our observations suggest that an electric charge is some sort o f a property that a particle 
can have in two different varieties: the positive and the negative. What suggests that this 
is a universal (actual) condition - apart from the fact that we have never observed a 
particle having both a negative and a positive charge at the same time - is that the 
causal powers associated with electric charges could not arise i f the same particle could 
have both charges at the same time. 1 0 3 For instance, atoms would not hold together. It 
103Perhaps it should be mentioned that although every atom has, in a sense, a negative and a positive 
charge which cancel each other out, this is hardly a counter-example: atoms are not fundamental 
particles and we know that the charge of electrons on the one had and the charge of the quarks that 
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might be that this is not a metaphysically necessary condition for the existence of the 
mentioned causal powers, but all that matters here is that in the actual world electric 
charges have the particular causal powers that they have and they emerge because of the 
polarity of the charges. In other words, in the actual world the laws of physics require 
that electric charges have polarities - otherwise this particular macrophysical 
construction would not be possible. The law of non-contradiction, i f it is valid, is 
perhaps the most fundamental condition of this type. 
So far it appears that the case against the metaphysical reading of LNC and consistency 
in general has not even been adequately characterised. We need to keep in mind the 
three ways of understanding the relationship between metaphysics and logic that I listed 
in the beginning of this chapter. It is crucial that this relationship is examined, as a lot of 
what follows depends on it. Fortunately, the best known advocate of contradictions has 
recently clarified his position in regard to this particular issue (cf. Priest 2006). 
Given this understanding of LNC, let us see i f it is possible to accommodate violations 
of the principle in our ontology. There have been at least half-hearted attempts to do 
this. 1 0 4 This is not a very typical topic in the dialetheist literature, as most of it is 
concerned with semantic paradoxes, which are not at issue here. However, a recent 
paper by Edwin Mares (2004), where he distinguishes between semantic and 
metaphysical dialetheism - the latter stating that there are true contradictions in the 
world - inspired a reply from Graham Priest: 
protons consist of on the other hand are responsible for the (neutral) charge of atoms. In any case, we 
can say that no fundamental particle can have both a negative and a positive charge at the same time. 
104See Priest (2006: 300) and Beall (2000, 2004). 
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To be a metaphysical dialetheist, one must suppose that it makes sense to talk about reality itself, 
as opposed to what is said about it. That is, one must suppose that 
1. There is an extra-linguistic reality 
Next, this reality must comprise things that are propositional in some sense, or the talk of its being 
consistent or inconsistent would make no sense. [...] So we must have that 
2. Reality is constituted by facts 
or by fact-like entities such as objects-cum-properties. Even given 2, there is still nothing 
consistent or inconsistent simply in a bunch of facts. There must therefore be more to the matter 
than this; there must be something within the structure of facts that corresponds to negation in 
language. It must be the case that 
3. There are polarities within facts 
That is, i f / is a possible fact, say one that would make a true, there must be a corresponding one, 
/ , that would make -a true. (Priest 2006: 300.) 
As you can see, Priest puts forward a sketch of an ontology of facts and suggests that 
this ontology could accommodate contradictions. The crucial premise is the third one, 
namely the claim that there could be negative truthmakers. Priest, though, does not seem 
to be very interested in defending this sort of a picture and adds that his In 
Contradiction is, in effect, neutral in regard to the semantic/metaphysical dialetheism 
distinction. Be that as it may, the ontological options for accommodating contradictions 
are scarce. J. C. Beall (2000) has tried to make a case for an ontology roughly like the 
one Priest suggests by defending negative truthmakers. However, this looks very much 
like an ad hoc case, regardless o f Beall's courageous defence: to uphold the idea o f 
truthmakers having polarities, Beall appeals to physics, because we have polarities there 
as well. But this is hardly relevant, for polarities of charged particles are observable by 
empirical means, whereas polarities within truthmakers have no such grounding. In fact 
we have just seen that a crucial feature of the polarities of charged particles is that they 
215 
11. Logic and Metaphysics 
introduce new causal powers, whereas negative truthmakers, at least in Beall's ontology, 
merely serve as a way to accommodate contradictions. So, we clearly have a classic ad 
hoc case at hand and an appeal to ontological parsimony should be quite enough to rid 
us of the polarity of truthmakers. 
Of course, were the dialetheist to offer some further evidence suggesting that there 
really are contradictions in the world, we might have to start considering feasible 
strategies to accommodate the idea in our ontology. Perhaps the best candidates for 
violations o f LNC are paradoxes concerning change (cf. Priest 2006: ch. 11-12). Not 
every sort of change wi l l do though. Consider our previous example: i f a charge were to 
change from negative to positive, the instant when this change occurs is not such that 
there is both a negative and a positive charge present, but rather no charge at all. But 
Priest, regardless o f his supposed neutrality in terms of the semantic/metaphysical 
dialetheism distinction, has discussed a number of other examples (concerning change 
and other matters) which suggest that there might be contradictions in the world, the 
best known of these is no doubt Zeno's arrow paradox. 
Priest starts by considering a number of everyday examples involving change and time. 
One of these concerns writing a word on a paper with a pen: the pen touches the paper 
while the word is being written, and is lifted at the end of the word. Now, i f motion is 
continuous, there wi l l be an instant at which it is indeterminate whether the pen touches 
the paper or not, namely the instant at which the pen is lifted (Priest 2006: 160). Since 
we do not seem to have any reasons to decide whether the pen is touching the paper or 
not at this instant, we might be better o f f i f we said that it both touches the paper and 
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does not touch the paper - alas, we have a contradiction in the world. But this does not 
follow: the example relies on vague terms to start with, namely 'touching the paper1 is 
vague. This is somewhat easy to f ix though, in fact Priest does it himself: '[T]here is a 
last point at which the electrical repulsion between my pen and the paper is equal to the 
weight of the pen, but no first point at which this is not the case' (ibid.). Although Priest 
has his concerns about this, it would appear that the paradox can be resolved; we can 
define 'touching the paper' in terms of the electrical repulsion between the pen and the 
paper (or something similar), which hardly leaves space for a contradiction in the world 
- at best there is confusion over our language (and I certainly admit this). But Priest 
attempts to demonstrate that the problem at hand does not concern vagueness: 
I am in a room. As I walk through the door, am I in the room or out of (not in) it? To emphasize 
that this is not a problem of vagueness, suppose we identify my position with that of my centre of 
gravity, and the door with the vertical plane passing through its centre of gravity. As I leave the 
room there must be an instant at which the point lies on the plane. At that instant am 1 in or out? 
Clearly, there is no reason for saying one rather than the other. (Priest 2006: 161.) 
Indeed, once again this is not a problem of vagueness in the world, but it seems to me 
that it is, again, a very obvious example of vagueness concerning language. This time 
the question is over our definition of 'being in a room' - do we wish to define it 
inclusively or exclusively in regard to the doorway? Whatever we do with cases like 
this, I do not see how they could be examples of contradictions in the world: the concept 
of a 'room' is anthropocentric and because of that it wi l l always be subject to vagueness 
concerning language. The reason for us lacking a specific definition for 'being in a 
room' is that in ordinary contexts we never need to define it as accurately as Priest here 
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requires. However, i f we needed to, we could very easily do that: we certainly do when 
we consider whether a football is in the goal or not. 
We still have not discussed Priest's most celebrated example: Zeno's arrow paradox. It 
must be noted here that much of the thrust of Priest's arguments rely on his particular, 
intrinsic view of motion, which is Hegelian in spirit. 1 0 5 Priest argues against the so 
called cinematic account of motion, according to which, say, Zeno's arrow simply 
occupies subsequent points in space at different times - this is all there is to its motion 
(cf. Priest 2006: 174). According to the cinematic account of motion at each instant of 
its journey the arrow is at rest and thus makes no progress, but the sum of these instants 
can nevertheless be greater than zero, given a sufficient number of instants (approaching 
infinity). Unsurprisingly, Priest is not happy with this. 
Clearly, what is at issue here is the nature of motion (and time) and i f Priest is right, the 
nature of motion is fundamentally contradictory. But we do have a number of other 
ways to go here, albeit all of them have their problems.1 0 6 Aristotle's preferred solution 
was to deny that time consists of indivisible instants (Aristotle 1984b: 239b5-9). I f the 
smallest instant of time is non-zero, as it apparently has to be i f time does not consist of 
indivisibles, then motion is possible during this instant and Zeno's arrow paradox can be 
resolved. Another possibility (also originating from Aristotle's ideas) is to deny that 
there are velocities at instants - this view was later developed to the so called 'at-at' 
theory, which is effectively what Priest calls the cinematic account of motion (cf. 
Arntzenius 2000). According to the 'at-at' theory, motion can be reduced to different 
105See Mortensen (2006) for further discussion. 
106For a survey of possible resolutions and the problems they face, see Arntzenius (2000). 
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locations at different times. This, however, seems unsatisfactory, and it is no wonder 
that Priest wishes to resist the account. But, as Lowe (2002: 302) has pointed out, even 
though the measurements that we make concerning the velocity o f an object at a time 
are of course made in terms of the locations of the object at different times, this does not 
mean that the velocity of an object fully reduces to the locations that it occupies at 
different times. 
The fundamental problem, then, seems to be the idea of instantaneous velocity. A third 
way to deal with this is to understand motion as an intrinsic property, which is not 
reducible to the combination of times and locations occupied by the moving object; 
Arntzenius (2000) calls this the 'impetus theory'. According to this view, motion can be 
understood as a 'directional tendency' (cf. Lowe: 243), that is, there is a difference 
between a stationary and a moving arrow even at an instant: a moving arrow has the 
tendency, the potential, i f you like, to move in a certain direction. Instantaneous velocity 
is thus something like a dispositional property (cf. Lowe 2002: 302-303; see also Tooley 
1988). Arntzenius (2000: section 4) discusses a number o f objections to this view, but 
concludes that the only one that holds is an argument from ontological parsimony. 
Namely, to uphold the impetus theory we would have to accommodate these 'intrinsic 
velocities' in our ontology, as well as ensure that there is correspondence between the 
'intrinsic velocity' and velocity understood as the ratio of the distance covered by an 
object to the period of time it takes for the object to travel that distance. 
It is impossible to discuss all the implications o f these different views concerning 
motion here, but for my purposes it is sufficient to demonstrate that the picture is 
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certainly more complicated than a choice between the cinematic account of motion (or 
the 'at-at' theory) and Priest's revised Hegelian account of motion, contrary to what he 
seems to suggest. Naturally, Priest's account of motion faces its own problems; i f 
nothing else, then at least the requirement of accommodating contradictions in our 
ontology, the difficulties of which I have already discussed. To this extent, Priest's 
account of motion and the impetus theory share the same problem, but, at least arguably, 
the changes required by the impetus theory are less fundamental than the ones required 
by Priest's theory. Accordingly, i f we acknowledge the requirement for ontological 
parsimony (and set aside any other problems that Priest's account of motion might 
encounter), it would already seem that the impetus theory is preferable. 
Finally, I should very briefly consider the challenge that quantum mechanics is 
sometimes suggested to raise for LNC. 1 should note that Priest himself does not rely on 
arguments based on quantum mechanics very heavily, although he does entertain a 
rather speculative theory in terms of the possible explanatory work that the Hegelian 
account of motion might be able to do in regard to the uncertainty concerning a 
particle's location at a time, as suggested by certain interpretations of quantum 
mechanics (cf. Priest 2006: 180-181). However, arguments from quantum mechanics 
which seem to suggest that there could be true contradictions in the world have been 
offered by others (cf. Bueno & Colyvan 2004). It is not necessary to go into the details 
of quantum theory here, for the details are controversial in any case. What matters is 
that there are interpretations of quantum mechanics which imply that the reality might 
be in violation of the law of non-contradiction, such as the Copenhagen interpretation, 
and there are ones which imply the opposite, such as the Bohmian interpretation. In 
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other words, the jury is out on the interpretation o f quantum mechanics and at the 
moment any arguments relying on either interpretation are hardly conclusive. 
Furthermore, even i f the correct interpretation is on the lines of the Copenhagen 
interpretation, this does not necessarily mean that the law of non-contradiction is refuted 
- certainly not in any universal sense. 
I do acknowledge the theoretical fallibility of even such fundamental principles as LNC, 
but quite possibly, even i f the characterisation of the principle suggested above fails, a 
weakened version of the principle might still hold. This seems very plausible because 
the macrophysical world clearly is consistent, thus, whatever the story about the 
microphysical involves, one of its implications is that we have consistency on the level 
of the macrophysical, that is, the law of non-contradiction is true at least in the sense 
that it is implied by the deep structure o f the world, even i f it would emerge from 
inconsistency. In a somewhat similar manner we still rely on Newtonian mechanics in 
most connections, even though, strictly speaking, it is false. But all this is speculative; I 
have demonstrated that all the arguments against the validity of the law of non-
contradiction understood as a metaphysical principle based on current information are 
dubious at best. Unless further information emerges, I contend that there are no true 
contradictions in the world. 
I f the account of the metaphysical reading of LNC that I have suggested is correct, we 
finally have the means to examine the broader implications for the metaphysical status 
of logic. What we have here is, to use Michael Resnik's (1996) terms, a realist monist 
view of logic. As such, it is Fregean in spirit, but it is important to keep in mind that my 
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account is tightly interwoven with fallibilism. So yes, my contention is that there is a 
'One True Logic', but it might be very hard, or impossible, to ever accurately formulate 
it. Here 1 wish to take no stand as to what is the true logic, my point is only that it must 
reflect reality, there must be some metaphysics to back it up. The same naturally applies 
to language, in fact, it is reasonable to suppose that language is largely grounded in the 
very same features of reality as logic is, as we wi l l see in the next chapter. This 
correspondence is by no means free of errors though, which is exactly why tracing the 
route back from language or grammar to logical syntax (and even to ontological 
considerations) is a bad idea and leads to infeasible results. The Liar and other 
paradoxes are a good example of this: taking them too seriously leads to rather wild 
theories, such as metaphysical dialetheism, while they only imply semantic dialetheism. 
Perhaps it is reasonable to ask how, exactly, should we go on about doing logic 
according to the current account. Well, by doing metaphysics! This is not to say that 
there could not be value in pursuing specific logical problems. As 1 acknowledged 
above, we have a wide range of internally consistent, interesting logical frameworks and 
many of them have important applications. However, we must be wary of any 
metaphysical implications that someone might try to derive from these logical 
considerations. Deontic logic, say, might very well be worthwhile, but to draw 
implications concerning morality from it might be a serious mistake, as the many 
paradoxes that have been formulated suggest (see for example Chisholm 1963). To this 
extent, logic and metaphysics are not continuous. Accordingly, i f your desire is to use 
logic as a guide to metaphysics, you must start from metaphysics. On a more positive 
note, much work in this regard has already been done. Above 1 have defended the law of 
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non-contradiction as one of our core logical principles. Its validity strikes most people 
as the single most certain thing in the world. We saw that even Priest, the best known 
proponent of contradictions, has very little to say about true, metaphysical, 
contradictions. We cannot even imagine what it would be like for there to be one. 
Maybe quantum mechanics gives us a way to approach the idea, but clearly we do not 
yet understand what is happening at the quantum level. Is it not more likely that the lack 
of sufficient information has resulted in yet another linguistic blunder? Be that as it 
may, one thing is clear: in issues metaphysical, metaphysics should always have priority 
over logic. 
I should perhaps, very briefly, consider how my view fits in with the recent discussion 
about logical pluralism (cf. Beall and Restall 2006). In a somewhat trivial sense, I have 
no objections to the idea that we could be pluralists about logical truth. This is the sense 
that I have already mentioned, i.e. we can have quite different, even incompatible 
logical systems, as long as they are consistent within a given framework. These may be 
useful because they have interesting applications, or they may be rival systems and 
claim to reach a more accurate correspondence with reality. However, i f what I have 
said is correct, only one of them can be true in a deeper sense, insofar as they are 
incompatible. The others can be true only in the sense that Euclidean geometry is true, 
that is, within a given framework. I have no quarrel with logic done within a framework 
like this, but the logical systems most interesting from a metaphysician's point of view 
are certainly the ones which claim universal application. Thus, we should be careful 
with the use of the notion of 'logical truth', for i f it is taken to imply truth in a logical 
system, any logical system, then it has little bearing on truth in a metaphysically deep 
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sense (cf. Beall and Restall 2006: 100-102). 
So, i f metaphysics is about mapping the fundamental structure of reality, then logic, as I 
have described it, is about representing the results formally. When we reason about, say, 
matters of possibility and necessity, we are interested in the modal constraints that the 
structure o f reality imposes on different kinds of entities. Modal logic is valid only 
insofar as it reflects these constraints. The fact that we can prove the existence of God in 
S5 is not a very important result i f we do not have good reasons to believe that S5 is the 
correct way to formalise the modal constraints in the world. A very natural idea about 
the different systems of modal logic is that they reflect the different uses of 'necessity' 
and 'possibility' in our language. But this, again, leaves the question about modality in 
the world completely unanswered. Surely, we must have some kind o f a theory of 
modality to be able to settle the status of different modal logics. Given the picture 
suggested above, there can be only one way that matters stand in the actual world. So 
we cannot settle the question merely with the help of formal considerations. No matter 
how neat your system might be, there has to be something to back it up. Yet, the 
literature is exhausted with examples which lack any arguments beyond a given formal 
framework. 1 have in mind especially arguments like those in Williamson (2002), which 
almost systematically fail to go the ful l length of defining the initial presuppositions. 
For instance, Williamson argues for the necessary existence of merely possible physical 
objects, refuses to further discuss what kind of things merely possible physical objects 
are (2002: 19) and gives us no reasons whatsoever to accept the radical ontological 
implications that he draws from his logical framework. To pursue a project like this, one 
should first put forward an ontology that can accommodate these merely possible 
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physical objects - not derive them from an arbitrary logical framework. 
In conclusion, there seems to be a desperate need for meta-logical considerations 
regarding many of the popular topics of contemporary logic. At the very least, the 
problems concerning the grounds of logic that were raised above have to be addressed. 
My suggestion is that logic is grounded in metaphysics. This appears to be the only 
plausible way to deal with the obscure challenges to classical logic that seem to be 
growing in popularity. 
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12. Semantics and Metaphysics 
Already over 30 years ago, Hilary Putnam (1975c) and Saul Kriplce (1980) started a 
new phase in the philosophy of language and semantics. The externalist framework that 
they created and which is now so familiar to us was an important step in the philosophy 
of language and in many ways helped us to step away from the shadow of Wittgenstein 
and to do something new. It was a healthy inquiry into some of the most basic questions 
about the relationship between language and philosophy, or semantics and metaphysics. 
However, although I greatly sympathise with much of this project, it seems to me that 
the implications o f Putnam's and Kripke's work are often misinterpreted. 
Putnam's collection of papers, Mind, Language and Reality (1975a) starts with a paper 
entitled 'Language and philosophy' (1975b), where he contemplates about philosophers' 
interest in language. Especially interesting for my purposes are his remarks about using 
semantical methods as a guide to 'the Great Questions of philosophy', i.e. metaphysics. 
In other words, is semantics a guide to metaphysics? Putnam (p. 2) attempts to 
reconciliate between the 'layman' who thinks that language is irrelevant for the Great 
Questions and the contemporary (analytic) philosophers who generally agree that 
philosophy of language is of utmost importance and could perhaps act as a guide to 
metaphysics as well. The resolution that he offers is of course the externalist 
framework: 
(a) no set of mental events - images, or more 'abstract' mental happening and qualities - constitute 
understanding; and (b) no set of mental events is necessary for understanding. In particular, 
concepts cannot be identical with mental objects of any kind. (Putnam 1975b: 7.) 
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The upshot is thus that there is a middle way: semantics may be of some help when 
pursuing metaphysics. But how does this work, exactly? Well, possessing a concept, 
according to Putnam (1970, 1975a, 1975c), is knowing how to use it, grasping the 
stereotype - not a mental image. Furthermore, at least in the case of natural kind terms, 
there seems to be an intimate connection between concepts and the essences or natures 
o f the kinds that the terms refer to. Ordinary speakers might not be able to fully grasp 
this connection, but since we have experts, scientists who know what the deep structure 
of the kinds in question are, we can consult them when unsure. We have all learned this 
story, but what are its implications for the relationship between semantics and 
metaphysics? On the face of it, the situation seems to favour the view that language is a 
guide to the Great Questions of philosophy, at least insofar as we have experts who 
make sure that our stereotypes capture the deep structure o f the entities that our 
concepts refer to. But it would be very dangerous indeed to think that, say, grammar 
reflects the structure of reality. Just consider all the linguistic paradoxes, such as the 
Liar. There are of course problems with the group of natural kinds as well; the question 
seems to be whether the Kripke-Putnam semantic framework is committed to 
essentialism or not. And many (cf. Mellor 1977, Salmon 2005, Mackie 2006) seem to 
think that it is not. 1 fully agree with this, it would be incredible i f a theory of semantics 
constrained our metaphysical choices. 
In fact, 1 think that the whole setting of the question is misguided: there should be no 
controversy over whether language is a guide to metaphysics - the question is rather to 
what extent is our language restricted by metaphysics. Clearly, any connection between 
language and metaphysics w i l l be loose, as we often say things that make very little 
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sense, but arguably there must be something that language and grammar are based on, 
and in what follows I wi l l demonstrate that this basis is metaphysical. 
The idea of language being a possible basis for many philosophical problems and our 
rational activities in general has been noted in passing in many of the preceding chapters 
(and wi l l once again be discussed in the next one), and it is often the first objection 
raised by the relativist. For instance, the Kantian line of thought that our system of 
categorisation is based on a certain linguistic or mental framework, which might be 
different for rational agents other than humans, is regularly contrasted with the 
Aristotelian line that I have been defending. It is difficult, i f not impossible, to offer a 
conclusive argument for one or the other, but at least we can see how the different 
approaches fare in terms o f specific examples. Given the enormous attention that the 
status of natural kind terms has received, perhaps this particular discussion would be 
appropriate for our survey. For the sake of brevity, I w i l l here focus primarily on 
Putnam's discussion of the matter. 
Natural kinds are both semantically and metaphysically a problematic class: they seem 
to elude simple, and sometimes even complicated definitions, yet intuitively they should 
have well-defined boundaries. Putnam introduced many of his familiar ideas about 
natural kind terms already in the paper 'Is Semantics Possible?' (1970). One of the first 
things that he points out is that although natural kinds such as lemons have 'defining 
characteristics', merely listing these characteristics can never be enough to define 
natural kinds, because there may be, for instance, abnormal members of the kind, such 
as green lemons (p. 140). Plausibly, the defining characteristics of natural kinds emerge 
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because of some more fundamental features o f the kind in question, what Putnam calls 
the 'essential nature' of the kind (ibid.). The problem that remains is that it is science 
which determines what these more fundamental features in fact are, and science is a 
fallible discipline. In other words, our beliefs concerning the most fundamental features 
of natural kinds are subject to revision. Now, clearly, the essential features themselves 
cannot change, but we might have gotten our story about them wrong. Thus we have no 
means to reliably f ix our conceptual scheme according to the genuine essential features 
of natural kinds, yet we generally think that we use words like 'lemon' and 'tiger' 
accurately and that we do grasp the genuine essential features of the kind in question. 
This story is quite familiar to us and its upshot is as follows: 
Even if cats turn out to be robots remotely controlled from Mars we will still call them 'cats' [...]. 
Not only will we still call them 'cats', they are cats [...]. But the fact that a term has several possible 
uses does not make it a disjunctive term; the mistake is in trying to represent the complex 
behaviour of a natural kind word in something as simple as an analytic definition. (Putnam 1970: 
143.) 
This is the lesson of semantic externalism, but Putnam still needs to reconcile it with the 
ordinary usage of natural kind terms. The crucial idea here is to associate stereotypes 
(the characteristics of a normal member of a particular kind) with the correct natural 
kind. And here, new problems emerge. Consider 'aluminium' and a qualitatively 
indistinguishable metal 'molybdenum'. Putnam (1970: 150 f f ) asks us to imagine a 
colony of English-speaking people on a spaceship, travelling towards a distant planet. 
None of them can recall the atomic weight or any other defining characteristics of 
aluminium or molybdenum. They have both these metals with them and they guess 
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which one is which, incorrectly, as it happens. What can be done to preserve the 'normal' 
meaning of aluminium? There is not really anything that can be done i f we want to 
maintain a purely conventionalist account: apparently the convention has changed 
within this colony. 
However, Putnam suggests that with the help of a test the colonists could be guided 
towards the normal use of 'aluminium'. This test is supposed to fix the extension of 
'aluminium', thus: 'Meaning indeed determines extension; but only because extension 
(fixed by some test or other) is, in some cases "part of the meaning" (p. 151).' I take it 
that the test in question is some kind of a scientific test. And there has to be a test, as 
clearly the stereotype by itself does not suffice to fix the extension of natural kinds. But 
Putnam continues: TMothing normally need to be said about the extension, however, 
since the hearer knows that he can always consult an expert i f any question comes 
up' (ibid.). 
This suggests that no one else apart from experts can grasp extensions, no one else 
except experts really knows how to use language correctly; indeed, no one else can have 
knowledge o f essences. This seems to leave us in quite an awkward situation, for an 
expert on aluminium is probably not an expert on cats or whales, and an ordinary 
speaker is presumably not an expert on anything. The fact that we can consult such 
experts hardly gives us much comfort, for it would be quite a task to find one whenever 
we want to make sure that we are using natural kind terms correctly. Naturally this is 
not what Putnam had in mind, just the possibility of doing this is sufficient for him. But 
it seems that it gives us unreasonable liberty: we do not check our stereotypes very 
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often, in fact, how are we even able to know when they fail? 
The colony of English-speakers was unaware of its mistake, but i f we think about it, 
perhaps it was not a very serious mistake. It is important to note here that everyone in 
the colony already knew that the kind aluminium actually exists. Furthermore, and this 
is what Putnam does not take into account: they all had grasped the essence of the kind 
aluminium (given that they knew what aluminium is). That is to say that everyone can 
grasp essences, all rational human beings are capable o f doing this, not only experts. 
What is (mostly) the task of experts, is to verify (or falsify) our initial classificatory 
scheme concerning natural kinds. Often this requires a lot of work, but once the work is 
done, anyone who understands the notion 'natural kind' certainly understands what 
natural kind terms refer to, namely the deep-structure of the kind - its essential features. 
Thus, in one sense, the members o f the English-speaking colony were able to use the 
concept 'aluminium' correctly at all times, because they knew that it has been verified 
that the natural kind aluminium actually exists. They failed simply in ostension: they 
pointed to the wrong material. 
To make the case a bit more substantial, suppose that no one in the colony (or, indeed, 
on Earth) has ever heard of molybdenum, and they think that all the aluminium-like 
metal they have encountered is aluminium, but some of it is in fact molybdenum. This 
would perhaps be a mistake of a more serious kind, but in no way more disastrous for 
the account at hand, because we know that the empirical story is always subject to 
revision. I f it turns out that what we think was aluminium is sometimes molybdenum, 
then the class o f natural kinds would simply have a new member: molybdenum. But just 
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the fact that we sometimes treated molybdenum as i f it was aluminium does not mean 
that we had not grasped the essence of aluminium. In fact, this is ontologically quite 
uninteresting, and linguistically too. A scientist might be enthusiastic over a finding like 
this, but it gives us no reason to modify our ontology or semantics (except, of course, in 
the sense that we would need a word for the other aluminium-like metal: molybdenum). 
Let me try to explain how the account I am sketching differs from Putnam's. What 
Putnam emphasises, especially in 'The Meaning of "Meaning"' (1975b), is the social 
aspect of language, that is, extension is partly determined socially. This is already 
implicit in the use o f 'stereotypes', which were introduced in his 'Is Semantics 
Possible?'. The problem with stereotypes is that they tend to be inaccurate, and in fact 
contingent. For instance, we associate all kinds of stereotypes with water: the stuff that 
comes from the tap, rains from the sky and fills the lakes. However, hardly any of this is 
essential for water. Of course, what is usually considered to be an essential feature o f 
water is that it is H 2 0 ; and being able to distinguish water from liquids with different 
chemical compositions, say XYZ, is something that Putnam associates with expert 
speakers. This is of course right because only experts can actually verify that water is 
H 2 0 ; only they know it by first hand experience. Consequently, Putnam's case for the 
social aspect of language is based on the fact that expert speakers give us new 
information about the world. A l l this may sound fine, but it underestimates the skills of 
normal speakers. 
Consider tigers. My dictionary describes tigers as very large solitary cats with a yellow-
brown coat striped with black, native to the forests of Asia. Most people would be quite 
happy with this definition. But scientifically, as well as in terms of the deep structure of 
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natural kinds, it is clearly not a satisfactory definition. We would rather have to say 
something about the genetics of tigers. It should also be mentioned that there are eight 
different tiger subspecies (of which three are extinct) and so on. Again, this is something 
that expert speakers would tell us. Indeed, it seems to me that we cannot talk about 
anything (or at least about any natural kinds) without the help of these so called experts, 
because in the end, natural kind terms always reflect the scientific framework. But I do 
not think that this means that only expert speakers know what they are talking about. 
It seems to me that the semantics of natural kinds follow a very simple pattern. Putnam 
has outlined this pattern, but his account does not adequately explain how the expert 
speakers differ from ordinary speakers. Like I noted above, I do not think that expert 
speakers have a privileged access to natural kinds. Non-experts might be satisfied with 
the dictionary definition of'tiger', which is more or less a description o f what tigers look 
like, but even the dictionary definition contains one crucial word: 'cat'. 'Cat' is of course 
another natural kind term, which connects tigers with a broader classificatory 
framework. What I want to say here is that every speaker, be it an expert or a normal 
speaker, relies on the same underlying structure, the same classificatory framework, 
when trying to put tigers in the right place. Putnam hints towards something like this 
when he talks about semantic markers: 
Not only do such features as 'animal', 'living thing', 'artifact', 'day of the week', 'period of time', 
attach with enormous centrality to the words 'tiger', 'clam', 'chair', Tuesday', 'hour1; but they also 
form part of a widely used and important system of classification. The centrality guarantees that 
items classified under these headings virtually never have to be reclassified; thus these headings 
are the natural ones to use as category-indicators in a host of contexts. (Putnam 1975: 267-68.) 
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Putnam derives the idea of semantic markers from Fodor and Kate, and integrates it 
with his own idea of stereotypes. For Putnam, this is only a small clarification, but for 
my purposes, this is the central part of the theory.1 0 7 When someone asks what a 'tiger' 
is, 1 think that the question is really 'to which locker do tigers belong?'. Some 
stereotypes associated with tigers, such as 'carnivore', are in fact very heavily loaded 
with categorical information. For when I turn to my dictionary, the word 'carnivore' is 
explained to be associated with mammals of the order Carnivora, which comprises the 
cats, dogs, bears, hyenas, weasels, civets, raccoons and mongooses. So, the reference-
fixing of natural kind terms clearly includes two stages: 
1. the 'classification', i.e. to which 'locker' the natural kind term could belong to 
2. the scientific account which verifies the connection between the most plausible 
potential 'locker' and the deep structure o f the natural kind 
When we refer to tigers, we always aim to refer to the deep structure, the actual 'locker' 
that the natural kind 'tiger' belongs to. 1 0 8 The scientific explanation associated with that 
'locker' gives us the details and makes sure that our initial classification corresponds 
with the actual categorical structure of reality. The latter part is, as has been noted, 
subject to revision. Accordingly, something like tigers turning out to be robots would 
not be disastrous for the picture. Indeed, the word 'tiger' would, at least at first, still refer 
also to the potential cat-like animal, although eventually this convention might change. 
Nevertheless, the revisability of the empirical verification is built in the framework. 
1071 should perhaps note that my point only concerns natural kinds, not things like days of the week. 
108Putnam (1990: 62-63) has expressed some sympathy towards this sort of view. 
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The upshot of this account is that the semantics of natural kind terms are fundamentally 
linked with the ontology of natural kinds. But it is important to see that the order of 
explanation is not from semantics to essentialism concerning natural kinds, but rather 
from essentialism to this particular semantic framework. That is, we classify things into 
natural kinds because nature is in fact organised according to a certain categorical 
structure. This does not mean that our conceptual framework accurately corresponds 
with the actual categorical structure, but what is guaranteed, due to the self-
correctiveness o f science, is that slowly our framework approaches the actual structure 
of reality. Putnam's story about these matters is very much on the right lines, but I hope 
to have made it clear how we should develop it. Firstly, both normal and expert speakers 
rely on the very same classificatory framework, and secondly, the most important 
features of this framework can be reduced to matters of ontology. With these revisions 
in place, it appears that our understanding o f the semantics o f natural kind terms is in 
good shape. 
I f the account I have sketched is correct, we have a compelling case for the priority of 
metaphysics over language in at least one case. It is plausible that this is a proof of a 
more general dependency relation. As Putnam noted in the previous quote, a central 
feature of our language is that it is replete with systems of classification. My opponent 
would claim that the different classificatory systems that we use, even ontological ones, 
are based on language. But what is language based on? Surely there would be natural 
kinds and other kinds of entities even without language - without any rational agents 
whatsoever. To say that the structure of reality is dependent on us talking or thinking 
about it is an incredibly arrogant and anthropocentric claim. I f it is true, then how did 
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language originate? 
Perhaps the only way to uphold the thesis that language has a fundamental status which 
does not reduce to anything else is to adopt the idea suggested by Chomsky (1965), 
namely that humans have an innate universal grammar. Obviously this is a rather 
controversial idea as well. The idea of a universal grammar is not the problem, in fact 
the common origin of the various human languages can very easily be explained on the 
lines of what 1 have suggested above. But to postulate that the universal grammar is an 
innate idea certainly requires further motivation. Is it not more likely that we have 
adopted certain systems of classification because there are in fact certain categorical 
constraints in the world: some entities are living, others not; some particles have an 
electric charge, others are electrically neutral. The need for a system of classification 
arises because these different kinds of entities have different causal powers. And 
different entities have different causal powers because of their distinct natures - because 
they are entities of different kinds. It is important to remember that this by no means 
implies that our language and grammar accurately reflect reality. Certainly, some of the 
features o f our language are due to the nature of our linguistic and rational capabilities, 
which quite plausibly are distinct to humans. But in many cases our systems of 
classification are universal, namely, rational agents other than humans, e.g. aliens o f 
some kind, would presumably classify most natural kinds in a manner equivalent to our 
own. Unfortunately we have no means to test whether this is true, but it surely sounds 
more feasible than the claim that, say, the structure of the periodic table of elements is 
merely due to the specific way in which humans see the world. 
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In conclusion, although the origins of language may remain elusive, the order of 
explanation should now be settled: language is by no means a fundamental part of the 
world, and it can only be a guide to metaphysics in the sense that it reflects our prior 
metaphysical system of classification. 
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13. When are Metaphysical Debates Substantial? 
Every so often it is suggested that a certain metaphysical debate is meaningless - merely 
linguistic or non-substantial. In fact, there are philosophers who insist that this is the 
case with all metaphysical debates; others would only grudgingly admit that any 
metaphysical debates lack substance. In this chapter I wi l l address the worry that many 
metaphysical debates might be non-substantial and thus the role o f metaphysics 
undermined. However, I do not wish to insist that all metaphysical debates are 
substantial, rather, I wi l l take the middle way and suggest that some debates in 
metaphysics are indeed only conceptual or non-substantial, while the majority are very 
much worthwhile. The issue that emerges is that somehow we ought to be able to 
determine when metaphysical debates are substantial and when they are not. This is not 
always a very easy task, as we wi l l see when we consider some potential criteria for 
determining the status of problematic debates. In what follows I wi l l demonstrate the 
main problems with the help of familiar debates in metaphysics, and, by analysing these 
cases, establish some guidelines for potential criteria concerning individual debates. 
The famous example of Carnap and the Polish logician, due to Putnam (1987: 16 f f . ) , 
must be one o f the best known cases o f an allegedly non-substantial metaphysical 
debate, and wi l l serve as a starting point. 1 0 9 We wi l l also briefly look at the debate 
between three- and four-dimensionalism, which has received attention exactly in regard 
to its potential superficiality - it has been suggested that the two positions are in fact 
metaphysically equivalent (Lowe and McCall 2003, 2006; Miller 2005a, 2005b). The 
109There are plenty of other well-known cases that could serve as an example, Peacocke (1988) lists 
some of them. 
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third example that we wi l l consider concerns atomism and its rival, the theory of 
atomless 'gunk'. I wi l l argue that this debate is metaphysically substantial and examine 
why this is so. Additionally, some recent contributions to the metaontological problem 
at hand, i.e. when metaphysical debates are substantial, deserve attention. I wi l l discuss 
Cian Dorr's (2005), Eli Hirsch's (2002, 2005) and Kristie Miller's (2005c) views. 
Finally, I w i l l introduce a methodological tool which is based on a relation I call 
truthmaker latching. The purpose of this tool is to help us to determine when 
metaphysical debates are substantial. 
First, recall Putnam's example. He asks us to consider a world with three individuals, 
x l , x2 and x3. Then it is asked: how many objects are there in this world? I f we follow 
the Carnapian line, the answer is a straightforward 'three', but i f we side with the Polish 
logician and the Lesniewski line o f reasoning, i.e. i f we endorse mereology, the answer 
is 'seven'. We might go as far as 'eight' i f we decide to count the so called 'null object'. 
According to Putnam, we have a case o f conceptual relativity at hand, and thus the 
debate is merely linguistic - we cannot settle the debate because the answer is always 
relative to the choice o f a conceptual scheme. Let me note at this point that I agree with 
Putnam about this debate being non-substantial, albeit my reasons for thinking so differ 
from his. 
Consider what the disagreement between the different views might amount to. On the 
face of it, the question seems to be whether to count mereological sums as objects or 
not. The answer to this question would seem to depend on the ontological status of 
mereological sums. It could be argued that mereological sums are just fictional entities 
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and should not be counted as genuine objects at a l l . 1 1 0 According to this story, an object 
which consists of my nose and the Eiffel Tower is just a convenient fiction. However, 
this is not what Putnam tried to establish. More recently, Putnam (2004: 43) has 
clarified that he considers the Carnapian way of talking and the mereological way of 
talking as optional languages, i.e. we can decide whether to adopt either one of them, 
while the question of whether mereological sums really exist is just a 'silly question'. It 
appears then that Putnam is unwilling to even start to consider the possibility that we 
might make some sense of the question. But this is a much too hasty decision. Surely 
we can agree at least about the fact that the issue at hand reduces to the ontological 
status of mereological sums. 
It is, however, possible to take Putnam's point about the optional languages even i f his 
general line is too pessimistic. For mereology is an optional addition to our language 
and thus we can distinguish between languages which have not been enriched with 
mereology and the ones that have - nothing metaphysically substantial depends on the 
issue. Indeed, as van Inwagen (2006) has recently pointed out, to treat 'mereological 
sums' as a stand-alone general term seems to be a very problematic thing to do. That is, 
mereological sums are not a special kind of object, rather 'mereological sum' just means 
'object that has parts'. This is quite clearly of utmost importance when we try to make 
sense of a debate over whether mereological sums 'really exist' or not - or about 
whether this debate is meaningful or not, as the case may be. I f van Inwagen is right, 
there is a logically consistent way in which we can talk as i f every object is a 
mereological sum. Then again, we may choose not to. What is important for the case at 
hand, however, is that because of the very nature of mereological sums, i.e. that they are 
1 lOOr indeed that there are no 'mereological sums', on the lines of Merricks (2001). 
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not stand-alone general terms, the initial question that Putnam put forward, concerning 
the number of objects in a world, has very little to do with mereology. 
This is by no means the only problem that we wi l l face. Even i f we ignore van 
Inwagen's take on mereology for the time being, there are serious difficulties in the way 
that the initial question was set up. Putnam says nothing about what kind of individuals 
we are working with, nor about the relations that they might have with each other. 
Surely, even i f we have a theory of parthood and composition to refer to, any answer to 
Putnam's question would require information as to whether the individuals at hand can 
be in such an arrangement that they compose a further object. Consequently, the 
question, and thus the debate, is obviously underdetermined. 
Perhaps this is not a very surprising conclusion, as the whole question is artificial. It is 
all the more striking that Putnam derives some very strong results from this very 
example, namely that conceptual relativity is a common feature of all metaphysical 
debates. My quarrel with Putnam, then, is not so much about this particular debate, but 
about the unwarranted conclusions that he makes on the basis of this debate. We have 
seen other reasons to doubt these conclusions in many of the previous chapters. 
Nevertheless, I do think that the question 'How many genuine objects are there in the 
world?' is a metaphysically substantial one. It is not necessarily a particularly interesting 
question, or even one that we could ever provide an answer to, but, in theory, there is a 
substantial answer which depends on the identity and existence conditions of different 
kinds of entities. Clearly, we cannot even begin to contemplate what the answer might 
be before we have settled questions about composition and identity, but I see no reason 
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to suspect that these preliminary questions could not eventually be settled. Putnam's 
example presupposes a world where these substantial ontological questions have already 
been resolved (except for the ontological status of mereological sums) and we know that 
there are only three individuals. To ask how many objects there genuinely are in that 
world is just unintelligible. We can really come up with any answer we like i f 
mathematical tools such as mereology enrich our language. 
Unfortunately, not all cases can be settled as easily as this. Before we look at a few 
other examples, we should address the more general line of thought that motivated 
Putnam's treatment of the previous example. This is the line of thought according to 
which all or most metaphysical debates are meaningless. For Putnam, this view emerges 
from his relativist agenda, although it should be mentioned that more recently he has 
weakened this thesis."1 But there are others who end up with very similar conclusions 
from, supposedly, non-relativistic grounds. 1 have in mind especially Eli Hirsch (2005) 
and Cian Dorr (2005), who both defend a view that could perhaps be dubbed 
'ontological charity', i.e. when two groups of speakers are in conflict, we can often settle 
the debate with a 'charitable interpretation', as it is very likely that their disagreement 
reduces to linguistic matters. In other words, whatever the underlying ontology of, say, 
composite objects is, we can always reduce different ways of talking about them to that 
same ontology, provided that this way of talking is internally consistent."2 
What is crucial about Dorr's and Hirsch's views is their scope. Dorr only discusses the 
status of the special composition question, but his arguments seem to suggest that the 
lllPutnam made this concession in his closing address at the 'Putnam @ 80' conference celebrating his 
80111 birthday at U C D in March 2007. 
1 l2This is a simplification of their views, but captures the thrust of the argument. 
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situation might be the same with most ontological debates. Interestingly, Dorr himself 
tries to defend a certain answer to the special composition question on these grounds, 
namely the nihilist one. Hirsch, on the other hand, argues that many debates over the 
ontology o f (highly visible) physical objects are merely verbal - these naturally include 
questions about composition. What seems to be crucial for both Dorr and Hirsch is a 
certain doctrine not unlike the idea of optional languages that we discussed in Putnam's 
case. This doctrine, known as quantifier variance, states that the linguistic decisions that 
we make determine the meaning of the existential quantifier, that is, the meanings and 
truth-values of sentences stating that something exists are determined by our linguistic 
decisions (cf. Hirsch 2002). Stated like this, the doctrine seems to presuppose a certain 
account of meanings, namely that the meanings of sentences are determined strictly in 
terms of linguistic decisions; they are agreements. Thus, the existence of something like 
the fusion o f my nose and the Eiffel tower - the meaning of the sentence stating that 
such a fusion exists - is determined by our interpretation of the existential quantifier. I 
find this approach deeply flawed. 
Surely, the meanings and truth-values of sentences must have something to do with how 
things are in the world, otherwise they would be quite uninteresting to start with. The 
idea of optional languages is fine as far as it goes, as we saw with Putnam's classic 
example, but no one, as far as I know, has suggested that there would be anything 
ontological at issue at this level. In a very trivial sense, quantifier variance is quite 
acceptable, indeed, it was already Humpty Dumpty who taught us this by stating that 
the meanings of the words that he uses are determined by the linguistic decisions that he 
makes. What is at issue here is of course the fact that one way of talking, one way of 
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fixing the references of words, and indeed one way of interpreting the existential 
quantifier must be closer to the way that things actually stand in the world than the 
others. Theodore Sider (forthcoming) expresses this by saying that some candidate 
meanings 'carve the world at the joints' better."3 The challenge for the defenders of 
quantifier variance is to demonstrate that there is anything more than the trivial, 
ontologically uninteresting sense to it. Presumably the argument would be that in cases 
where we can, with the help of a charitable interpretation, reduce seemingly conflicting 
sentences to the same ontology, there is a case o f quantifier variance at hand and the 
debate is merely verbal. Sometimes this really seems to be the case - Hirsch's claim is 
that this is the case with most debates over physical objects - but Hirsch never 
demonstrates this. He (2005: 90) takes Sider to be the only proponent of'deep' ontology 
who has addressed his challenge and Sider's approach of denying different possible 
languages the only feasible strategy o f doing this. But it seems that it is Hirsch himself 
who needs to provide further evidence. Interestingly, he nevertheless insists that 
quantifier variance is compatible with realism. I have already acknowledged the trivial 
sense in which this is so, but it is hard to see how Hirsch could say anything very 
interesting i f this was really the case. A closer look at Hirsch's understanding of truth-
conditions reveals where the problem lies. 
Hirsch (2002: 69 ff . ) examines two optional languages inspired by David Lewis and 
Peter van lnwagen and compares them with ordinary English. The claim is that the 
'deep' way to approach ontological questions represented by Lewis and van Inwagen is 
inferior to the 'shallow' approach endorsed by Hirsch, which just restates the sentences 
1131 do not wish to consider the technical implications of quantifier variance here, Sider (forthcoming) 
has already done this in sufficient length. 
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of ordinary English. The thrust of the argument relies on the idea that we should always 
prefer the language that is closest to commonsense English, and it would appear that the 
ontological claims that Lewis and van Inwagen make are not true in commonsense 
English. The upshot of this view is that the theoretical considerations that Lewis and 
van Inwagen have put forward for their views are of little importance: sentences uttered 
by the typical speaker of English are false both in Lewis' and van Inwagen's language. 
However, something is seriously amiss here: how does it follow that the commonsense 
speaker has priority over Lewis and van Inwagen? It would appear that nothing that 
Hirsch says gives us any reason to choose one over the others. To be fair, we must 
acknowledge that commonsense English should be preferred i f there are no theoretical 
considerations to support a different choice. Hirsch's point, I suppose, is that we really 
have no plausible theoretical considerations to rely on, and thus commonsense English 
automatically maintains priority. To support his view, Hirsch appeals to the idea o f 
charitable interpretation"4: 
If you simply set yourself the task of interpreting in the most charitable way possible the language 
of our community, you cannot avoid the conclusion that the ontological sentences typically 
accepted by the community are true in that language, in the strictest and most literal sense. (Hirsch 
2005: 90.) 
This can certainly be challenged. No matter how charitable one is, there are cases in 
which the commonsense view of the 'community' is arguably quite mistaken, not to 
mention cases where we simply lack the information needed to determine what is true. 
Take the case of the bronze statue and the lump of bronze. No doubt the non-
1 HAdmittedly, Hirsch (2005: section V) attempts to address this concern, but his treatment certainly does 
not warrant the general conclusion about the status of metaphysical debates concerning physical 
objects, even though I am inclined to reach a similar conclusion about some of them. 
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philosopher would say that the bronze statue and the lump of bronze are a single object, 
as the 'commonsense' view is that two things cannot exist in the same place at the same 
time. Well, this is of course true of things of the same kind, but, as is well demonstrated 
in the literature (e.g. Lowe 2005a), it is quite plausible that two different kinds of 
entities can occupy the same space-time location, as in the case of the bronze statue and 
the lump of bronze. There is an abundance of examples like this, and to claim that the 
commonsense approach wins in every case seems very questionable. So, Hirsch 
seriously oversimplifies matters: even i f he was right and the commonsense view were 
true in (almost) every case, there is certainly a lot o f work to be done before anything 
like that can be established. 
Hirsch is guilty of trying to derive a general conclusion about the status of metaphysical 
debates from very little material, as Putnam was in a lot more serious sense. One thing, 
then, should be clear: as tempting as it might be to try to argue that all, most, or indeed 
even some metaphysical debates are substantial or non-substantial, depending on your 
preferences, it is very unlikely that this can be easily established. I suppose that the 
situation slightly favours a relativist approach, say, along the lines of Putnam - but an 
approach like that certainly has its own, very serious problems, as has been 
demonstrated in earlier chapters. So, the kind of project that Hirsch and Sider are 
pursuing, from opposite ends, faces the same problem: they would have to go through 
each metaphysical debate and either show that there is a translation between the two 
approaches (cf. Hirsch), or that there is a deep, ontological issue at hand (cf. Sider). 
Establishing either one wi l l be a long and hard task indeed, and in the end it seems 
likely that there are both substantial and non-substantial debates (even in the realm of 
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highly visible physical objects which Hirsch's project concerns). 
Another recent attempt on these lines is due to Miller (2005c). She systematically 
examines features of metaphysical theories that would be relevant in judging whether 
they might be metaphysically equivalent, such as inter-translatability and empirical 
equivalence, but also less decisive features such as explanatory power and simplicity. 
However, as Miller (2005c: 67) acknowledges, the criteria that she provides for 
determining whether there exists a correct translation between two theories are 
necessary, but insufficient. Therefore, the problem is that even i f all the criteria are met, 
we are not quite in the position to say that two theories are equivalent. The definition of 
metaphysical equivalence that she offers is simple enough: two theories are equivalent i f 
they have the same truthmakers. The question is, how do we settle whether they do have 
the same truthmakers or not? This, of course, is the same problem that I noted above 
with Hirsch. What really needs to be done is to settle i f it is possible that reality might 
admit different sets of truth-conditions for the opposing views, that is, whether Lewis 
and van Inwagen, for instance, hold views which are incompatible with each other, but 
the actual world might turn out to be compatible with either one. 
Of course, we can make some progress. For example, Miller (2005a: 14, 2005c: 58) 
quite correctly points out that part of the disagreement between three- and four-
dimensionalists is the fact that their theories presuppose a different understanding of 
mereology and thus is not a cause for a substantial metaphysical disagreement, as the 
mereological assumptions come from within the theory."5 Consequently, three- and 
115The crux of the 3D/4D debate is that objects are extended either in only the three spatial dimensions, 
or also in the fourth dimension, i.e. time, and thus that objects persist either by enduring or perduring 
(see e.g. Miller 2005a). 
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four-dimensionalists would have to have other reasons for disagreement i f the debate 
was substantial. Certainly, they would claim to have such reasons, and in general, one 
can always insist that there are some 'unobservable facts' in the world which would 
corroborate a theory that might otherwise seem equivalent with its competitor (cf. 
Miller 2005c). Maybe this would just be an ad hoc argument, but it does seem hard to 
establish the equivalence between two theories without leaving any room for doubt. So, 
as useful as it would be to have some general criteria for this, it seems that there is 
always an escape route from the general case. Perhaps we can try something else. 
Recall the discussion about the debate between Carnap and the Polish logician. Our 
conclusion was that this is not a substantial metaphysical debate, but rather a 
disagreement about which mathematical framework to adopt. Moreover, the initial 
setting o f the debate is underdetermined and because of this it is compatible with 
radically different accounts. Perhaps other non-substantial debates are similar. I wish to 
take no definite stand in regard to the 3D/4D debate here, but one could raise an 
analogous concern in this case as wel l . " 6 For instance, the particularly hard questions 
about the nature o f time that three- and four-dimensionalists must address make it very 
hard to determine the exact ontological commitments of the theories."7 Until these 
questions have been settled, it might be impossible to tell whether there really is 
something substantial at issue, but it would appear that three- and four-dimensionalism 
treat time like they treat parthood: from within the theory. Thus, whatever the true 
nature of time turns out to be, it could be compatible with both approaches. This would 
116Tb this extent, Hirsch (2005) might very well be right (he specifically talks about the debate between 
four-dimensionalists and mereological essentialists), but as I pointed out above, each case must 
receive an individual treatment. 
117Lowe & McCall (2003) discuss some of these questions, see also Miller (2005a) and Lowe & McCall 
(2006). 
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make three- and four-dimensionalism equivalent in this regard as well, as others have 
argued. 
So, in many cases the answer to the question whether a debate is substantial or not 
depends on unknown factors, sometimes empirical ones. Perhaps the most effective way 
to determine whether a debate is substantial or not is to wait: once further results are 
established, the issue wi l l be settled. This is admittedly a rather negative result and it 
does leave the ad hoc escape of insisting that some (presently) unobservable facts exist 
which would settle the debate. Well, fortunately there is a faster way. Consider this: why 
do we usually believe that a theory differs from another one in some substantial, non-
linguistic way? It should have something to do with how the theory describes the world. 
Now, the truth of the theory depends on whether there are appropriate truthmakers in the 
world, and what I suggested above was that maybe we should just wait and see i f there 
in fact are any appropriate truthmakers in the world. However, at this point the debate is 
over in any case. To be able to determine whether two theories refer to the same 
truthmakers we have to know something about the method of how the theory latches on 
to them. Even i f the existence of the suggested truthmakers is unknown, we can still see, 
judging by the method that a theory uses to latch on to them, whether it could be 
equivalent with its competitor. For i f the methods are similar, we know that the theories 
must be using the same language. I f there is still disagreement, then the difference 
between the conclusions of the two theories must be something non-linguistic, 
something about the truthmakers of the theories. In what follows I wi l l introduce a tool 
which helps to clarify all this, I have dubbed it truthmaker latching. 
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Perhaps the best way to illustrate what I mean by 'truthmaker latching' is to consider an 
example. I w i l l take the case of atomism and gunk, as it seems fairly clear that this is a 
substantial metaphysical debate. Why is this so? Well, the method of latching on to the 
truthmakers o f the theory seems to be very much similar in both atomism and the gunk 
theory. The debate is over the nature of matter: whether matter is fundamentally 
infinitely divisible, atomless gunk, or whether it consists of some kind of indivisible 
simples, however small. Lacking definite empirical information about the issue, the 
arguments in favour of either view are usually to a priori. Van Inwagen (1990) holds 
that atomism is necessary; Zimmerman (1996) argues that the ontological options 
available for a defender of atomism are unacceptable; and Sider (1993) thinks that at 
least the possibility of gunk should be acknowledged - the status o f gunk in the actual 
world is another question. This debate as well could be non-substantial in at least some 
respects - the debate is related to the discussion about parthood, but mereology as a 
mathematical theory is logically compatible with both atomism and the gunk theory (cf. 
Simons 1987: 41 ff . , Varzi 2006). In other words, any mereological considerations by 
themselves would be quite insufficient for either camp. Here we would indeed have a 
good example of what would clearly be a non-substantial debate: one side defending 
atomism and the other one atomless gunk, but both from mereological grounds. There 
would be nothing substantial at issue. Of course, this does not mean that the debate over 
gunk is non-substantial - the substantial arguments are just not grounded in mereology. 
Although the a priori arguments available to both sides in the gunk debate are various, 
this debate is fortunate enough to have a very clear path to the potential truthmakers. 
Virtually all the arguments concern the possibility of the appropriate truthmakers: 
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whether they would be compatible with already established results and would the 
subsequent ontological ramifications be acceptable. Consequently, it is perfectly clear 
that the difference between the positions lies in the fact that the truthmakers for each 
one would be different. I f indivisible simples exist, atomism is true, i f not, then gunk 
prevails. The upshot of this is that, rather than translating a theory to its competitor's 
language, we should concentrate on clarifying the methodological commitments of the 
theory. What this means in practice is that we must examine how a given theory could 
be true. This applies quite generally: i f we wish to evaluate, say, the thesis that brain 
states are mental states, we must know something about the preconditions of the identity 
claim, i.e. what it would be like i f brain states were mental states. 
Let me take a moment to reconstruct the idea. The propositions put forward by 
competing theories need to be true in virtue of something, i f they are true at all. I f a 
theory is internally inconsistent or refutable by other conclusive means and thus false, 
we need to look no further - this theory can be abandoned. I f two theories appear to be 
feasible and claim to differ, then the difference must be grounded in the truth-conditions 
of the theories; otherwise the debate is merely linguistic. So, once again, to determine 
the status of the debate we need to determine what the appropriate truthmakers would 
be, i.e. what does reality need to be like for each view to be true? This is not always an 
easy question, as we have seen. For instance, in the 3D/4D debate the truth-conditions 
concern nothing less than the nature of space-time. Our understanding of space-time, 
limited as it is, is the major issue here, but it is also possible that it is neutral in terms of 
the 3D/4D controversy. However, the problem is that in this case it is notoriously hard 
to determine the exact truth-conditions for either view, which is what keeps the debate 
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alive. This might be quite frustrating and I cannot blame Hirsch and others too much for 
putting their foot down and trying to settle matters once and for all. However, we should 
be wary of the sort of generalisations that we saw Hirsch to be guilty of. The substance 
of a debate cannot be determined by comparing it to commonsense ontology. Rather, we 
need to examine how the theory latches on to its truthmakers. Some preliminary 
conditions for this analysis are listed below in regard to the theory of atomism: 
1. The central claim(s) of the theory must be identified. In the case of atomism, 
this would be the claim that all matter is composed of indivisible particles."8 
2. The nature of the potential truthmakers must be specified. This is a crucial 
qualification and generally concerns any ancillary assumptions that might be 
implicit in the original claim(s). For atomism, the truthmakers concern physical 
reality, i.e. material objects, and their composition. Furthermore, it needs to be 
specified what we consider as proper parts and whether simples may be 
extended or not (cf. Simons 2004). 
3. Any empirical or logical constraints for the potential truthmakers must be 
acknowledged. These may or may not be relevant depending on the nature of 
the truthmakers. Our example certainly requires a survey of the latest results in 
fundamental physics, which might have some important implications for the 
potential truthmakers (cf. Arntzenius & Hawthorne 2005). Also, there are some 
mathematical constraints that have to be addressed (cf. Zimmerman 1996). 
4. The theory ought to give a detailed account of how we are supposed to 
identify the relevant truthmakers if and when we encounter them. For 
proponents of atomism, this amounts to a physical description based on the 
118For the sake of simplicity, I will ignore any further qualifications. 
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conditions specified in (2) and (3) as well as an account of the status of the 
theory in regard to a completed ontology of physical objects. 
Some of these requirements might seem rather vague, and they clearly leave out 
potential arguments which do not concern the truthmakers per se, but rather, say, 
ontological parsimony or the metaphysical implications o f a theory. Nevertheless, these 
are certainly necessary requirements for any complete account. Keep in mind though 
that we are interested in some guidelines to help us determine whether two theories are 
equivalent or not, not just the validity of one theory. Now that we have the background 
sorted, it is time to consider truthmaker latching in more detail. 
What sort of a relation is truthmaker latching? We have seen that different theories can 
have quite distinct methods o f latching on to their truthmakers and it might thus seem 
that we are really talking about a family of relations here. The crux of the matter, in any 
case, is that there must be a plausible story about what the reality ought to be like for a 
certain theory to be true. Not only that though: for a theory to be in any way defensible 
it should propose some means of verification (or falsification). That is to say that just 
listing the potential truthmakers of a theory is not sufficient, the theory should 
additionally offer a rigorous method of identifying these truthmakers. What could such a 
method be based on? This appears to be the key question: i f we do not have a clear idea 
about our epistemic access to whatever is supposed to make a given theory true, then we 
surely cannot hope to convince our opponent about its validity, or, indeed, to convince 
the sceptic about the meaningfulness of the debate in the first place. 
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Now, it would seem that the only way to determine whether the truthmakers postulated 
by a theory actually exist in the world, thus making the theory true, is to observe them 
directly or indirectly. As cases where we can observe the relevant truthmakers directly 
are generally quite clear to start with, it is the indirect access to truthmakers that we are 
here interested in. Consider temporal parts postulated by four-dimensionalists. What 
would reveal the existence of temporal parts to us? Clearly, no direct observation helps 
to settle matters once and for all and accordingly the arguments tend to concern 
situations where we might acquire support for temporal parts indirectly, such as identity 
through change (cf. Sider 2001: 5): change can be explained as a difference between 
temporal parts, and thus via change we receive indirect evidence of the existence of 
temporal parts. However, due to the indirect nature o f this information, there might just 
be an alternative explanation, as Lowe and McCall have suggested: perhaps 'Change is 
the relative movement, rearrangement, gain or loss o f enduring 3D particles in a 
macroscopic body' (2006: 575). Consequently, identity through change is not a 
satisfactory indirect indicator of the existence o f temporal parts, as three-
dimensionalists could just as well use it as indirect evidence for their theory. 
In fact, it appears that so far neither three- or four-dimensionalists have succeeded in 
providing definite (direct or) indirect evidence for the existence o f the appropriate 
truthmakers of their respective theories. Perhaps such evidence is forthcoming, but 
otherwise we should deem the 3D/4D debate non-substantial. It wi l l not do to insist that 
one of the two theories might still be correct and it is just our epistemic access to the 
truthmakers that has failed; i f a theory is unable to provide definite means to establish 
epistemic access to its truthmakers, then it simply is not a complete theory. 
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The question that remains is how, exactly, are we supposed to establish epistemic access 
to the truthmakers of a given theory? This is the key element of truthmaker latching. It 
also seems that sometimes indirect evidence is misleading, as we saw above, and we 
would do well i f we could come up with a more rigorous method here. To do this, we 
need to carefully analyse the potential truthmakers o f the theory under investigation and 
determine what sort of observable effects their existence might imply. In other words, 
we ought to inquire into the causal powers of the potential truthmakers. 
Consider the atomism/gunk debate again. I f both atomism and gunk are possible, that is, 
i f the actual world could be either atomistic or gunky, then a proponent of either view 
must say something about what it would be like i f their view was the correct one. Then 
they must offer some support for the conclusion that the actual world really is like that. 
So, we can only decide between two competing views, given that they are valid and 
coherent, by considering what the world would be like i f either view was true and then 
checking whether the world really is like either view suggests. Accordingly, i f Sider 
(1993) is right, the atomism/gunk debate would seem to turn to empirical matters, 
whereas van Inwagen (1990) and Zimmerman (1996) attempt to establish the necessity 
of their respective views by a priori means. Clearly, the a priori work needs to be done 
first, but i f a definite solution is lacking after this stage, then we must proceed to analyse 
the causal powers of the potential truthmakers and attempt to determine how the 
existence of these truthmakers would be reflected in the actual wor ld ." 9 We might have 
to turn to our colleagues in the empirical sciences to do this, as might have been 
expected. 
1191 will not dwell in the case of atomism/gunk any longer, nor attempt to analyse it according to this 
scheme. In fact 1 am inclined to think that we can settle this particular debate by a priori means, but 
this obviously does not undermine the scheme itself. 
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In conclusion, our means to determine when metaphysical debates are substantial rely 
on tracing the route from empirical results (when the debate cannot be settled by a priori 
means) to the truthmakers that might manifest themselves via such results, given their 
causal powers. This general method is what 1 have called truthmaker latching. Finally, 
we are in a position to say what sort of a relation truthmaker latching is. Truthmaker 
latching is reducible to the causal powers of truthmakers, but it is not strictly a causal 
relation itself. Rather, it concerns the things that bring forth the causal powers of 
truthmakers, namely, the essences of truthmakers. Truthmaker latching is the relation 
from the essences of truthmakers to their empirical manifestation. When we evaluate the 
validity o f a theory, it is this relation that we focus on, and we should have a plausible 
story about how the theory latches on to its truthmakers. It is by comparing these stories 
that we can determine whether two theories are equivalent: i f the theories latch on to the 
same truthmakers, then the quarrel between them is non-substantial - presumably just a 
different story about the route to the truthmakers. 
The point that I have been trying to make is thus methodological; each metaphysical 
debate must receive an individual treatment, as there are no general criteria for 
truthmaker latching - at least nothing much more detailed than what we saw above. 
However, we can and should say a lot more about each individual truthmaker latching 
story. It is a telling symptom of a serious lack of research into these matters that 
metaphysical debates are deemed substantial or non-substantial on quite arbitrary 
grounds, as I have demonstrated. The best remedy for this is a thorough inquiry into the 
very basics of the theories under scrutiny - it must be made clear what is being said 
before we can evaluate whether the actual world corresponds with it, not to mention to 
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settle i f another theory says the same thing or not. The tools for doing this are certainly 
within our grasp. 
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There seems to be a growing interest towards the methodology of metaphysics from a 
metaphilosophical or metaontological point o f view, as we saw in the previous chapter. 
However, serious dedication to methodological issues in metaphysics is still rare. Most 
philosophers who engage in some kind of metaphysical research do say a word or two 
about methodology, but these passages are usually sketchy at best. A fact that might 
contribute to this is that there is no standard of how metaphysicians should discuss the 
methodology of metaphysics. My aims in this chapter are two-fold: to point out the need 
to discuss methodological issues in metaphysics as well as discuss the way this should 
be done, and to make some suggestions as to what would be the correct methodology 
for metaphysics. 
As to the first point, the need for methodological considerations in regard to 
metaphysics, I believe that we have a clear case. In the last chapter 1 demonstrated that 
to able to determine when a metaphysical debate is substantial, we must compare the 
methodologies o f the competing theories. Naturally, this would be a much easier task i f 
there were some guidelines as to what kind of methodological issues a metaphysical 
theory should address in the first place. Strangely enough, there have been hardly any 
extensive attempts to map these guidelines. Perhaps one reason for this is the apparent 
diversity of approaches that one may take - from the complete denial of the whole 
discipline to extreme idealism. However, I see no reason why this should prevent us 
from setting at least some rudimentary guidelines. There is certainly a call for them, as 
the lack of even a basic common ground seems to be the cause of many redundant 
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debates in contemporary metaphysics. Furthermore, there is simply a complete lack of 
discussion between some approaches. The obvious example that comes to mind is the 
analytic/continental barrier. While I admit that a complete reconciliation is probably out 
of the question, I do think that the search for some common guidelines should be a joint 
effort. I f nothing else, a project like this would help us to determine where, exactly, 
different approaches divide. More often than not even this condition is not met and the 
core of the problem is clouded by terminological or even emotional issues. Having said 
that, I must acknowledge that my approach is guilty as charged, for it is distinctly 
analytic in nature. I hope that I can nevertheless point out some fairly uncontroversial 
guidelines for any metaphysical theory. 
To begin with, we are faced with the obvious problem for any attempt to map general 
guidelines for metaphysics: how can we separate methodological issues from 
ontological presuppositions? Well, any exhaustive account of the methodology of 
metaphysics is bound to end up with at least some ontological commitments, and so 
does the one that 1 wi l l put forward. But perhaps we can identify the issues that divide 
different accounts and come up with a list o f topics that one must address before making 
any specific metaphysical commitments. A natural starting point, although already 
contentious, are the laws of logic. Perhaps such principles as the law of non-
contradiction, or at least a minimal principle of contradiction, i.e. not every statement is 
both true and false, as suggested in Putnam (1978), would work as a starting point. You 
might add a number o f slightly less uncontroversial principles to this list, like the 
principle of bivalence, but of course there are some who would question this move (cf. 
Dummett 1991). Even the law of non-contradiction, as we saw in chapter I I , has been 
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challenged (cf. Priest 2006). I have already addressed these worries, and would hope 
that we can make at least some progress. It is perhaps noteworthy that the three 
principles that are often considered to be the most fundamental philosophical principles, 
i.e. the law of non-contradiction, the law of identity and the law of the excluded middle 
can all be found in Aristotle. Consequently, it might be Aristotle who has best managed 
to characterise some of the most basic methodological guidelines for metaphysics.120 At 
this level the idea is simply that we must agree on the most fundamental requirements 
for rational thought to be able to have any kind of a discussion. The mentioned 
principles are at least good candidates for this. 
Even i f we can agree on principles like the law of non-contradiction, we are certainly 
going to need more common ground i f we hope to say anything substantial about the 
methodology of metaphysics. One question that apparently needs answering is this: 
what is the target of metaphysical inquiry? 1 am afraid that already here we wi l l see a 
number of opposing views. A very general answer to this question might be 'the world' 
or 'reality', or perhaps 'the fundamental structure of reality'. But there are those who 
would rather answer 'the mind' or 'concepts'. Of course, this reflects the debate between 
realism and different kinds of anti-realist views. Maybe we can reach at least a virtual 
agreement though. For no matter what we think about the outside world or the nature of 
reality, there is always going to be something in common with different metaphysical 
theories. Perhaps Strawson's (1959) classic distinction between descriptive and 
revisionary metaphysics would help to illustrate this. 
According to Strawson, descriptive metaphysics describes the actual structure of our 
120Recall the discussion from chapter I: 1. 
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thoughts about the world, whereas revisionary metaphysics tries to produce a better one. 
But even though the descriptive and the revisionary metaphysician might disagree about 
whether we should try to produce a better structure, at least they agree that there is some 
sort of a structure to talk about, and it is the task of metaphysics to say something about 
it. This agreement might be only virtual because there are also those who insist that a 
fundamental study of reality is impossible, or uninteresting. Nevertheless, i f complete 
nihilism is put aside, it seems to me that any honest philosopher has to admit that, 
ideally, philosophy and metaphysics should try to reach as much information about the 
nature of reality as possible. Part of this task may be to define the limits of what can be 
known, but it would be contradictory to assume that the answer is 'nothing'. After all, 
even that is an answer to the question. Strawson's distinction, however, does not help in 
settling the fundamental difference between realist and anti-realist approaches, which 
we wi l l discuss shortly, i.e. does metaphysical knowledge concern our thoughts about 
the world, or the mind-independent structure of the world? This issue has of course been 
touched upon in many o f the preceding chapters and in the end it seems to come down 
to a choice between Aristotelian metaphysics and Kantian metaphysics. At this point, it 
should be quite clear where my loyalties are, but in what follows I wi l l return to this 
issue once more. 
Some further preliminaries should be examined before we advance though. A question 
that certainly needs to be addressed is how do we reach knowledge about metaphysics, 
what is the method of our inquiry? This question might be dubbed epistemological, but I 
think that it is in fact one of the most important metaphysical questions, or indeed 
methodological ones. In any case, this is surely a question that wi l l divide views. Most 
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proponents of metaphysics would probably say that a priori reasoning is the principal 
tool of metaphysical inquiry, but it could also be argued that a posteriori knowledge is 
quite sufficient for metaphysics, as has recently been suggested by Fraser MacBride 1 2 1. 
One has to be very careful here though. The fact that many metaphysicians share the 
view that a priori reasoning is crucial for their discipline does not mean that they agree 
about the exact role that a priori reasoning plays in metaphysical inquiry. For some, a 
priori reasoning might be the only thing that metaphysics is concerned with, while 
others would rather say that we need a combination of a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge. Moreover, and more importantly, metaphysicians have radically different 
views about what a priori reasoning actually is. For instance, my own view about the 
nature of metaphysical reasoning is probably closer to MacBride's than to some of those 
who praise a priori reasoning, but my view about the nature of a priori reasoning is 
certainly different from MacBride's as I hold that a priori reasoning is crucial for 
metaphysical inquiry. So, one thing seems clear: we must add the nature of a priori 
reasoning and its role in metaphysical inquiry, i f any, to our list of key issues that any 
metaphysical theory must address.122 
A related, crucial issue is the degree of certainty that can be reached with the help of the 
chosen method of inquiry. The classic view is that a priori knowledge is certain (and 
necessary), but as 1 have demonstrated, I think that some fundamental revisions are 
needed here, one of them being the adoption of a thoroughly fallibilistic view. Needless 
to say, anyone who claims that absolute certainty can be reached, should be ready to 
present a strong case for that view. It is important to say something about the degree of 
121 MacBride, F., 'Ontological Categories: A priori or A posteriori?', delivered at the Conference On 
Methodological Issues In Contemporary Metaphysics, 6-7 January 2006, Nottingham. 
1221 have of course discussed this already in chapter eight. 
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certainty in any case though, as one should be able to demonstrate that whatever one's 
preferred method of inquiry is, a sufficient level of certainty can be reached with it. Any 
account that admits a posteriori elements in our inquiry, as I believe that we should do, 
quite clearly has to acknowledge that there is always room for error. There are 
numerous ways in which these errors might be minimised, but the most promising way 
seems to be to rely on the scientific method: science has learnt to live with the 
uncertainty o f empirical information and we would do well to take advantage of this in 
metaphysics as well. The initial reaction might be to say that this cannot be done, as 
metaphysics does not deal with empirical verification, whereas this is exactly what the 
methodology of science is based on. 
This reaction is problematic in two ways. Firstly, the only way to uphold the view that 
metaphysics has nothing to do with empirical results is to restrict it just to a priori 
knowledge. While this view might be defensible, the burden of proof is certainly on 
those who hold it, as they wil l have to find a way to explain things like a posteriori 
necessities; these being normally considered to express something metaphysically 
substantial, yet having an important a posteriori part. Secondly, I think that we have 
good reasons to believe that the methodology of science is not strictly based on 
empirical verification, there is in fact quite a lot of a priori reasoning taking place, the 
most obvious example being scientific thought experiments.1 2 3 In short, empirical 
information is not metaphysically innocent. The upshot of this is that we already have a 
rather seasoned method of inquiry which, although not absolutely certain, nevertheless 
reaches a high and consistent degree of certainty and is self-correcting. 
123These issues were discussed in detail in chapters five to seven. 
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Yet another issue that is related to the discussion above is the question of how different 
views about modality might affect the picture. Some of the most important debates 
about metaphysical inquiry are fundamentally debates about the nature of modality and 
one of the key topics here is the necessary a posteriori. It seems that, sooner rather than 
later, any metaphysical theory wi l l have to deal with questions concerning modality. 
Indeed, often some of the strongest arguments in favour of one view or another are 
based on presuppositions about modal truths. Modality has received increasing amounts 
of attention for these very reasons, but even the main contributors rarely approach the 
topic in a methodologically sound fashion, perhaps with the exception of Kit Fine 
(1994, 2002). By 'methodologically sound' I mean an approach that tries to go to the 
very bottom of the problem, that is, tries to give an account o f what modality is, what it 
is grounded in and how many fundamental types of modality there are. Fine's take on 
the matter is that modality is grounded in essences, a view towards which I am very 
sympathetic.124 
The problem with many discussions about modality is that the fundamental questions 
are clouded by technical issues or debates over modal logic. One of the most confusing 
ways to 'solve' problems raised by the necessary a posteriori and the likes of it is the 
system of two-dimensional modal logic. It seems to me that none of the various 
formulations o f it (e.g. Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996) help us to get any closer in 
answering the initial question: what modality is and how can it be grounded. Rather, 
these accounts often presuppose a certain view about modality, generally a conceptualist 
view. At the same time, some philosophers who do use the two-dimensional framework, 
namely Jackson and Chalmers, are using it to argue for some very strong conclusions 
l24See chapter nine. 
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indeed, i.e. for or against physicalism. Now, surely, what one needs before putting 
forward such arguments is a detailed account on what modality is. 
Many of the remarks I made above were very cursory. However, I have discussed all of 
the mentioned topics in detail in previous chapters; and this is exactly because I believe 
them to be some of the most crucial issues concerning the methodology of metaphysics. 
So far, I have mentioned the following issues: 
1. An account of the most basic requirements for rational thought is needed. 
This may consist of such principles as the law of non-contradiction etc. 
2. We need to say something about the target o f metaphysical inquiry. 
3. It must be shown how information about this target is reached, i.e. what is 
the methodology of metaphysical inquiry. This w i l l most likely have 
something to do with a priori knowledge. 
4. Whatever the method of inquiry is, we have to examine what is the degree 
of certainty that we can be reached with it. 
5. At some point we are faced with questions about the modal status of our 
results. So, an account about the nature of modal truths is required. 
Naturally this list does not cover everything, but it is a start. It would certainly be a sign 
of progress i f we could see at least a reasonable attempt to cover these issues when 
philosophers put forward metaphysical theories. Also, this list complements the points 
raised in connection to the method of truthmaker latching, which I introduced in the 
previous chapter, namely, the issues at hand need to be addressed in a complete story 
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about how a theory latches on to its truthmakers. 
Instead of repeating what has been said in previous chapters in regard to the listed 
issues, I wi l l devote rest of this chapter to a topic which is related to all of them: the 
debate over realism. Are the methodological remarks that were made above of any help 
in settling this debate? Well, they might be, i f we approach the problem from a slightly 
different angle. Two recent contributions to the literature, by Kit Fine (2001) and Ted 
Sider (forthcoming), are fairly good examples o f what I have in mind. They both 
challenge the anti-realist approach and argue that there is hardly an intelligible way to 
even formulate a non-sceptical version of anti-realism (which it would need to be to 
have any value). They examine, among others, the views put forward by Dummett, 
Goodman and Hirsch. 1 2 5 
According to Fine (2001: 14), the only plausible challenge to metaphysical realism is 
what he calls 'quietism', whereas Sider is trying to defend his ontological realism against 
'ontological deflationism'. There is an important difference between these two, however. 
For Sider, the challenge is that metaphysical questions are nonsensical, and this indeed 
seems to be what many 'ontological deflationists' have suggested. Fine, however, 
disagrees, as he thinks that the serious challenge is the claim that we cannot find 
answers to metaphysical questions. So, which is the stronger case for the anti-realist: 
that we cannot properly formulate sensible metaphysical questions, or that we are just 
unable to answer them? Well, it seems to me that we can formulate sensible 
metaphysical questions, as both Fine and Sider argue.126 They both also put forward a 
1251 examined the (Putnam-)Dummett-Goodman line in chapter two and Hirsch's approach in chapter 
four. 
126Recall also the discussion from the last chapter. 
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suggestion as to how we might proceed to answer these questions, but these suggestions 
are certainly controversial. It would thus seem that the real challenge is to provide 
answers to metaphysical questions. This is not a bad result though, for as Fine (ibid.) 
notes, i f we do find a way - a working methodology - to answer metaphysical 
questions, then the anti-realist objection is automatically refuted. 
The methodological challenge that metaphysicians face is thus to demonstrate that we 
have the means to settle metaphysical debates, that we have a reliable method of 
metaphysical inquiry. Of all the anti-realist objections that I have addressed in the 
course of this thesis, this seems to be the most reasonable one. Of course, one of the 
aims of this thesis is to pursue exactly this issue, and I have indeed already introduced 
the method of metaphysical inquiry which seems to me to be the most fruitful one. To 
put it in one sentence: we reach information about the (metaphysically) possible ways 
that the world might be with the help of a priori reasoning, which is ultimately grounded 
in essences, and the status of these results in terms of the actual world is determined by 
a posteriori means. 
On the face of it, the method which I have introduced might not fare much better against 
the anti-realist than Fine's and Sider's corresponding suggestions, but my strongest 
argument is perhaps that the anti-realist as well is very much committed to the very 
same method. This is because the modern anti-realist, whether she admits it or not, 
certainly shares the generally accepted scientific world-view with the realists.127 That is 
to say that we do, after all, have some shared ground - some shared assumptions - on 
127And if she does not, we probably have not heard of her - anyone relying on modern communications 
technology is undoubtedly committed to the scientific world-view. 
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which to build. As I argued in length in chapters five to eight, we have good reasons to 
think that science is far from being metaphysically innocent, rather, it is specialised 
metaphysics, subject to the same method of inquiry as metaphysics, albeit with a strong 
emphasis on the empirical part. The upshot is thus that i f my account of the continuity 
between metaphysics and science is correct, then there is very little room for any kind of 
anti-realist metaphysics: only a metaphysical realist can put forward a plausible theory 
about the metaphysical foundations of natural science. 
In conclusion, although it is not the primary concern o f this thesis to discuss the 
methodology of metaphysics as such, but rather to demonstrate that metaphysical 
inquiry is necessary, I hope to have successfully outlined one promising way of doing 
metaphysics. But now it is finally time to formulate the concluding argument of the 
thesis - the argument for the necessity of metaphysics. 
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15. The Necessity of Metaphysics 
1 am now finally in the position to discuss the main argument o f the thesis, the argument 
for the necessity o f metaphysics, in detail. In the course o f the second part 1 have 
demonstrated that everything from the natural sciences to logic, language and truth have 
an intimate connection with metaphysics - are grounded in metaphysics. However, a 
simple and conclusive argument is yet to be established, and admittedly the case-by-
case strategy which I have used can never be enough to demonstrate the necessity of 
metaphysics. Nevertheless, I do hope to have shown that we have very strong reasons to 
think that metaphysics is an extremely influential and important discipline. It is perhaps 
difficult to see what kind of an argument could do the job, as any claim for the necessity 
of metaphysics is surely going to have an endless amount of controversial premises, not 
the least of them which concern the nature of metaphysics. However, I believe that I 
now have everything that is needed at hand. The most important provisional work was 
done in chapters eight and nine, as a priori knowledge and modality are in a central role 
in the argument for the necessity of metaphysics which I am about to put forward. 
The form of my argument is not entirely original. Most of the elements were already 
present in Aristotle, but E. J. Lowe has formulated the idea in contemporary terms. 
Lowe's initial concern is the possibility of metaphysics, but i f the idea is correct we can 
make a stronger claim: 
In short, metaphysics itself is possible - indeed necessary - as a form of rational human inquiry 
because metaphysical possibility is an inescapable determinant of actuality. (Lowe 1998: 9.) 
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This should perhaps sound familiar, given what has been said in previous chapters. The 
central premise here is that metaphysics deals with possibilities - metaphysical 
possibilities - but is not able to determine what is actual without the help of empirical 
knowledge. However, it is crucial for this account that empirical knowledge in itself is 
not able to determine what is actual either, for metaphysics is needed to delimit the 
space of possibilities from which the actual can be 'picked out' by empirical means. 
Basically, the idea is that metaphysics is necessary and prior to knowledge about 
actuality because without it, there would be only an endless space of possibilities, from 
which it would be impossible to pick out the actual. 
The discussion in the previous chapters about the a priori and modality in particular 
follows the pattern just described very closely. As 1 have suggested, the metaphysical 
delimitation of what is (metaphysically) possible is the task of a priori reasoning. That 
is, a priori reasoning is concerned with metaphysical possibilities. Furthermore, I argued 
at length that metaphysical modality is grounded in essences, and thus that essences are 
the fundamental target of a priori reasoning. With these qualifications in mind, the 
argument for the necessity of metaphysics takes the following form: 
1. A l l rational inquiry requires a delimitation of what is possible. 
2. The modal space is exhausted by metaphysical modality. 
3. Metaphysical modality is grounded in essences. 
4. A l l rational inquiry requires knowledge about essences. (From 1, 2 & 3.) 
5. Our epistemic access to metaphysical modality is via a priori reasoning. 
6. A priori reasoning is fundamentally concerned with essences. (From 3 & 5.) 
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7. A l l rational inquiry requires a priori reasoning. (From 4 & 6.) 
How does this line of reasoning imply that metaphysics is a necessary discipline? Well, 
already at stage 4 we seem to have a strong case for this, as knowledge about essences is 
effectively what metaphysics is about, indeed, according to Aristotle metaphysics is the 
science of essences. However, I have not discussed the exact nature of essences at great 
length, and in any case our epistemic access to essences wil l surely be a crucial part of 
the story - this is where a priori reasoning comes in. A priori reasoning, I take it, is a 
form of inquiry which is quite uncontroversially metaphysical. Consequently, all 
rational inquiry is based on metaphysical inquiry. One o f the most interesting 
implications of this is that the natural sciences as well are committed to metaphysical 
inquiry; this was of course discussed in detail in chapters five to seven, where we saw 
that the most important requirement for progress in science is the forming of a 
hypothesis, which is based exactly on a priori considerations. 
Premises 2, 3 and 5 were defended in chapters eight and nine and I wi l l not discuss 
them in detail here. Premise 1, on the other hand, has not been defended in detail. As the 
first premise is perhaps also the most controversial one, I w i l l devote the rest of this 
chapter to elaborating and defending it. The idea that all rational inquiry requires a 
delimitation of what is possible has been touched on in passing in many of the previous 
chapters, but it might almost appear to beg the question. Let me demonstrate why this is 
not the case. 
Firstly, as I have already addressed a number of different anti-realist objections to this 
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project in previous chapters, I wi l l not further concern myself with these. Perhaps the 
best way to illustrate the idea behind premise 1 is to consider an example. Many 
examples that have already been discussed in this thesis would be suitable for this 
purpose, but let us take a completely new one from an area of philosophy which is 
notoriously difficult in regard to a priori considerations, namely philosophy of mind. So, 
consider the basic thesis of the identity theory: brain states are mental states. This is of 
course an a posteriori identity claim and, I take it, currently its status is unsettled. Now, 
the question is, what sort of empirical information could verify this identity claim? We 
certainly have ample information about what happens in our brains, but not even many 
physicalists claim that this is by any means enough to settle the debate. In fact, I think 
that it is fair to say that no amount of purely empirical information wi l l settle the debate 
by itself. Without going into the literature about the 'explanatory gap', it can be said that 
this appears to be the case because we lack sufficient information about the underlying 
a priori identity claim. What this means is exactly that even the possibility of mind-
brain identity has not been sufficiently characterised, nor, of course, has the possibility 
of mind-brain duality. 
The stalemate in contemporary philosophy of mind amounts to just this: the a priori 
delimitation of what is possible has not been completed, at least not in sufficient detail 
to convince the majority of philosophers. What this means is that we do not know what 
sort of empirical information would verify or falsify the identity claim in question. We 
might even already possess this empirical information, but as the a priori work 
regarding the debate has not been completed, the empirical information is of little use to 
us. The same, I think, is true of many other a posteriori identity claims. 
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More generally, the way in which we interpret and analyse empirical information is 
dependent on the a priori delimitation of what is possible. In some cases the a priori 
work has been done long ago1 2 8, whereas some cases seem to elude definite a priori 
characterisation very effectively. As we have seen, the same is true of the natural 
sciences. No amount o f empirical information wi l l settle the most important and most 
difficult questions concerning quantum mechanics; any attempt to interpret the results 
wi l l have to start from metaphysics. For instance, we need to know what kind of 
interaction between photons is possible - what kind of relations could hold between 
them - before we can address the problem of'spooky action at a distance'.129 
Any number o f examples that I give about the need of an a priori delimitation of what is 
possible is unlikely to be enough, so 1 wi l l conclude by emphasising the reasons for this 
delimitation being a universal condition for all rational inquiry. Obviously this has 
something to do with the preconditions o f rational inquiry. These preconditions, as I 
have argued throughout this thesis, must be determined in terms of the target of our 
rational inquiry. As should be clear at this point, my contention is that the target of our 
rational inquiry is the essence of whichever entity we are trying to reach knowledge 
about. I have already discussed our epistemic access to essences in detail, and the 
upshot of this discussion was that we reach knowledge about essences with the help of a 
priori reasoning. However, this is not possible directly, but rather via the modal 
constraints which the essences of the entities under investigation impose. These modal 
constraints are reflected in the space of metaphysical possibilities which is directly 
accessible to our a priori capabilities. Finally, because this is the only way in which we 
128For instance, the a priori part in the identity claim concerning Hesperus and Phosphorus, which was 
discussed in chapter nine, is relatively clear. 
l29Some issues concerning this problem were discussed in chapter five. 
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could possibly acquire information about the natures of the entities under investigation, 
it follows that this process is necessary for any form of rational inquiry. And why is this 
the only way? Well, because of what we have just seen: empirical information by itself 
does not tell us anything about the fundamental natures of the entities that are the cause 
of the observed empirical results. Specifically, purely empirical research does not tell us 
which entity is the cause o f the empirical observations in question. Indeed, empirical 
information is just a manifestation of the causal powers of different kinds of entities, 
and i f we did not know what kind of entities there could be, then we would have no 
means to determine what our empirical observations amount to - they would tell us 
nothing about the fundamental structure of reality. A particularly good example of this 
process is our ability to predict future empirical observations with great accuracy - this 
is only possible because we know something about their fundamental causes, about the 
essences of the entities which are the reason for these empirical observations in the first 
place. 
Al l this, I hope, should be enough to demonstrate that metaphysics is indeed a necessary 
discipline, the first discipline - maybe even the only discipline, insofar as we consider 
special sciences to be concerned with just a small part of being and metaphysics to 




The case for the necessity of metaphysics has now been presented, but a good number 
of other issues concerning metaphysics - what it is, how it should be done and why 
should we engage in it - have also been discussed. The purpose of this thesis is to 
support the renaissance of metaphysics proper, metaphysics as the first philosophy, and 
to demonstrate that realism can hold its place despite the numerous attacks from 
sceptics, relativists and even from those who claim to be (realist) metaphysicians, but 
misconstrue the very nature of the discipline. I would like to conclude the thesis with a 
few words about some very influential philosophers who I have completely omitted 
here, and also to point out some possibilities for future research emerging from this 
project. 
It might seem incredible that I have managed to discuss everything from realism to 
semantics and logic, and hardly mentioning Wittgenstein. I have several reasons for 
doing this. Most importantly, I believe that many of Wittgenstein's ideas are very much 
present in the literature which I have covered (cf. Kant, Carnap, Quine, Putnam, 
Dummett, Jackson and Hirsch). It was never my purpose to focus strictly on individual 
philosophers, even though the structure of the thesis might suggest the opposite, 
especially in regard to the first part. Rather, I have been concerned with the ideas 
themselves, and, as we have seen, most anti-realist objections are very similar in spirit. 
However, there are more specific reasons for not discussing Wittgenstein; they are 
largely the same as the reasons for not discussing Kripke in more detail than I have. 
What I mean is that 1 wish to avoid exegetical matters, and with Wittgenstein more than 
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with anyone else these seem to be unavoidable. 
Something should perhaps be said about the complete lack of continental figures as 
well, such as Hegel, perhaps also Nietzsche. Here my primary reason is simple: I lack 
the relevant expertise for an in-depth discussion about these philosophers' views 
concerning metaphysics. For this reason, it would have been impossible to do justice to 
their projects. Furthermore, although it is certainly no reason to ignore them altogether, 
the conception of metaphysics that these philosophers have is, I believe, so radically 
different from the ones discussed in this thesis that fruitful comparison would have been 
very difficult. Having said that, I am optimistic about the possibility of comparing any 
philosophical systems i f it is done in a piecemeal fashion. The question is, how far can 
we get before a fundamental disagreement, like a disagreement over the law of non-
contradiction, is encountered? Aristotle suspected that this might cause a fundamental 
communication breakdown, and I am inclined to agree. 
I could keep listing important philosophers that I have had to omit for some time, but I 
hope that a very general remark wil l suffice for the rest: even as it stands, the scope of 
this thesis is very broad and it has been necessary to skip many details. Accordingly, 
including any more material would have meant that the thesis would have been little 
more than an overview of different views concerning metaphysics. This was not the 
purpose, and I hope that the balance between historical matters, contemporary topics 
and revisionary content is about right. 
In addition to the main argument, I have put forward some novel arguments concerning, 
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for instance, the a priori, modality and logic. However, in this thesis I have only 
outlined these arguments, and many of them deserve much more careful attention. 
Because of this, I would like to note some potential lines of future research. 
Firstly, more needs to be said about the bootstrapping relationship between a priori and 
a posteriori knowledge which I introduced in chapter eight of the second part. My 
opponent may claim that the examples concerning scientific hypotheses and thought 
experiments are inadequate. Thus, the details of this relationship need to be examined. 
Also, there is a risk of confusing a priori propositions and modal intuitions and it would 
be useful to further clarify the link between apriority and modality. 
Secondly, related to the last point, our epistemic access to modality, which I claim to be 
based on our a priori capabilities, calls for further analysis. In chapter nine of the second 
part 1 derived my case from an analysis of a posteriori necessity, but given the threat of 
pseudo-possibilities that I have introduced, the concern that our epistemic access to 
modality might be thoroughly unreliable needs to be discussed. 
Thirdly, although I hold that all modality reduces to metaphysical modality, there are 
further issues about how specific sub-species of metaphysical modality are related, i.e. 
what is the structure of the modal space. This includes issues about the scope of 
conceptual modality (understood as a sub-category of metaphysical modality), logical 
modality, physical modality, natural modality, and so on. 
These three points are further specifications of the account I have already established, 
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but a number of original topics emerge from the themes of this thesis. These include the 
following. 
Firstly, what is the nature of the grounding relation mentioned in connection to a priori 
knowledge and modality (i.e. the a priori is grounded in modality) and again with 
modality and essences (i.e. modality is grounded in essences)? The notions of 
'grounding' and 'in virtue o f are generally used in connections where the dependence 
between two things is not causal, but something metaphysical or ontological (cf. Lowe 
2005b). It might be fruitful to examine the dependence relation in the mentioned cases. 
For instance, what does it mean, exactly, to say that cats are necessarily animals in 
virtue of the necessary relationship between the kinds 'cat' and 'animal'? Generally, this 
has something to do with the identity conditions of the involved entities, in this case the 
kinds 'cat' and 'animal', and is thus a feature o f essential dependence (ibid.). 
Secondly, what is the role of essences in the picture 1 have sketched? Typically, the 
'essence' of an entity refers to its 'nature' or 'deep structure', but for some it has 
unfavourable, almost mystical connotations. Quine famously argued against 
'Aristotelian essentialism', and indeed, for Aristotle, metaphysics is the science of 
essences. Certainly, essences do a lot of explanatory work in this thesis. The status of 
essentialism in contemporary metaphysics would be a useful thing to examine, and a 
rigorous account of what essences are, following Fine (1994) and the Aristotelian line 
would support the project at hand. 
Thirdly, my account of a priori knowledge seems to leave very little room for certainty, 
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because our means to verify the truth of (non-analytic) a priori propositions are 
fundamentally fallible (i.e. empirical). But surely truth itself cannot be fallible? Well, 
that may be, but 'absolute truth' and 'absolute certainty' are obsolete notions, as I have 
noted. Fallibilism, once you commit to it, pervades your ontology. This does not need to 
be a bad thing, however; science at least has learned to live with it. However, it does 
leave open a number of questions. I f metaphysical inquiry is always fallible, how are we 
supposed to determine when we have feasible results? The process is surely not as 
simple as it is in natural science. Or is it? Furthermore, what is the exact relationship 
between truth and fallibilism? Implicit answers to these questions have been offered, but 
a more detailed analysis is called for. 
Finally, what is metaphysical realism? The answers that 1 suggest to the questions raised 
in this thesis are 'realist', and indeed my conception of metaphysics in genefaTls 
rigorously realist, as I have emphasised repeatedly. The classic realism/anti-realism 
discussion has been covered at some length, but the core of the matter seems incredibly 
elusive. At its simplest, metaphysical realism amounts to the idea that reality is mind-
and language-independent, but what does that mean? Further, and more importantly for 
my conception of metaphysics: what kind of implications does this have for 
metaphysical inquiry? 
These are only some of the issues that emerge from this thesis, and although the line I 
would take in addressing them should be clear, they certainly deserve more attention. 
Nevertheless, my primary goal has been established and I believe that I can safely say 
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